Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA6846
2005-11-21 13:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

NOV. 8 CAUCASUS WORKING GROUP MEETING IN ANKARA

Tags:  PREL MARR MASS TU AJ AM GG KZ RS 
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RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211315Z NOV 05
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1360
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA//
RHMFISS/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU
RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006846 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS TU AJ AM GG KZ RS
SUBJECT: NOV. 8 CAUCASUS WORKING GROUP MEETING IN ANKARA

REF: A. 04 ANKARA 7044


B. ANKARA 6768

Classified By: Counselor for Political-Military Affairs Timothy A. Bett
s for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006846

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS TU AJ AM GG KZ RS
SUBJECT: NOV. 8 CAUCASUS WORKING GROUP MEETING IN ANKARA

REF: A. 04 ANKARA 7044


B. ANKARA 6768

Classified By: Counselor for Political-Military Affairs Timothy A. Bett
s for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) During Nov. 8 Caucasus Working Group discussions, the
U.S. and Turkey shared assessments of the strategic situation
in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The U.S. side briefed on
the Caspian Guard program, and urged the Turks to
participate in the upgrade of Nasosnaya Airbase in
Azerbaijan, to host a Marshall Center conference on enhancing
Azeri-Kazakh security cooperation, and to participate in the
South Caucasus Clearinghouse. Turkey requested the U.S.
coordinate more closely on equipment transfers. End summary.


2. (C) On November 8, the Turkish General Staff (TGS) hosted
bilateral Caucasus Working Group talks in Ankara. The U.S.
delegation was led by OSD Principal Director for Eurasia
Scott Schless. Turkey was represented by TGS J5 Chief of
Strategy and Force Planning MG Serdar Savas. Unlike the last
CWG meeting in Dec. 2004, the Turkish MFA was represented.
Schless and Savas agreed that Turkish and U.S. interests and
policies in the region remain quite close, and that
senior-level dialogue on the Caucasus and Central Asia should
continue.


3. (C) In his opening statement, MG Savas expressed concern
that weak economies in the Caucasus and Central Asia make it
that much harder to solve regional problems. Additionally,
Central Asian countries are vulnerable to Islamic extremism,
and Georgia faces a special threat from infiltrating Chechen
terrorists. According to Savas, security for energy projects
(such as the BTC pipeline) is "essential." He added the (for
Turkey, obligatory) point that Armenian genocide claims hurt
Turkey-Armenia relations, and "hurt our efforts to bring
peace to the region."


4. (C) Schless noted that since the first CWG in 1999, it has
become even clearer that Turkey and the U.S. share many

common policy objectives in the region. Additionally, Turkey
and the U.S. are the two countries most active and involved
in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The U.S. remains most
concerned about the Russian role in the region, energy
security, and frozen conflicts. Schless noted that
Azerbaijan is a "country of priority" for OSD; for its part,
Georgia is eager to join the Alliance, and the U.S. wants to
assist the GOG to be in the best position when it comes time
for NATO to make future enlargement decisions.

Assessment of the Region
--------------


5. (C) Schless pointed out that the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict keeps the U.S. from fully realizing full cooperation
with Azerbaijan. Despite the Minsk Group's best efforts, we
have been unsuccessful in solving the dispute to date. That
said, the two presidents met in May and August and reached
agreement on some issues. Schless added that Turkey -- with
its uniquely close relationship to Azerbaijan -- may be able
help move the process along. Additionally, the prospect of
opening Turkey's border with Armenia might give Yerevan an
incentive to be more flexible in making a deal.


6. (C) Savas responded emotionally to this subject: he
averred that 1.3 million Azeris have been displaced and still
face a desperate situation. "This (situation) is not frozen
for them," he stated. He noted that U.S. policy toward the
region stressed democratization, human rights, free markets,
and not changing borders by force, and asked that this
standard be applied to Armenia as well. The MFA
representative, Department Head for the Caucasus Suleyman
Gokce, took a more positive approach, urging that we take
advantage of the window of opportunity from now until
Armenian elections in early 2007. He added that the onus is
now on Armenia to act responsibly.


7. (C) Turning to Russia's role in the region, Savas believed
that Moscow had been hurt by the popular revolutions in
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan; in turn, this might compel
the Russians to be more realistic in dealing with
Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey seeks to help the countries in the

ANKARA 00006846 002 OF 003


region be fully independent. Given both Russian and Iranian
designs in the region, this is critically important.
However, Savas added, the very fact that these countries'
militaries use Russian equipment is just one example of how
hard it is to break Russian influence. Schless replied that
we share Turkey's view: Establishing fully independent
nations in this region is at the heart of U.S. policy.


8. (C) Turning to Georgia, Schless reviewed President
Saakashvili's proposal for the international community to
help solve the South Ossetia conflict. The United States is
concerned that events there could spin out of control, for
example the "independence day" celebrations and the
subsequent mortar firings on Sept. 20. He noted that the USG
urged the OSCE to take an active role to reduce tensions.


9. (C) MFA's Gokce noted the Oct. 8 Georgian parliamentary
resolution asking the GOG to "take all necessary steps" to
engage with all parties to solve South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
and expressed concern that such a move might provoke the
Russians. Gokce said that the GOT had advised the GOG not to
provoke Moscow unnecessarily. Schless added that the main
U.S. message has been the need to settle these issues
peacefully. While the U.S. has counseled the Georgians not
to be impulsive, putting some pressure on Russia "is not
necessarily a bad thing." The Turkish delegation noted that
while Turkey wanted to assist Georgia's military, the GOT
hoped the GOG would not use the military to solve its
internal problems. Schless agreed: The main goal in building
up Georgia's military was for it to play a useful role in
international coalitions.


10. (C) Schless characterized Abkhazia as "the most frozen"
of the regional conflicts, especially given the extent of
Russian interference. Unfortunately, Russia has not been
able to move away from a "zero sum" mentality and understand
how stable border areas are in its own best interest. For
its part, Georgia must find a way to attract local support in
the area. Savas agreed. (NOTE: We reported ref b on Senior
Adviser for Eurasia Mann's meetings with Turkish MFA
officials the same day on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. END
NOTE.)

Caspian Guard
--------------


11. (C) EUCOM Azerbaijan Desk Officer LTC Scott Sweetser
briefed the Caspian Guard program and security assistance to
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Over the next 6 years, the USG is
planning to spend $130 million for counterterrorism,
counterproliferation, and counter-trafficking efforts. Our
main priorities are airspace and maritime surveillance,
national-level command and control, and enhancing the
militaries' and coast guards' ability to respond to a crisis.
The U.S. side invited Turkey to consider participating with
us in providing upgrades to Nasosnaya Air Base in Azerbaijan,
and also to consider hosting in April 2006 a George C.
Marshall Center conference on bilateral Azeri-Kazakh security
cooperation. (NOTE: Later Savas said that Turkey will
consider the first issue, but he asked that we direct the
conference proposal to the Turkish MFA. MFA officials asked
that the proposal be fleshed out further before we formally
approach them. END NOTE.)


12. (C) Savas responded that Turkey enthusiastically supports
Caspian Guard as a concrete measure in the GWOT. He believed
that the assistance we have provided to Azerbaijan under this
program has contributed to security for the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project, obviously of
great importance to Turkey. Savas asked if Russia had
objected to Caspian Guard; the EUCOM briefer responded that
we had heard no complaints above the 0-6 level.

Central Asia
--------------


13. (C) Schless stated that Central Asia is in a time of
flux, with political, religious, and economic sources of
instability. Russia and China are promoting competing models
of governance, while the U.S. continues to support
independence, democratic reforms, good governance, and free
markets. The flow of drugs into and through the region from
Afghanistan threatens to "rot away" any progress we might
make. Schless asked Savas for his view on the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, which seems to be taking an even

ANKARA 00006846 003 OF 003


more forthrightly negative stance toward the west.


14. (C) Savas agreed with the U.S. assessment, but added that
radical Islam is a growing negative influence in Central
Asia. It is partly for this reason that Turkey has continued
to encourage the Central Asian governments to maintain strong
relations with the west and with NATO institutions. Schless
noted that in the past, Uzbekistan had been more willing to
stand up to Russia and China, but now that U.S.-Uzbek
relations have soured, Karimov may be more willing to
cooperate with Moscow and Beijing. Thus Kazakhstan becomes
all the more important; luckily, Kazakhstan's natural
resources give it an edge in maintaining its independence.
Savas added that the people in Turkmenistan share western
values but are stifled by their government. Turkey will
engage with Shanghai Cooperation Organization members.

Security Cooperation
--------------


15. (C) Both Turkey and the U.S. briefed on our security
cooperation programs in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.
During the briefs, the Turks noted that both countries
provided similar items -- such as radios -- to the Georgians.
TGS argued that the U.S. and Turkish sides should seek to
coordinate these donations more efficiently, perhaps with an
eye toward reducing potential maintenance issues later on for
the equipment. The U.S. side urged Turkey to participate
more fully in the South Caucasus Clearinghouse meetings.
Both sides agreed to consider each other's requests. Schless
closed the meeting by inviting Savas to Washington for the
next CWG.


16. (U) Mr. Schless has cleared this cable.
MCELDOWNEY