THE ANNAN PLAN AND UNTYING THE CYPRUS KNOT:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006774

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2015
TAGS: PREL CY
SUBJECT: THE ANNAN PLAN AND UNTYING THE CYPRUS KNOT:
ANKARA PERSPECTIVES

REF: NICOSIA 1585

(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) In the aftermath of October 3, there may be an
opportunity for us to make a renewed push toward a Cyprus
settlement. Though we hesitate to express even guarded
optimism, we do believe that the time has come for us to take
a hard look at alternative ways forward. We applaud Embassy
Nicosia for its efforts (reftel) to stimulate debate on this
question. Recognizing Embassy Nicosia is best placed to
judge how to influence the Cypriots, we offer the points
below as a contribution to what we hope becomes a vigorous
review of USG Cyprus policy.


2. (C) Reftel proposes that the USG cease public endorsement
of the Annan Plan and stop calling on Greek Cypriots to set
forth their objections to it with clarity and finality. We
appreciate Embassy Nicosia's points about the difficulty in
framing the debate with the Greek Cypriot press and Greek
Cypriot hardliners and defer to Nicosia on how to manage that
internal debate.


3. (C) However, we believe ceasing public references to the
Annan Plan could undercut the UN and invite confusion and
discouragement among the wider set of actors on the Cyprus
issue:

-- The UN is still publicly anchoring its efforts in the
Annan Plan and the need for Greek Cypriots to state their
objections to it. This proposed approach would open a gap
between the U.S. and the UN -- a first. As stymied as the
SYG's Good Offices Mission is, it is currently the only
realistic vehicle for overall settlement.

-- The GOT, facing over 60% domestic opposition to the Plan
in late 2003, spent political capital, torqued around public
opinion, and went on to help bring Turkish Cypriots to yes.
Changing our stance now would confuse and anger the GOT and
the Turkish public, weaken the hand of pro-solution forces
here, and leave the field to conspiracy theories about the
reasons for our changed public stance. It also risks
damaging support here for Turkey's EU process, since a number
of vocal critics see the Negotiating Framework as already
having given away the Cyprus store. If we want to lobby
Turkey for support for a renewed round of concessions, which
we believe would ultimately be desirable, this would not
help.

-- We are concerned about how the EU and member states would
take our new public lack of support for the Plan. At least,
it would be confusing; coming after Turkey's October 3
opening of EU accession talks, some in the EU would interpret
this as tacit endorsement of a greater (perhaps exclusive) EU
role in settlement.

-- Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly supported the Annan Plan
in 2004. Reftel offers no judgment about what effect ceasing
public endorsement of the Plan would have on them.

-- We believe that supporting the Plan in private while
ceasing support in public is not a sustainable public
diplomacy approach with the audiences with which we have to
deal. From our point of view, it is more useful to have a
consistent message that we can transmit to all parties
concerned.


4. (C) We believe reftel's public diplomacy concerns can be
addressed without ceasing public support for the Annan Plan:

-- As far as we can tell, there is unanimous agreement in the
USG that the Plan inevitably will be changed. We are aware
of no USG public statement to the contrary. As reftel
suggests, the USG should publicly state that there will need
to be meaningful changes to Annan to accommodate Greek
Cypriot concerns -- with the caveat that the Plan will have
to be re-opened to changes by both sides, not just one.

-- We agree that we can cease using "uniquely balanced"
rhetoric to describe the Plan. Most of the Plan's basic
concepts have been considered in one form or another for
decades and all appear open to adjustments to the details.

-- We agree it is unhelpful to debate whether the Plan is "a
basis," "point of departure" or "point of reference." Under
any construction, we should stress that the SYG needs to know
what Greek Cypriots want, and his assessment is that the
Greek Cypriots have not adequately set that forth.


5. (C) All this is preliminary to what we hope will be a
collective effort to see whether the post-October 3 period
offers a window to move forward constructively with all
parties on Cyprus. Mission Turkey looks forward to
participating actively in this discussion.
MCELDOWNEY