FM GUL PLANS TO VISIT SYRIA TO URGE COOPERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006706

SIPDIS

EUR FOR DAS BRYZA, AND EUR/SE SILLIMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2015
TAGS: PREL SY TU SYRIA
SUBJECT: FM GUL PLANS TO VISIT SYRIA TO URGE COOPERATION

REF: MCELDOWNEY - BRYZA TELCON 11/14/05

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for Reasons 1.4 (b and d).


1. (C) Summary and Action Request. MFA Middle East DG Oguz
Celikkol called in CDA November 14 to inform her that FM Gul
plans to travel to Damascus on Wednesday, November 16, for a
focused, three-hour visit with the purpose of encouraging
Syrian President Bashar al-Asad to cooperate with the UNIIIC,
as well as to prevent the entry of terrorists from Syria into
Iraq and to cease support to Islamic Jihad. While in
Bahrain, Gul was reportedly encouraged by UK FM Straw, EU's
Solana, and Arab counterparts to consider ways Turkey could
be helpful with Syria. Celikkol noted Syrian FM al-Shara had
made conciliatory statements in Bahrain suggesting Syria was
ready to cooperate on providing access to persons of interest
to the Mehlis Commission. CDA noted Secretary Rice's earlier
request to Gul that Turks not/not meet with Syrians at a high
level and cautioned that such a visit could be misperceived
by the international community, and manipulated by the
Syrians. CDA advised that, if Gul nonetheless insists on
going to Damascus, the MFA should make it absolutely clear --
publicly and in advance -- that Gul will demand Syrian
cooperation with UNSCR 1636 as well as better Syrian behavior
on Iraq and Palestine. Action Request: Post requests
Department guidance on Gul's proposed visit as well as any
specific points for MFA by OOB November 15. End Summary and
Action Request.


2. (C) DG Celikkol told CDA that, while in Bahrain, Gul had
met with U.S. officials as well as with UK Foreign Secretary
Straw, the EU's Solana, and Arab counterparts, who all
encouraged Turkey to consider ways to help break the deadlock
with Syria over cooperation with the Mehlis Commission
(UNIIIC) under UNSCR 1636. Moreover, Celikkol reported,
Syrian FM al-Shara had shown up unexpectedly in Bahrain and
had made surprisingly conciliatory statements indicating
Syrian willingness to make persons of interest to the UNIIIC
available at a UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
facility or at an Arab League facility outside of Syria and
Lebanon. According to Celikkol, Gul made the decision to go
to Syria only upon his return to Ankara from Bahrain.


3. (C) Celikkol said Gul's visit to Damascus, scheduled for
the afternoon of Wednesday, November 16, would be short
(three hours or less),devoid of protocol, and focused
entirely on a meeting with al-Asad (and perhaps al-Shara) to
press the Syrians to cooperate with the Mehlis Commission.
With key U.S. concerns in mind, Celikkol said, Gul would also
urge the Syrians to prevent the entry of foreign fighters
into Iraq via the Damascus International Airport as well as
the land border, and to cease support for Islamic Jihad. Gul
is willing to convey other U.S. messages to Syria as well.
Finally, Gul plans to encourage al-Asad to move forward on
domestic political reforms.


4. (C) The MFA does not plan to go public with the visit
until the day of Gul's departure, when it will make a
straightforward statement of Gul's mission. Celikkol
elaborated that Gul believes his mission is urgent and
necessary to break the political deadlock over UNSCR 1636.
Should the Syrians fail to cooperate with UNIIIC before
December 15, the MFA is convinced the targeted sanctions that
will likely go into place will not be effective. The MFA
also fears a broader embargo against Syria will not be
sustainable. Celikkol explained the broader MFA concern,
reinforced by Gulf state FMs to Gul, that continued Syrian
isolation would only bring Damascus under increasing Iranian
influence. Gul's conclusion is that Syria must see that
there is still time to "do the right thing," Celikkol said.


5. (C) CDA reminded Celikkol of the Secretary's earlier --
and quite explicit -- request to Gul that Turkey not/not meet
with Syrian officials at a high level. In that context, she
could not predict USG support for Gul's mission. She
undertook to request Department guidance and respond to the
MFA in short order. Should the trip proceed nonetheless, she
urged Celikkol to consider a very forceful public statement
of intent upon Gul's departure, making clear that Gul will
tell the Syrians categorically that they must cooperate with
the Mehlis Commission, stop entry of terrorists into Iraq,
cease support for Palestinian extremist groups, and act more
responsibly in the region. Gul's trip, in short, must be
perceived as in full harmony with the international
community's goals for drastically improved Syrian behavior in
the region. Asad should not gain the impression he can wait
out his difficulties. Celikkol took the point, saying any
MFA statement would be made in "diplomatic" terms but would
clearly convey Gul's purpose. He said the MFA would await a
formal response from Washington, both on the trip itself and
on any specific points the USG may wish Gul to raise.
MCELDOWNEY