SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 006558

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SE AND PM/DTTC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MARR PARM TU IZ AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE PETER FLORY TO TURKEY

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Your visit to Turkey marks the first High
Level Defense Group (HLDG) meeting to be held in two years.
In the absence of this high level bilateral dialogue, our
political military communication with Turkey since 2003 has
been dominated by the war in Iraq and its impact on the PKK,
Turkey and Turkey's perceived constituents, the Iraqi
Turkmen. The 19th HLDG provides an opportunity to elevate
the dialogue beyond Iraq, to underscore our positive
collaboration in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),
including the logistics hub at Incirlik and the Habur Gate
GLOC, and to re-focus on our long-term shared strategic
goals. It will be important to note U.S. actions to
implement commitments made during recent high level USG
visits to help Turkey to combat the PKK, but equally
important to emphasize opportunities to develop closer
cooperation in space technology, missile defense and other
areas of the Global War on Terrorism. The HLDG also provides
an opportunity to highlight the renewal of our Special Forces
collaboration after two years of limited contact. END
SUMMARY.


2. (S) We aren't out of the woods yet, but our bilateral
political military relationship is on the upswing from the
trough that began in 2003 and deepened in fall 2004 with
MNF-I operations in Talafar and Fallujah, repeated Turkish
truck driver abductions and killings and Turkey's neglect of
its relationship with the US while it courted the EU in
search of an accession start date. Despite the continued
unpopularity of the war in Iraq (over 95% of the population
opposed the war),it no longer completely dominates the news.
Following the Dec. 17, 2004 EU decision to begin accession
talks with Turkey on Oct. 3, and at the initiation of the
military, Turkish government rhetoric began to shift to a
more positive tone. DCHOD Basbug took the first step in a
January 26, 2005 nationally-televised press conference, in
which he underscored the importance of the bilateral
relationship and NSC SecGen Alpogan, FM Gul and others
scrambled to match his words. In an April speech to the
Istanbul War Academy, CHOD Ozkok called the bilateral
relationship too broad and important to be defined by one
issue. With the visits of PM Erdogan, FM Gul and DCHOD
Basbug to Washington in early June, the Sept. 8-9 visit of
EUCOM Commander Gen Jones and CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lt Gen
Smith and the Sept. 24 visit of APNSA Hadley, both sides have
demonstrated their commitment to rebuild our historically
strong ties. The HLDG provides a platform to deepen this
goodwill and, while noting the importance of cooperation on
the PKK, to broaden our dialogue and press for specific
actions in other areas of interest.

PKK -- GETTING CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE
--------------


3. (S) TGS notified the Embassy that it was prepared to leave
PKK off the HLDG agenda since the military believes a
separate mechanism to deal with that issue has been
established and is working. However, given the high level of
attention that this issue has received in Washington,
including the Deputies Committee (DC) deliberations,
demarches to European capitals asking governments to take
action against PKK support networks, and EUCOM and CENTCOM
actions to follow through on commitments made during their
September visit, we believe that TGS should be reminded of
the US effort to combat this problem within our capabilities,
and the actions that have been taken toward that end. We
should insist that the government does not use this issue to
pander to a domestic audience.


4. (S/NF) Both EUCOM and CENTCOM remain engaged on the PKK
issue and have taken steps, or committed to do so, to
implement the offers made in September. TGS has rejected
EUCOM's offer of aerial surveillance along the Turkish side
of the border with Iraq but welcomed CENTCOM's offer to
continue aerial overflights of the Iraqi side of the border.
A program of regular flights is under development. It
accepted EUCOM's offer of Information Operations (IO)
support. Following an exploratory meeting between EUCOM IO
officials and TGS on Oct.6, EUCOM is developing a proposal
for interagency consideration to assist GOT development of a
comprehensive IO program. TGS also welcomed a "surge
capacity" intelligence-sharing program, one stage of which
has been completed. CENTCOM offered to expand the list of
PKK HVI on the CENTRIX system and to facilitate TU/IZ mil-mil
contacts, which may include joint border patrols. These
offers remain under discussion. In addition to laying out
these concrete actions, you may wish to emphasize the level
of attention this issue is receiving in Washington and share
any additional outcomes from the interagency deliberations.

SPECIAL FORCES RE-ENGAGEMENT
--------------


5. (S) One of the casualties of the Iraq war was the
relationship between our Special Forces (SF). The July 4,
2003 incident in which US forces hooded and handcuffed
Turkish SF officers in Suleymaniyah, Iraq has become the
stuff of folk lore throughout the Turkish military. The DOD
Joint Staff invitation to Turkish Special Forces for a US
visit from Sept. 19-27 began to restore that once close
relationship, and we fully support a possible SF JCET in
March 2006. We understand that TGS has approved the request
for this JCET and that a EUCOM survey team may visit Turkey
in December to initiate planning. This would be the first
JCET in at least three years. You may wish to highlight the
importance the US places in renewing this historically good
relationship by building on the Sept. visit with a JCET and
additional visits.

BEHIND THE SCENES SUPPORT FOR IRAQ
--------------


6. (SBU) Despite the unpopularity of the Iraq war, Turkey has
provided significant logistical support to both Operation
Iraqi Freedom and to OEF in Afghanistan. Turkey has approved
multiple requests for the use of Incirlik Air Base,
including: a tanker refueling operation which has delivered
28 million gallons since operations began in 2003 and flown
over 2,600 sorties; the transit of 8,500 US troops on
rotation from Iraq from January through April 2004; and the
establishment in May 2005 of a logistics hub which allows 6
US military C-17 aircraft to move the amount of cargo it took
9-10 military aircraft to move from Germany. This hub has
facilitated the movement of 41,339 tons of supplies since its
inception; flown 1280 C-17 sorties; received 577 wide-bodies
cargo aircraft; and houses 150 TDY support personnel. Turkey
also approved the use of hub flights for the emergency
evacuation of US soldiers from Iraq.


7. (SBU) The Habur Gate crossing from Turkey into Iraq has
facilitated 25% of fuel shipments to Coalition forces in Iraq
-- approximately 340,000 gallons of fuel every day. It also
handles two-thirds of gasoline and diesel fuel shipments for
the Iraqi people in the form of three million gallons a day
in humanitarian fuel shipments. Significant shipments of
food and water for coalition forces also pass through the
border.


8. (SBU) The Turkish government has also demonstrated its
support through its public announcements of support for the
January elections, the October Constitutional Referendum and
the upcoming December elections; provision of training in
Turkey for Iraqi diplomats and (as part of the NATO training
mission) for the Iraqi security forces; hosting a seminar for
Iraqi constitution drafters; hosting a meeting of rival
Talafar tribal leaders in August for a reconciliation
dialogue; and delivery of aid to Talafar following the recent
Coalition operation there.

PARTNER IN GWOT
--------------


9. (S) Beyond its support for Iraq, Turkey has provided
valuable assistance and cooperation to GWOT. On Aug. 8,
Turkey completed its second International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) command (II and VII) in Afghanistan, which it
held for six months and during which time it contributed over
1,600 troops. Turkey and France have agreed on a shared
command of the ISAF Multinational Brigade in Kabul during the
second half of 2006 and Turkey has also indicated its
willingness to consider heading or supporting a Provisional
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the future. Turkey also
contributes to reconstruction and training efforts in
Afghanistan. It is involved in the reconstruction of schools
and is exploring counter-narcotics training programs for
Afghan police and alternative livelihood options for poppy
farmers. Following PM Erdogan's May visit to Afghanistan, he
pledged an additional $100M in assistance to the country.


10. (U) Together with the US, Turkey coordinates military
assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their
abilities to protect key energy transport routes. Turkey
subscribes to every security arrangement it is eligible to
join, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
It will host the first PSI combined air, land and sea
exercise in May 2006.

IRAN AND SYRIA - DIFFERENT MEANS TO THE SAME END
-------------- ---


11. (S) Turkey's watchword for both Syria and Iran is
"engagement." While the government shares our goal of a
nuclear-free Iran, it doesn't want to jeopardize its nascent
trade development opportunities, including energy, or its
renewed intelligence exchange with Iran on the PKK.
According to TGS, Turkey and Iran began sharing intelligence
this summer on the PKK, holding regular meetings at the
border. As of September, Iran had turned over 40 suspected
PKK members or sympathizers. Turkey touts its support for
the EU-3 dialogue and Turkish officials stress to us the need
to maintain dialogue and to identify a diplomatic solution.
The tepid and equivocal response by PM Erdogan and the MFA to
President Ahmadinejad's Oct. 25 statement about Israel
demonstrate that Turkey is trying to walk both sides of the
line on Iran. Turkey's tact toward Syria is the same.
Turkish military officials have characterized Syria as a
"scared cat" that could lash out if "backed into a corner."
While Turkey supports the UNIIC, the Turkish foreign policy
establishment fears instability if there is a regime change
in Damascus. They and others in the government stress the
need to support Assad against those in the regime who seek to
undermine him and regularly urge US engagement.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION WEAK
--------------


12. (SBU) Historically the strongest area of our bilateral
relationship, the bilateral security cooperation
relationship, is significantly declining. Under Turkey's
current policy, being implemented by the Undersecretariat for
Defense Industries (SSM),the emphasis is on Direct
Commercial Sales at the expense of Foreign Military Sales and
American companies are having difficulty competing. The last
significant commercial tender won by a U.S. firm was the 2002
win by Boeing for an Air Early Warning and Control (AEW&C)
system. (Note: Boeing recently threatened to take SSM to
arbitration over protracted contract disputes and just signed
the Critical Design Review this month.) In early 2004, SSM
canceled three tenders (UAVs, Main Battle Tanks and ATAK
Helicopter). A second UAV tender was won by the Israelis
weeks before PM Erdogan's spring 2005 visit to Israel.


13. (SBU) The revised ATAK Helicopter tender (Note: The first
tender was issued in 1995 and won by Bell Textron. SSM
canceled it over technology transfer issues. End Note.)
issued in February 2005 was the first to contain new
"standard" terms and condition. The three US firms that took
the tender (Bell, Boeing, Sikorsky) found the new T&Cs so
onerous that Bell immediately dropped out of contention and
Sikorsky soon followed. Boeing invested considerable time
and energy to try and work through its concerns with SSM but,
even after several contract revisions and two postponements
of the bid due date, was unable to justify participation. On
Oct. 13, Boeing notified SSM that it will not submit a bid on
Nov. 8. (Note: SSM Undersecretary Murad Bayar is invited to
the Charge's Nov. 8 dinner in honor of your visit. End Note.)


14. (SBU) SSM's stated goal is to develop an indigenous
defense industry that can supply components, such as a
mission computer system, for integration into foreign
products, beginning with the ATAK Helicopter, and has
outlined an aggressive timetable to do so. To meet that
schedule, SSM requires companies to sign up unconditionally
to all T&Cs and to confirm at the time of bid submission the
host government's willingness to allow transfer of the
required technology. ASD Suzanne Patrick and State DAS Greg
Suchan explained to Bayar in clear terms the USG limitations
that prohibit such up front guarantees. SSM has offered to
exchange side letters with US firms that would clarify SSM
acceptance of a USG "advisory opinion" but refused to revise
the tender language to clarify that requirement. Sikorsky,
which is considering participating in a tender for 52 utility
helicopters and, if it wins, establishing in Turkey a global
production site for its "World Hawk" helicopter, will not bid
if this condition is not clarified in the tender. ODC Chief
MG Sutton has held extensive talks with Service Chiefs, DCHOD
Kosaner and J-5 head LTG Zorlu about the negative impact of
the SSM program on US participation in the Turkish defense
market. Across the board, they pledged their preference for
US equipment but professed an inability -- or unwillingness
-- to influence the process.

SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE - NEGLECTED AREAS OF OPPORTUNITY
-------------- --------------


15. (S) Turkey is interested in finding a partner for the
initial purchase and eventual co-development of a remote
satellite sensing system. In August 2004, the Turkish Air
Force submitted a questionnaire to six countries (US,
Germany, France, Israel, UK and S. Korea) to gauge each
government's willingness to share the required technology
with Turkey for such co-production. Subsequently this
project was passed to SSM as a procurement project. SSM
issued an RFI to which over 41 institutions and companies,
including Lockheed Martin, responded. It expects to issue in
Jan. 2006 a tender for the purchase of an initial satellite
system.


16. (S) At the same time, the US has been working with Turkey
towards signature of an umbrella space agreement under which
working groups could be established to explore joint project
opportunities. The Turks have been reluctant to establish a
working group absent a signed agreement. Your signature of
this agreement will remove that excuse and we will press
Turkey to engage with us.


17. (S) Our missile defense cooperation with Turkey is
limited. Despite TGS' acknowledged concerns with Iran's
nuclear program, it does not view Iran as a near-term threat.
The USG would like to evaluate Turkey as a potential
location for a forward based radar site in Europe but it took
a year of discussions to gain GOT agreement, in July 2004, to
conduct a missile placement study. The study will not only
provide additional input into the sensor placement evaluation
process, but will hopefully engage Turkey in the process. To
gain agreement on this study we had to amend the bilateral
Ballistic Missile Defense MOU. After eight months of
negotiation, on Oct. 22, TGS confirmed its agreement to the
amended MOU text. However, the agreement calls for the use
of FY 05 funding. With the start of the new fiscal year, we
lost those funds and will have to identify a new source of
funding.
MCELDOWNEY