Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA6543
2005-11-02 09:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:
AT THREE, TURKEY'S AKP GOVERNMENT SHOWING ITS AGE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006543
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EU TU CY
SUBJECT: AT THREE, TURKEY'S AKP GOVERNMENT SHOWING ITS AGE
(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary and Comment
-------------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006543
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EU TU CY
SUBJECT: AT THREE, TURKEY'S AKP GOVERNMENT SHOWING ITS AGE
(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary and Comment
--------------
1. (C) After three years in power, Turkish PM Erdogan and
his Justice and Development Party (AKP) government remain
atop Turkey's political heap in popularity, and in control of
the Turkish parliament and Turkey's municipalities. Yet the
AKP government is beginning to show its age: it has receded
from its high-water mark in parliamentary power, and lost
momentum against nationalist opposition on EU accession,
Cyprus and issues affecting Turkey's Kurds. Opposition has
also blocked AKP government attempts to advance issues
important to Turkish Islamists. The AKP government faces two
long-term threats: persistent allegations of AKP internal
corruption and AKP's failure to ameliorate Turkey's
unemployment.
2. (C) For three years, Erdogan has been the glue that has
held the AKP party together -- an umbrella party encompassing
different ideological tinges and ambitious personalities.
Some MPs resent Erdogan's authoritarian leadership; ambitious
AKP members, DPM/FM Gul foremost among them, seek more
prominent roles. Given Erdogan's popularity, AKP's current
dominance, and the current lack of any viable opposition,
AKP's now-quiescent dissidents are biding their time.
Individual issues are unlikely to rock the AKP ship in the
short term. But if and when a viable political alternative
finally emerges, a chunk of AKP will be sorely tempted to
jump the AKP ship.
AKP, Erdogan Still Most Popular
--------------
3. (U) After three years, PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan remains
Turkey's most popular political figure, and Erdogan's AKP
remains Turkey's most popular party. Neither has fallen from
first place since AKP came to power in the November 3, 2002
elections, and no other person or party currently appears
capable of challenging them.
AKP's Parliamentary Majority Slowly Eroding
--------------
4. (C) AKP won 363 of parliament's 550 seats in November
2002. From July 2004 until February 2005, thanks to
transfers from other parties, AKP reached what will probably
be its high-water mark of 367 seats, a two-thirds majority,
enough to pass constitutional amendments without a
referendum.
5. (C) Since then, AKP has slipped to its current 356 seats,
80 more than the majority required to pass legislation, and
26 more than the three-fifths majority needed to amend the
constitution and then submit amendments to a referendum.
Barring a political crisis, AKP will continue to hold a
majority of seats over the next year, although further MP
defections will slowly erode AKP's majority.
6. (C) AKP stanched a round of MP defections earlier this
year; its parliamentary group has fared better than main
opposition Republican People's Party (CHP),now down to 154
of the 178 seats it won in 2002. The newly-formed 22-member
Motherland Party (ANAP) parliamentary group is a diverse
collection of refugees from other parties and currently poses
no threat to AKP.
. (C) Erdogan and the AKP leadership have done a remarkable
job of holding together AKP's mix of pious, nationalistic and
pragmatic MPs. After stumbling badly in the March 2003 vote
on whether to allow U.S. troops to pass through Turkey en
route to Iraq, AKP's parliamentary group has held together in
every subsequent vote. Erdogan personally oversaw the
October 2003 vote on sending Turkish troops to Iraq,
resulting in a slam-dunk approval.
8. (U) AKP consolidated its 2002 general election victory in
March 2004 municipal elections, capturing 1,949 of Turkey's
3225 municipalities. AKP mayors now govern 12 of Turkey's 16
biggest cities, including seven of Turkey's eight biggest
ANKARA 00006543 002 OF 003
cities.
Feckless Opposition; AKP's Good Grassroots Organization
-------------- --------------
9. (C) Turkey's feckless opposition is one major reason for
AKP's success. Main opposition CHP, initially the party of
Ataturk and once the bulwark of Turkey's center-left, suffers
from abysmal leadership and lack of a compelling message.
Ultra-nationalist MHP has not yet capitalized on Turkey's
rising nationalism, and Islamist Saadet remains a fringe
party. No other political party has approached AKP's success
in building grassroots organizations and support; many
Turkish politicians still do not comprehend the need for such
an approach.
AKP Stalled on the EU, Kurds and Cyprus
--------------
10. (C) Across the board and despite the AKP government's
dominance, it appears to have stalled. Since its
extraordinary success in passing EU-related reforms in 2004,
it has accomplished little on the EU front. Turkey's
commencement of accession talks in October resulted largely
from prior momentum -- and nearly failed. FM Gul complains
that he is currently the only cabinet member doing the heavy
political lifting on EU questions. The AKP government has
done little to counteract a decline in public support for EU
accession, instead finding itself on the defensive against
charges that it is sacrificing national interests for the
sake of accession.
11. (C) Erdogan has also failed to follow words with deeds
after his August speech in Diyarbakir in which he proclaimed
that Turkey has a "Kurdish problem." Erdogan has not even
repeated the phrase, and his AKP government has no plans for
any follow up. Public discourse on the Kurdish problem is
back to hackneyed talk about employment and education; even
so, the AKP government is taking no initiatives in those
areas. The most significant government effort in the
heavily-Kurdish Southeast is the military effort against the
resurgent PKK. Faced with its own inaction and blowback from
nationalists on PKK violence, the GOT has fallen back on
blaming the U.S. (in northern Iraq) for the PKK problem.
12. (C) And after a bold 2004 initiative to resolve Cyprus,
the GOT has abandoned PM Erdogan's vow to stay "one step
ahead" of the Greek Cypriots. Lack of measures to help
Turkish Cypriots has left the AKP government without
ammunition against domestic Cyprus hardliners. The GOT now
insists that their 2004 effort, and Turkish Cypriot approval
of the Annan Plan, relieves them of responsibility to move
forward either on settlement or lesser measures. The AKP
government is delaying bringing the Ankara Agreement
extension protocol to parliament for ratification partly out
of concern that this perceived concession on Cyprus risks
splitting the AKP parliamentary group.
Little Success in Advancing Islamist Agenda
--------------
13. (C) Amid continuing debate over whether AKP has a hidden
Islamist agenda, Erdogan's government has had little success
in advancing Islamist causes. Over the past three years, the
AKP government has repeatedly floated proposals on
headscarves, religious (imam-hatip) schools, and other
Islamist causes, only to pull them back in the face of
secular opposition. The headscarf ban remains in place in
schools and government workplaces. Imam-hatip graduates are
still handicapped in university admissions.
14. (C) The Saadet Party, on AKP's Islamist flank, has
constantly criticized AKP's failures, but has so far failed
to draw away AKP strength. No AKP MP has yet resigned and
gone over to Saadet, and even Saadet party contacts admit
they have not drawn disaffected AKP members.
Corruption, Unemployment Threaten AKP Power
--------------
15. (C) AKP's loss of momentum and failed Islamic agenda do
not currently threaten its domestic dominance. Two other
ANKARA 00006543 003 OF 003
issues could, should the opposition ever gain steam: AKP's
internal corruption and AKP's failure to ameliorate
unemployment.
16. (C) AKP's image as a clean party was a major reason for
its November 2002 victory. However, since coming to power,
some AKP politicians persistently have been alleged to be as
corrupt as their predecessors. Concrete examples are
multiplying. The AKP government has failed to address -- or
even acknowledge -- such persistent allegations of corruption
within the party. The average Turk accepts that while there
may be some corruption in AKP, AKP corruption is far less
than previous governments'. However, the issue remains a
time bomb. One AKP MP recently prepared an internal party
report saying that corruption in AKP is eroding its popular
support. PM Erdogan's only reaction was to tell AKP MPs in
October that the party "is not explaining itself well."
17. (C) Before the 2002 election, AKP and Erdogan famously
promised to ease Turkey's unemployment problem in three
years. Despite substantial growth in employment, job
creation cannot keep up with the increase of new entrants
into the labor force. After three years, ordinary Turks
still say unemployment remains Turkey's most serious problem.
Opposition parties have not yet been able to cut into AKP's
popular support using the unemployment issue, and the AKP
government has so far resisted the urge to break fiscal
discipline in order to create jobs. However, in the long
run, the issue has traction and may force the AKP government
into tough choices between fiscal discipline and popular
support.
MCELDOWNEY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EU TU CY
SUBJECT: AT THREE, TURKEY'S AKP GOVERNMENT SHOWING ITS AGE
(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary and Comment
--------------
1. (C) After three years in power, Turkish PM Erdogan and
his Justice and Development Party (AKP) government remain
atop Turkey's political heap in popularity, and in control of
the Turkish parliament and Turkey's municipalities. Yet the
AKP government is beginning to show its age: it has receded
from its high-water mark in parliamentary power, and lost
momentum against nationalist opposition on EU accession,
Cyprus and issues affecting Turkey's Kurds. Opposition has
also blocked AKP government attempts to advance issues
important to Turkish Islamists. The AKP government faces two
long-term threats: persistent allegations of AKP internal
corruption and AKP's failure to ameliorate Turkey's
unemployment.
2. (C) For three years, Erdogan has been the glue that has
held the AKP party together -- an umbrella party encompassing
different ideological tinges and ambitious personalities.
Some MPs resent Erdogan's authoritarian leadership; ambitious
AKP members, DPM/FM Gul foremost among them, seek more
prominent roles. Given Erdogan's popularity, AKP's current
dominance, and the current lack of any viable opposition,
AKP's now-quiescent dissidents are biding their time.
Individual issues are unlikely to rock the AKP ship in the
short term. But if and when a viable political alternative
finally emerges, a chunk of AKP will be sorely tempted to
jump the AKP ship.
AKP, Erdogan Still Most Popular
--------------
3. (U) After three years, PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan remains
Turkey's most popular political figure, and Erdogan's AKP
remains Turkey's most popular party. Neither has fallen from
first place since AKP came to power in the November 3, 2002
elections, and no other person or party currently appears
capable of challenging them.
AKP's Parliamentary Majority Slowly Eroding
--------------
4. (C) AKP won 363 of parliament's 550 seats in November
2002. From July 2004 until February 2005, thanks to
transfers from other parties, AKP reached what will probably
be its high-water mark of 367 seats, a two-thirds majority,
enough to pass constitutional amendments without a
referendum.
5. (C) Since then, AKP has slipped to its current 356 seats,
80 more than the majority required to pass legislation, and
26 more than the three-fifths majority needed to amend the
constitution and then submit amendments to a referendum.
Barring a political crisis, AKP will continue to hold a
majority of seats over the next year, although further MP
defections will slowly erode AKP's majority.
6. (C) AKP stanched a round of MP defections earlier this
year; its parliamentary group has fared better than main
opposition Republican People's Party (CHP),now down to 154
of the 178 seats it won in 2002. The newly-formed 22-member
Motherland Party (ANAP) parliamentary group is a diverse
collection of refugees from other parties and currently poses
no threat to AKP.
. (C) Erdogan and the AKP leadership have done a remarkable
job of holding together AKP's mix of pious, nationalistic and
pragmatic MPs. After stumbling badly in the March 2003 vote
on whether to allow U.S. troops to pass through Turkey en
route to Iraq, AKP's parliamentary group has held together in
every subsequent vote. Erdogan personally oversaw the
October 2003 vote on sending Turkish troops to Iraq,
resulting in a slam-dunk approval.
8. (U) AKP consolidated its 2002 general election victory in
March 2004 municipal elections, capturing 1,949 of Turkey's
3225 municipalities. AKP mayors now govern 12 of Turkey's 16
biggest cities, including seven of Turkey's eight biggest
ANKARA 00006543 002 OF 003
cities.
Feckless Opposition; AKP's Good Grassroots Organization
-------------- --------------
9. (C) Turkey's feckless opposition is one major reason for
AKP's success. Main opposition CHP, initially the party of
Ataturk and once the bulwark of Turkey's center-left, suffers
from abysmal leadership and lack of a compelling message.
Ultra-nationalist MHP has not yet capitalized on Turkey's
rising nationalism, and Islamist Saadet remains a fringe
party. No other political party has approached AKP's success
in building grassroots organizations and support; many
Turkish politicians still do not comprehend the need for such
an approach.
AKP Stalled on the EU, Kurds and Cyprus
--------------
10. (C) Across the board and despite the AKP government's
dominance, it appears to have stalled. Since its
extraordinary success in passing EU-related reforms in 2004,
it has accomplished little on the EU front. Turkey's
commencement of accession talks in October resulted largely
from prior momentum -- and nearly failed. FM Gul complains
that he is currently the only cabinet member doing the heavy
political lifting on EU questions. The AKP government has
done little to counteract a decline in public support for EU
accession, instead finding itself on the defensive against
charges that it is sacrificing national interests for the
sake of accession.
11. (C) Erdogan has also failed to follow words with deeds
after his August speech in Diyarbakir in which he proclaimed
that Turkey has a "Kurdish problem." Erdogan has not even
repeated the phrase, and his AKP government has no plans for
any follow up. Public discourse on the Kurdish problem is
back to hackneyed talk about employment and education; even
so, the AKP government is taking no initiatives in those
areas. The most significant government effort in the
heavily-Kurdish Southeast is the military effort against the
resurgent PKK. Faced with its own inaction and blowback from
nationalists on PKK violence, the GOT has fallen back on
blaming the U.S. (in northern Iraq) for the PKK problem.
12. (C) And after a bold 2004 initiative to resolve Cyprus,
the GOT has abandoned PM Erdogan's vow to stay "one step
ahead" of the Greek Cypriots. Lack of measures to help
Turkish Cypriots has left the AKP government without
ammunition against domestic Cyprus hardliners. The GOT now
insists that their 2004 effort, and Turkish Cypriot approval
of the Annan Plan, relieves them of responsibility to move
forward either on settlement or lesser measures. The AKP
government is delaying bringing the Ankara Agreement
extension protocol to parliament for ratification partly out
of concern that this perceived concession on Cyprus risks
splitting the AKP parliamentary group.
Little Success in Advancing Islamist Agenda
--------------
13. (C) Amid continuing debate over whether AKP has a hidden
Islamist agenda, Erdogan's government has had little success
in advancing Islamist causes. Over the past three years, the
AKP government has repeatedly floated proposals on
headscarves, religious (imam-hatip) schools, and other
Islamist causes, only to pull them back in the face of
secular opposition. The headscarf ban remains in place in
schools and government workplaces. Imam-hatip graduates are
still handicapped in university admissions.
14. (C) The Saadet Party, on AKP's Islamist flank, has
constantly criticized AKP's failures, but has so far failed
to draw away AKP strength. No AKP MP has yet resigned and
gone over to Saadet, and even Saadet party contacts admit
they have not drawn disaffected AKP members.
Corruption, Unemployment Threaten AKP Power
--------------
15. (C) AKP's loss of momentum and failed Islamic agenda do
not currently threaten its domestic dominance. Two other
ANKARA 00006543 003 OF 003
issues could, should the opposition ever gain steam: AKP's
internal corruption and AKP's failure to ameliorate
unemployment.
16. (C) AKP's image as a clean party was a major reason for
its November 2002 victory. However, since coming to power,
some AKP politicians persistently have been alleged to be as
corrupt as their predecessors. Concrete examples are
multiplying. The AKP government has failed to address -- or
even acknowledge -- such persistent allegations of corruption
within the party. The average Turk accepts that while there
may be some corruption in AKP, AKP corruption is far less
than previous governments'. However, the issue remains a
time bomb. One AKP MP recently prepared an internal party
report saying that corruption in AKP is eroding its popular
support. PM Erdogan's only reaction was to tell AKP MPs in
October that the party "is not explaining itself well."
17. (C) Before the 2002 election, AKP and Erdogan famously
promised to ease Turkey's unemployment problem in three
years. Despite substantial growth in employment, job
creation cannot keep up with the increase of new entrants
into the labor force. After three years, ordinary Turks
still say unemployment remains Turkey's most serious problem.
Opposition parties have not yet been able to cut into AKP's
popular support using the unemployment issue, and the AKP
government has so far resisted the urge to break fiscal
discipline in order to create jobs. However, in the long
run, the issue has traction and may force the AKP government
into tough choices between fiscal discipline and popular
support.
MCELDOWNEY