Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA64
2005-01-05 16:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

DEPUTY SECRETARY DISCUSSES IRAQ AND SYRIA WITH

Tags:  PREL MOPS TU IZ SY JO IR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000064 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2030
TAGS: PREL MOPS TU IZ SY JO IR
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY DISCUSSES IRAQ AND SYRIA WITH
TURKISH CHOD

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000064

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2030
TAGS: PREL MOPS TU IZ SY JO IR
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY DISCUSSES IRAQ AND SYRIA WITH
TURKISH CHOD

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: At their Jan. 3 meeting, Deputy Secretary
Armitage told Turkish General Staff Chief GEN Hilmi Ozkok
that his most recent visit to Iraq made him more optimistic
about the January 30 elections there. He outlined steps that
were being taken to reach out to Sunni Arabs, to improve
security, and to convince the Kurds to reverse their decision
to boycott elections in Kirkuk. He asked Turkey to support a
statement calling on full participation in elections
occurring on time at the meeting of Iraq's neighbors on Jan.

6. He also suggested that Turkey use its influence with
Damascus to encourage more responsible Syrian behavior.
Ozkok evinced suspicion of Kurdish intentions in the north,
concern about Sunni participation in the Jan. 30 elections;
and, doubts that Syrian President Asad was as in command as
he tried to project. End summary.


2. (C) During their Jan. 3 meeting in Ankara, Deputy
Secretary Richard Armitage and Turkish General Staff (TGS)

SIPDIS
Chief GEN Hilmi Ozkok agreed that the US and Turkey shared
the same overall goal in Iraq. "Your success is our
success," Ozkok said. The Deputy Secretary noted that Turkey
and the US were working together for success and, in that
vein, it was important to consult and, especially for public
opinion, to be seen as consulting.

--------------
Iraq Elections
--------------


3. (C) Having just visited Iraq, the Deputy Secretary
provided Ozkok with his assessment of the situation. Deputy
Secretary Armitage said that he had asked PM Allawi, who he

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met in Amman before traveling to Iraq, what he was doing to
reach out to Sunni Arabs. Allawi provided a sober
presentation, describing his meeting with various tribal and
political leaders. All were arguing for a delay in the
elections, but could not explain what they would do during
the interim to ensure a successful outcome. Their lack of a
plan led Allawi to the conclusion that there was no point in
a postponement.


4. (C) The Deputy Secretary said that he came away from his

meeting with the IECI impressed with Iraqis' courage and
commitment, and feeling better about the prospects for
successful elections that he had before. He admitted that
Ninewah (Mosul) and Anbar remained problem areas, but even in
these provinces elections were still possible: for example,
more troops were being dispatched to Mosul to improve
security, and easier-to-secure voting places outside of urban
centers were being discussed for Anbar.


5. (C) The Deputy Secretary explained that he had changed his
itinerary in order to talk to Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) leader Masood Barzani about his threat to boycott the
Kirkuk provincial elections. He told Barzani in a direct
manner we would be very unhappy if the KDP forced elections
in Kirkuk to be postponed. Although the Deputy Secretary
said that he was not sure whether he convinced Barzani, US
observers at the session judged that Barzani's position
softened as a result. In fact, the KDP leader told the press
after the meeting that "we will find a compromise" on Kirkuk.


6. (C) Ozkok responded by saying that TGS shared the Deputy
Secretary's assessment in large part. He noted that there is

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a danger of the Kurds pushing their aim for an independent
Kurdistan too far, but he believed that they will act
responsibly in the end. On Kirkuk, the Kurds seek a delay in
the elections because they have failed to alter the ethnic
balance in the province. However, the future of Kirkuk
should be decided by all Iraqis. Ozkok believed that the US
could convince Barzani, who he described as straightforward
and stubborn, "to do the right thing." Similarly, he thought
the US had leverage with Sunni Arabs to convince them to
participate in elections. The Deputy Secretary agreed, but
added that we were looking to friends like Turkey and Jordan
to speak publicly about the need for Iraqis to participate.
All of Iraq's neighbors, with the possible exception of Iran,
appeared prepared to support such a statement at their Jan. 6
meeting in Jordan. PM Allawi has said that he would like a
statement that calls on all Iraqis to participate in
elections held on time.


7. (C) Ozkok asked whether the US had a plan in the event
there was little Sunni participation in the elections. The
Deputy Secretary said that there was no "plan B." Polling
data showed that with adequate security significant Sunni
participation was possible in Baghdad and Ninewah; Anbar was
more difficult, he allowed. NEA Assistant Secretary William
Burns added that Sunni participation is likely to be lower
than that of Kurds and Shia, but still significant if
security is sufficient.

--------------
Security Forces
--------------


8. (C) PM Allawi learned two lessons from the operations in
Fallujah, Deputy Secretary Armitage reported. First, he
received much less "political blow-back" than he expected.
The lesson here was that the PM should use his authority
more, the Deputy Secretary explained. Second, he appointed
competent people who were succeeding. The lack of leadership
has been a problem for the security forces, the Deputy
Secretary said. The IIG was considering bringing back former

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regime officers to address this problem, but their loyalty
was uncertain. Ozkok said what Iraq needed was a developed
armed forces. The Deputy Secretary disagreed, saying that
police were needed to take the lead. Ozkok noted that in
Turkey, the police and the Jandarma are called in first, but
then Turkish governors have the option of turning to the
military for help. In Iraq, Ozkok doubted that the police
alone would be enough.

--------------
Mosul and Syria
--------------


9. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked what TGS was hearing from
its liaison officers with Task Force Olympia (TFO) in Mosul.
Ozkok said that he has heard of a build-up of coalition
forces and unconfirmed media reports that the coalition plans
to arm Kurds to allow them to protect themselves. He assumed
that a military operation would begin soon "to calm the city"
after the influx of insurgents following the Fallujah
operation. He said that Turkey wanted the situation calm
before elections, but added that any movement of troops
especially from the north could have a bad effect on the
local Turkmen, Arabs and other non-Kurdish ethnic groups.


10. (C) The Deputy Secretary said that the insurgents arrived
from not only Fallujah, but also Aleppo. The previous day he
had met with Syrian President Asad and told him that the
Syrians must do more to stop the flow. He told the Syrians,
he said, that they cannot just wait for the US to provide
information on these individuals, but should use their own
intelligence to go after these people. The bottom line of
the message to Asad was that the road to better relations
with the US lay through Baghdad.


11. (C) Ozkok replied that the Syrians are suspicious about
what kind of future awaits Iraq. This causes them to hedge
their bets. "If everything is clear, they may be more
cooperative." But if they believe that the US is going to
pull out of Iraq soon, then they will be less so. Also,
there are two groups in the government in Damascus; although
Asad wants overall control, he doesn't have it completely.
If Asad's hand were strengthened, Ozkok stated, Syria would
be more cooperative. Damascus asks for Ankara's help in
improving relations with the US, so there is a prospective
for better relations, he noted. The Deputy Secretary
responded that we take satisfaction with your relations with
Syria that have come a long way from five years ago when
Turkey amassed troops on the border. "It gives you
influence" in Damascus, he concluded.

--------------
Participants
--------------


12. (SBU) Ozkok was joined by TGS/J5 Lt Gen Aydogan Babaoglu,
TGS/J3 LTG Metin Yavuz Yalcin, TGS/J5 Strategy Dept Chief MG

M. Cengiz Arslan, MFA Americas DG Selahattin Alpar, and his
aide COL Tayyar Sungu. With the Deputy Secretary in addition
to A/S Burns were the Ambassador, EUR Assistant Secretary
Elizabeth Jones and PolMilCouns (notetaker) and acting DATT
LtCol Joseph Collins.


13. Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage has cleared
this cable.


14. Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN