Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA6251
2005-10-14 12:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

ANKARA AGREEMENT EXTENSION PROTOCOL FACES FIGHT IN

Tags:  PREL TU CY 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006251 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: ANKARA AGREEMENT EXTENSION PROTOCOL FACES FIGHT IN
TURKEY'S PARLIAMENT

REF: A. ANKARA 6229


B. 2003 ANKARA 6303

(U) Classified by Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006251

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: ANKARA AGREEMENT EXTENSION PROTOCOL FACES FIGHT IN
TURKEY'S PARLIAMENT

REF: A. ANKARA 6229


B. 2003 ANKARA 6303

(U) Classified by Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Although EU Enlargement Commissioner Rehn
recently urged Turkey to ratify the Ankara Agreement
extension protcol as soon as possible (ref A),the GOT still
has made no decision on when to send the protocol to the
Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). The GOT, initially
intent on sending Turkey's declaration of non-recognition of
the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) for ratification with the
protocol, now appears to be re-thinking that strategy.
Regardless, the protocol faces a tough TGNA fight. No one is
yet predicting defeat, but the battle lines are still not
fully drawn, and at least some of PM Erdogan's ruling AK
party MPs will defect and vote against it. Erdogan can
minimize defections by insisting on an open TGNA vote. End
Summary.

GOT Undecided About When to Submit Protocol
--------------


2. (C) Despite Rehn's strong urgings to PM Erdogan and FM
Gul, the GOT has not yet decided when to submit the Ankara
Agreement extension protocol (extending the Customs Union to
all 25 members, including the ROC) to the TGNA for
ratification. FM Gul told reporters on October 11 that
ratification of the protocol is not "an urgent issue." Asked
about ratification October 13, Chief EU negotiator Babacan
told reporters, "necessary steps will be taken when the time
comes." Main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) Vice
Chair for Foreign Relations Onur Oymen tells us his party
favors delaying ratification because the Turkish public is
currently angry over EU Cyprus-related demands on Turkey;
Oymen says delay will calm the debate.


3. (C) MFA Northeastern Mediterranean DDG Bilman told
visiting EUR/SE Director on October 12 that Gul's statement
reflects the difficult position the GOT is in on the
protocol. Asked whether the GOT will await European
Parliament (EP) approval before submitting it to the TGNA,
Bilman said the "idea has surfaced." He added that the GOT
faces a "chicken and egg" problem, since the EP is awaiting
word from Turkey on whether Turkey's declaration of
non-recognition of Cyprus will be submitted for ratification
together with the protocol.


Will Turkey's Non-Recognition Declaration Be Submitted?
-------------- --------------


4. (C) When we had spoken to him on October 7, Bilman had
assumed without question that the non-recognition declaration
would be submitted with the protocol for TGNA ratification,
adding that otherwise the protocol would not pass. MFA DDG
for economic relations with the EU Yenel told EUR/SE Director
the same thing October 11, though he acknowledged the EU did
not want the non-recognition declaration attached. However,
the GOT may be changing its approach. Asked the same
question in his October 12 meeting with EUR/SE Director,
Bilman (the MFA's Cyprus authority) said the GOT is now
examining "all options."


5. (C) Bilman speculated the TGNA could add its own
declaration. CHP Foreign Affairs Vice Chair Oymen told us he
proposes that the TGNA add its own reservation specifying
that the protocol would not be implemented as to Cyprus until
there is an overall settlement.

Worries About Defections Among Ruling Party MPs
-------------- -


6. (U) Ratification of the protocol requires a majority of
MPs present during the vote. Of 550 MPs, Erdogan and Gul's
ruling AK party has 355; main opposition CHP 155; Motherland
Party (ANAP) 21; other parties and independents 15; four
seats are vacant.


7. (C) Bilman, a frequent participant in high-level Cyprus
meetings, has told us privately for weeks that PM Erdogan and
FM Gul are deeply worried about defections among their own
AKP MPs when the protocol comes up for ratification. Bilman
reiterated those concerns October 12.


8. (C) According to Bilman, Gul returned from an October 2
meeting with all AKP MPs "a changed man," wondering whether
he could push the protocol through without "breaking the
party." According to Bilman, Gul received a "warning" from
AKP MPs that further Turkish concessions on Cyprus without
any move from the Greek Cypriots risks a split in AKP.
Publicly, in an October 7 television interview, Gul predicted
the extension protocol would pass -- but refused to give a
"guarantee."

No One Predicting Defeat -- Yet
--------------


9. (C) MPs from AKP's different factions, as well as MPs
from other parties, academics and journalists have given us
mixed predictions about how tough a fight the protocol will
face in the TGNA. None of our interlocutors, even those
opposed to the protocol, has yet predicted the protocol will
be defeated, but the real battle lines will be drawn only
after the MFA submits the protocol to the TGNA. All expect
tough debate, spurred by main opposition CHP. An
extra-parliamentary so-called Cyprus "National Experts
Group," which includes former PM Ecevit and Rauf Denktash,
has already turned up the heat with an October 9 letter to
all MPs urging a "no" vote on the protocol.


10. (C) Everyone expects defections among AKP MPs,
particularly nationalist MPs, but estimates vary. Some MPs
and other contacts predict easy ratification, with fewer than
a dozen defections; others anticipate significant defections;
some go so far as to predict the vote could provoke an AK
party split. Submitting the protocol for ratification
without also submitting Turkey's declaration on
non-recognition of Cyprus, contacts stress, will increase the
number of defections.


11. (C) A small group of dissident CHP MPs -- five to 10 --
will probably defy party leader Baykal and vote yes. The
newly-formed ANAP parliamentary group (septel) has not
announced its position; we expect at least some of its 21 MPs
will vote in favor.


12. (C) Some AK MPs and others with whom we spoke understand
that rejection of the protocol would deal a near-fatal blow
to Turkey's EU aspirations. The AKP Vice Chair of the TGNA
Foreign Affairs Committee told us that despite his misgivings
about the protocol, he is loathe to vote against it and end
Turkey's EU aspirations. CHP Foreign Affairs Vice Chair
Oymen is a notable exception; he thinks Turkey's EU candidacy
can survive TGNA rejection of the protocol -- unless, in his
words, the EU is seeking an "excuse" to exclude Turkey.

Watch How the TGNA Vote is Taken
--------------


13. (U) The manner in which the TGNA vote is conducted will
influence the number of AKP defections. TGNA ratification
votes are normally open; however, if more than half the MPs
present agree, the vote can be secret. The March 2003 vote
that defeated a motion to allow U.S. troops to transit Turkey
en route to Iraq was a secret vote, allowing MPs to defy
AKP's stated support for the measure with impunity.


14. (C) AKP leaders must also have to decide whether or not
to make a parliamentary "group decision" to impose party
discipline and require AK MPs to vote yes. AKP did not take
a group decision in the March 2003 vote. AKP is still
undecided on a group decision on the protocol vote.


15. (C) Erdogan, who avoids group decisions because of his
professed support for internal party democracy, could
accomplish the same objective by making his wishes known and
having an open vote. Defiant AKP MPs would face Erdogan's
wrath. Erdogan employed this tactic in the October 2003 TGNA
vote over sending Turkish troops to Iraq (reftel),which
resulted in overwhelming approval.


16. (C) Comment: Debate on the extension protocol is not
yet fully joined, and intervening events in the EU and on
Cyprus could affect the outcome. In any event, PM Erdogan
will have to expend significant domestic political capital to
gain TGNA approval. Given how crucial the EU accession
process is to Erdogan's government, and how crucial the
protocol is to the EU, he will do so. However, his price
will be upping the ante with the EU on future Cyprus-related
issues. End Comment.
MCELDOWNEY