Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA6233
2005-10-13 15:06:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKISH MFA ON COOPERATION AGAINST PKK

Tags:  PTER KTFN PREL PREF IZ PKK 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006233 

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR OTI - RLEBENSON
NSC FOR MCKIBBEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PTER KTFN PREL PREF IZ PKK
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA ON COOPERATION AGAINST PKK

REF: A. SECSTATE 186669

B. ANKARA 5448

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d).

This is an action request. See para 12.

This cable was cleared by Office Director Silliman.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006233

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR OTI - RLEBENSON
NSC FOR MCKIBBEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PTER KTFN PREL PREF IZ PKK
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA ON COOPERATION AGAINST PKK

REF: A. SECSTATE 186669

B. ANKARA 5448

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d).

This is an action request. See para 12.

This cable was cleared by Office Director Silliman.


1. (S) Summary: In a meeting with visiting EUR/SE Director
Doug Silliman, Turkish MFA Director General for Security
Affairs Hayati Guven provided a list of seven PKK names that
the GOT recommends we jointly target in Western Europe, all
of which are the subject of Interpol red notices. Three of
the seven names on the GOT list were also on the U.S. list
passed to the GOT on September 15. Silliman agreed the U.S.
would evaluate and propose joint demarches to appropriate
European capitals. The U.S. will have to work hand-in-hand
with the Turks to develop files sufficiently compelling to
prompt action by European law enforcement; this could include
a need for further consultations. End Summary.

--------------
PKK Individuals
--------------


2. (S) Silliman, accompanied by Acting DCM and Acting
EconCouns, met with Ambassador Guven October 12. Silliman
shared ref a talking points with Guven, and said Washington
had instructed U.S. Embassies to deliver them to European
governments. Referring to the GOT response to the Bryza
non-paper on enhanced cooperation against PKK and to the list
of names provided to MASAK September 15, Guven provided a
list of seven PKK names which the GOT recommends be the of
our efforts to secure enhanced cooperation in Western Europe:
Riza Altun, Zubeyir Aydar, Sakine Cansiz, Remzi Kartal,
Nuriye Kesbir, Ali Matur, and Hikmet Tabak. Guven did not go
into individual names except to emphasize the importance to
Turkey of action against Riza Altun, the PKK's "central
banker," who lives in Paris. He said it if the U.S. could
help convince the French to take action against Altun, it
would be a major coup against the PKK. Guven made the
general comment that Turkish "authorities" believed that many
of the U.S. names were secondary operatives, action against
whom would not be a significant blow to the PKK. Silliman
responded that the names we had proposed were the result of a

vetting process with a focus on names the U.S. thought the
Europeans might realistically act against, on the basis of
these individuals' criminal activity. Guven claimed that the
GOT-provided names could be pursued on the basis of their
criminal activity, using the information in the Interpol Red
Notices (the list, which Post will fax to EUR/SE, includes
some basic biodata and the red notice reference numbers for
each name). Silliman undertook that the U.S. would evaluate
the Turkish list and propose joint demarches on specific
cases Embassy Ankara. If necessary there could be further
bilateral discussions to refine the list.

--------------
PKK Organizations
--------------


3. (C) With regard to the PKK-linked organizations cited in
the GOT reply to the Bryza non-paper, Silliman differentiated
between the two U.S.-based organizations and those in Europe.
Guven agreed to Silliman's request to seek additional
information that would assist U.S. law enforcement in
evaluating whether these organizations had violated U.S. law.
Even if they had not, Guven requested that U.S. authorities
monitor them.

--------------
Media Outlets
--------------


4. (C) With regard to media outlets in Western Europe that
support PKK, Guven said the GOT's priority remains
Denmark-based Roj TV. He explained that the Danish MFA had
referred the Turkish Ambassador to the independent media
regulatory body, which in turn said it could only act against
Roj TV if the Copenhagen Police Chief agreed that the TV
station was supporting terrorism. Guven said the GOT had
provided the Danish police with extensive translations of Roj
broadcasts supporting terrorism and had also provided
information on Roj TV executives' links to the PKK
organization. Guven asked that the U.S. Ambassador to
Denmark consult with his Turkish counterpart before making a
demarche to the Danish government. Silliman said he would
need to discuss this in Washington.

5. (C) Silliman asked if Turkey knew the legal basis on which
German law enforcement had closed Ozgur Politika, noting that
knowing the legal basis might help the U.S. and Turkey in our
joint approach to other Western European governments. Guven
said an independent German body that monitors extremist
groups had included Ozgur Politika and other PKK-linked
groups in its annual report, and Foreign Minister Gul had
written German Foreign Minister Fischer to point this out and
request German action. Guven was not sure whether the Gul
letter had played a role in the German action.

--------------
U.S.-Iraq-Turkey Trilaterals
--------------


6. (C) Guven said Turkey would like to have another
trilateral meeting at his level in which an "action plan"
against the PKK in northern Iraq could be hammered out,
covering not only extraditions but also actions against PKK
finance in Iraq, and other law enforcement actions. Only
then would technical-level experts continue the work.
Silliman explained U.S. thinking that it would be desirable
to do further work with the Iraqi bureaucracy to get them to
better understand international legal obligations and
processes. Silliman also pointed out how difficult it will
be for senior Iraqi officials to take action on these issues
until after the elections and the formation of an Iraqi
Government. Guven took both points, saying Turkey could wait
until after the elections and he strongly endorsed U.S.
efforts to sensitize Iraqi officials to their international
legal obligations. Guven was discouraged by Iraqi officials'
comments at the trilaterals about Interpol red notices being
mere "pieces of paper."


7. (C) Silliman encouraged the GOT to engage the Iraqi
leadership--including Iraqi Kurds--and Ministry of Justice to
take action against PKK operatives. Guven said at all
high-level meetings the GOT makes this point "bluntly." He
said they would instruct their Ambassador in Baghdad to be
active on this issue with a broader array of Iraqis.

--------------
Makhmour Refugee Camp:
--------------


8. (C) Silliman briefed Guven on recent deliberations within
the USG on Makhmour. Though the U.S. had not reached a
decision on possible courses of action, Silliman described
the possibility of local integration of the refugee
population in Iraq in order to impede PKK activity in the
camp. As for UNHCR recognition that Makhmour no longer
fulfilled a humanitarian mission, Guven said UNHCR had
already reported this finding to the UN Secretariat. Silliman
also discussed Makhmour with Deputy Turkish Special Envoy for
Iraq Ethem Tokdemir on October 11, but Tokdemir did not
respond substantively.

--------------
U.S. Image Improving
--------------


9. (C) Guven concluded the meeting by confirming that the
recent visits and efforts of Secretary Rice and NSC Chairman
Hadley as well as continued USG efforts on PKK were having an
impact on the U.S. image in Turkey. A clearly pleased Guven
said additional steps will be "very, very helpful."

--------------
Comment and Action Requests
--------------


10. (C) The positive momentum continues in the bilateral
discussions of enhanced cooperation agains the PKK in Europe.
We will need to work hard to keep things moving forward and
are now approaching the most difficult stage: putting
together meaningful case files with the Turks that will work
in Europe. This may require further in-country consultations
to refine information and presentations. Post urges
Washington's close attention to keep things moving with a
quick U.S. response on the names. Follow-up actions are:

--Evaluating the Turkish-proposed list of names and proposing
demarche language to the GOT;

--Considering instructing the U.S. Ambassador in Copenhagen
to consult closely with the Turkish Embassy regarding Roj TV;

--U.S. law enforcement analysis of Turkish information on
U.S.-based PKK-linked organizations (once the GOT provides
further information);

--Requesting Embassy Berlin look into legal basis of recent
German anti-PKK actions;

--Reponding to the GOT's list of Europe-based PKK-linked
organizations.




MCELDOWNEY