Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA6181
2005-10-12 14:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

LAUNCHING A STRUCTURED STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH

Tags:  PREL PTER TU US 
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121428Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006181 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER TU US
SUBJECT: LAUNCHING A STRUCTURED STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH
TURKEY

REF: ANKARA 5825

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006181

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER TU US
SUBJECT: LAUNCHING A STRUCTURED STRATEGIC DIALOGUE WITH
TURKEY

REF: ANKARA 5825

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) With the October 3 EU decision on Turkey's accession
negotiations behind us, it is time to turn toward
consolidation of recent gains made in our bilateral
relationship and to expand regional cooperation with Ankara.
One way to do this is to establish a more structured policy
dialogue that would allow us to forge a common frame of
reference on shared challenges and opportunities for joint
action. For too long, our dialogue with Turkey has been
reactive and focused on issues of the day. This approach
worked when the two sides had a common understanding of the
issues, their relevance to national interests, and the
appropriate responses, such as during the Cold War when the
threats were clear and Turkey was led by Western-oriented
elites. Now, however, it is clear that we must invest more
in the relationship if we are to repair past fissures and
create a basis for genuine collaboration. A structured and
regularly scheduled dialogue could help ensure a common
understanding of issues, interests and responses, as well as
foster the trust necessary to prevent downturns in the
relationship like those experienced over Iraq in recent
years. While such a dialogue is likely to require
considerable commitment of time and attention, the potential
benefits are significant. There are a number of ways that
this dialogue could be structured; what follows is one
possibility for consideration and debate.


2. (C) We propose an annual meeting of a Structured Strategic
dialogue (SSD),rotating between capitals, with working
groups meeting between plenaries and reporting thereto. To
be successful, the SSD would need to be senior enough to have
meaningful dialogue across the spectrum of issues on which we
desire Turkey's cooperation -- counter terrorism, Iraq,
BMENAI, the Caucasus, Central Asia, etc. We recommend that
the SSD be chaired by under secretaries, namely, the US Under
Secretary for Political Affairs and the MFA Undersecretary.

SIPDIS
The focus of these conversations would be conceptual rather
than operational, with the intent of reaching a common
understanding of long term goals and broad purposes.


3. (C) SSD working groups would be more functionally
oriented, with each side wielding sufficient clout within
their own government to be able to effect the cooperation and
collaboration that would be the focus of their discussions.
This requires that they be chaired by senior officials. Many
issues require interagency coordination; to ensure the Turks
bring the right people to the discussion, our delegations
would also need to be multi-agency when appropriate. The SSD
could create or disband working groups as appropriate, but
initially we recommend the following groups be established:

-- Iraq: Led by S/I and GOT Iraq Coordinator Amb Koruturk,
this group would examine support for the political process in
Iraq and other Turkish support for the effort there.

-- Middle East: Led by NEA and MFA DU/S Uzumcu, this forum
would discuss Turkey's support for BMENAI and the Road Map.
It would also be a venue to encourage a tougher Turkish line
against Syria and Iran.

-- Counterterrorism: Led by S/CT and DU/S Sensoy (or Deputy
S/CT and DG Guven),this body should include law enforcement
officials (thereby responding to PM Erdogan's suggestion to
APNSA Hadley that the Interior Ministry be involved in SSD)
as well as representatives of the intelligence community and
perhaps Treasury. It would need to focus on actions against
the PKK in Europe and elsewhere, but should also address
trans-national terrorist threats and ways to disrupt them.

-- Nonproliferation: Led by an ISN DAS and DG Bayer, this
working group would focus on nonproliferation cooperation,
such as efforts to break up the A.Q.Khan network, to make PSI
more effective, and to develop competent export control
capabilities in other countries (e.g., Central Asia, Iraq,
etc.). Defense, customs and intelligence officials might be
included in this working group.

-- Eurasia: Led by EUR and DU/S Apakan, the two sides could
address Turkey-EU, Caucasus (unless the HLDG's Caucasus
Working Group is expanded to include political issues, as
proposed by EUR DAS Bryza),Central Asia, Black Sea and
Cyprus. In the Turkey-EU context, democratization and human
rights in Turkey could also be addressed. If the Department
shifts Central Asia to SA, then a separate working group on
that region, to include Afghanistan, might be advisable.
MCELDOWNEY