Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA5978
2005-10-04 12:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY, THE MORNING AFTER

Tags:  PREL PGOV EU TU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

041236Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005978 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV EU TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY, THE MORNING AFTER

REF: A. ANKARA 5932


B. ANKARA 1730

C. ANKARA 1074

Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005978

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV EU TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY, THE MORNING AFTER

REF: A. ANKARA 5932


B. ANKARA 1730

C. ANKARA 1074

Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The morning after Turkish FM Gul made his
late-evening, oft-postponed flight to Luxembourg to
officially open Turkey's EU accession negotiations, Turkish
officials and media alike are hailing the step as an historic
accomplishment. Last minute changes to the negotiating
framework text allowed the Turks to reach consensus on two
deal-breaker concerns and ease the national mood of wounded
pride (ref A). Turkish officials have expressed their thanks
to us for U.S. support; media have been overt in their
praise. But the afterglow will be short, as Turkey faces a
difficult road that will require hard work and profound
changes in mentality. End Summary.

Real Concerns, and A Tough Slog to Consensus
--------------


2. (C) In the run-up to the hard-won consensus on the
evening of October 3, the Turks' twin concerns over
"privileged partnership" and being forced to drop objections
to Republic of Cyprus (ROC) membership in international
organizations were real. Gaining internal consensus was a
tough slog; the Turks' vows to walk away from negotiations
over these issues were no bluff. The AKP government held its
final deliberations at AKP party headquarters to include
party leadership - a sign of the delicate internal political
balance.


3. (C) "Privileged partnership" cuts to the heart of
Turkey's nationalistic pride, denoting second-class
citizenship and discrimination. For all their anti-EU
rhetoric, most Turks desperately want to be seen as "good
enough" to be part of Europe; "privileged partnership" was a
shibboleth for even pro-EU Turks.


4. (C) The Cyprus issue, too, posed a dilemma. MFA
officials worried that negotiations would cease if Turkey did
not drop objections to Cypriot membership in NATO and other
organizations or, in the words of a sleep-deprived MFA
official, that the AKP government would fall if Turkey did
drop its objections. Often uneasy AKP government-Turkish
military relations were also certainly on their minds.


5. (C) Against the backdrop of news about back-and-forth

negotiations that trickled in throughout the day, Erdogan and
Gul successfully portrayed the final text as a victory both
for Turkey and for Europe. Reports of Austria's concession
and of text changes eased the Turks' bruised pride that had
prevailed in the days leading up to October 3.

Erdogan and Gul Hail Beginning of Talks
--------------


6. (U) PM Erdogan hailed what he termed "a gigantic step in
line with Turkey's historical mission." He called the
beginning of negotiations "the most important stage in the
ideals of our republic and the effort we made during the past
40 years."


7. (U) Speaking at an airport news conference just before
taking off for Luxembourg, Gul called the beginning of
negotiations an "historic point" and a "step toward a new
era," adding, "all the leaders in the EU have supported
Turkey." In a statesmanlike gesture, Gul noted that he had
called opposition People's Republican Party leader Deniz
Baykal, a fierce critic of Gul's AKP and the EU, to brief him
on the details of the final framework text.

Media Coverage, Transformed
--------------


8. (U) Media coverage, which on the morning of October 3 was
uniformly defiant about EU "demands," transformed instantly
into glowing headlines about Turkey's new EU vocation.
Several leading dailies carried headlines portraying the
final negotiating framework outcome as a Turkish "win." Even
leftist daily "Cumhuriyet," recently the media's most
strident anti-EU voice, settled for the tame headline of
"Negotiations Begin."

Public and Private Gratitude for U.S. Efforts
--------------


9. (U) The media also praised U.S efforts on Turkey's
behalf. Leading television news channel NTV ran the story
about Secretary Rice's conversation with PM Erdogan under the
ticker "The U.S. Steps In." After falling sharply Monday
morning, the beginning of the Turkish financial markets'
rebound coincided with news of the Rice/Erdogan call. The
call was also front page news in mass-circulation daily
"Hurriyet," anti-EU "Cumhuriyet," and Islamist-leaning Zaman,
under the headline "The U.S. Steps In: We Are On Your Side."
Several media reports outlined U.S. efforts with Cyprus and
other EU countries.


10. (C) Turkish officials have been effusive in their thanks
for U.S. support. Several advisors to PM Erdogan called
Charge immediately following the formal decision to go to
Luxembourg and profusely thanked the U.S. for its efforts.
An emotional MFA U/S Tuygan called Charge thereafter and
expressed deep gratitude for years of U.S. support.

Short Afterglow, A Hard Road Ahead
--------------


11. (C) Comment: The afterglow of October 3 will be
short-lived. Turkey's leaders must now shift gears quickly
and do the hard work to prepare Turkey, structurally and
mentally, for the negotiation process. Turkey's EU General
Secretariat needs to be re-organized and strengthened.

SIPDIS
Ministries need to set aside staff to work on the adoption of
the 80,000-page EU aquis. Chief EU Negotiator Babacan must
gather capable and experienced personnel.


12. (C) The mental transformations required of Turkey are
profound. Turkey's leaders must make the public understand
that there is hardly any give-and-take in EU "negotiations."
To be successful, the Turks will have to swallow some pride;
given Turkey's strong nationalism, this will be difficult and
controversial. The government's hope is that, with October 3
behind them, much of the formal process can become
regularized and slip under the radar screen of public
scrutiny. The strident and unhelpful opposition is unlikely
to allow that.


13. (C) The EU and Turkey navigated a similarly tortuous
path last December at the Summit when the EU established the
October 3 negotiation date. After the Summit, Turkey's
reform efforts stalled and the GOT allowed its EU candidacy
to drift politically (refs B,C). We will immediately engage
with the GOT about their plans for the next stage and
strongly urge them to move forward now, while the political
mood is still fresh. End Comment.
MCELDOWNEY