SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE'S VISIT TO ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000561

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON TU IZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE'S VISIT TO ANKARA


(U) Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: You arrive in Turkey as we begin to
recalibrate bilateral relations emphasizing renewed dialogue
on areas of mutual concern to maximize achievable
cooperation. We are working with a different democratizing
Turkey as elites rotate and under the impact of widespread,
and disaffection with U.S. policy in Iraq and Turkey's
absorption with EU accession negotiations. Our task is
complicated by the sharpening difference between a government
unwilling to reaffirm the value of the U.S.-Turkish
relationship in consistent, bold, public terms and a General
Staff (TGS) which is steadily, rationally, and publicly
signaling a desire to make the relationship work. End
summary.

MAIN ISSUES
--------------


2. (C) Iraq-related issues top your Turkish interlocutors'
agenda. The U.S. intervention remains sharply unpopular as a
result of instinctive Muslim/Sunni, solidarity or left-wing
anti-American sentiment, depending on the segment of Turkish
society; the Turkish media, government, and main opposition
party have all contributed to heightening the negative view
in Turkish public opinion. The Turks see the positive Jan.
30 Iraqi elections through the prism of Kurdish aspirations
for independence and the belief that we are essentially
handing over Kirkuk to the Kurds with negative implications
for Iraqi and Turkish stability and interests. (While they
supported the elections, their statements (pre- and post)
were heavily tinted with the view that they won't like the
outcome and an assertion that it will add to tension and
violence.) Moreover, the high level of official and
media-generated disinformation has nourished Turkish
conspiracy theories over lack of U.S. action against the PKK
in northern Iraq, perceived U.S. favoritism toward the Kurds
(e.g., on Kirkuk) and toward the Shi'a, perceived
discrimination against the Turkmen minority, and perceived
U.S. coldness toward Iraqi Sunni Arabs. Bilateral relations
were further poisoned by al-Jazeera style media distortion of
the fall 2004 Fallujah operation and related anti-U.S.
statements by PM Erdogan and FM Gul.


3. (C) Other issues on which your Turkish interlocutors will
focus include Cyprus, where the Turks expect the U.S. and UK
to take the lead in ending the isolation of the Turkish
Cypriots and bringing the Greek Cypriots back to the
bargaining table; and EU accession negotiations. The EU's
December 17 decision to open the accession process with
Turkey in October 2005 should spur continued internal reform,
at least on paper, but implementation remains a chronic
problem and Turkey faces a long, difficult path to membership.

ERDOGAN, AKP: UNASSAILABLE, OR OVERCONFIDENT?
-------------- -


4. (C) Despite resentment and suspicion of ruling AKP by a
waning Kemalist elite, Erdogan still appears unassailable for
the time being. He remains highly popular in the heartland
owing to the widespread conviction that he is the tribune of
the common man and because the common man says, "He looks
like us." Erdogan has a two-thirds majority in parliament
and faces no meaningful opposition from other parties,
especially given main opposition CHP's wallowing in bitter
infighting. Indeed, Turkey is functioning as a quasi-one
party state, which is slowly bringing other problems to the
fore.


5. (C) Unfortunately, Erdogan suffers from a lack of
competent, worldly advisors and, given the lack of
competition from opposition parties, we see a measurable
drift in policy- and decision-making: he has found it
impossible to choose a chief negotiator with the EU and he is
unable to organize a Cabinet reshuffle. That has
periodically been on his agenda for almost two years. His
effective policy direction has come either from the EU (the
Copenhagen Criteria) or from the IMF (standby agreements).
Erdogan does not have effective control of either the
entrenched State bureaucracy or his own party, owing in part
to his continual absence from Ankara -- he has made
approximately 75 foreign trips in two years and is otherwise
traveling around Turkey. He has failed to forge effective
working relations with either the Presidency or core
institutions of the State (armed forces, judiciary). And he
faces a growing problem of corruption in AKP.

TURKEY'S PROBLEMATIC VIEW OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Erdogan appears to accept the idea in principle that
maintaining good relations with the U.S. is important. He
and Gul have taken some verbal steps to reaffirm the
relationship (mixed with damaging emotional outbursts),but
Erdogan has no vision of how to re-energize and expand
relations from Turkey's side. Gul has Islam-influenced views
behind his seeming affability and Ahmet Davutoglu, the
Islamist foreign policy adviser to both Gul and Erdogan, is
inclined to distance Turkey from the U.S., in directions
familiar from Erbakan's days in the Prime Ministry (1996-97).
President Sezer is a narrow-minded statist with a tin ear
for politics and little enthusiasm for good relations with
the U.S. -- he maneuvered to prevent U.S. troop deployment
through Turkey for OIF and has been effusive in his response
to Putin. CHOD Ozkok is a solidly pro-Atlanticist senior
commander. Deputy CHOD Basbug (apparently in line to become
CHOD in 2008),whose repeated emphasis on the breadth, depth,
and importance of relations with the U.S. was a highlight of
his January 26 press conference, agrees, although he is
somewhat more reserved. Ozkok has moved step-by-step to try
to bring more modern thinkers into senior ranks, but
left-nationalist sentiments are strong at lower ranks.

SECURITY RELATIONS
--------------


7. (C) The GOT says it shares our goals for a secure, stable,
democratic Iraq, united and territorially whole, but your
interlocutors continue to complain that we do not listen to
their input or concerns. At the same time they have few
concrete proposals for next steps beyond keeping the Iraqi
Kurds in line or dealing with the PKK/Kongra-Gel.
Nonetheless, Turkey has provided valuable assistance on Iraq.
Ankara offered to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq in
October 2003, approved the use of Incirlik Air Base for
tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions for both
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF),authorized the transit of U.S. troops from Iraq on
rotation out, and permits the transit of supplies for our
forces and humanitarian goods. The GOT says it reached out
to all major Iraqi groups to encourage participation in the
elections. Turkey is active in reconstruction efforts,
including providing electricity for Iraq, and training in
Turkey of Iraqi diplomats, Sunni political groups and, as its
contribution to the NATO training mission, Iraqi security
forces. Lower level officials have suggested Turkey could
cut support, like the logistics transits to get our attention
on Kirkuk or Kongra-Gel.


8. (C) U.S. military leaders worked hard to repair the damage
caused by Turkey,s failure to approve passage of the 4th ID
in March 2003 and our arrest of Turkish Special Forces
personnel in Suleymania in July of that year. Nonetheless,
the security relationship remains fragile. Recent requests
to increase our use of Incirlik AB (e.g., establish a
logistics air hub, increase training deployments) have been
delayed as Turkish officials remain concerned the hub
proposal may be part of a larger U.S. request to move F-16s
permanently to the base as part of the Defense Posture Review
Initiative. Some Turks suspect we desire to use Incirlik AB
to stage strikes on neighbors Iran or Syria. We are seeking
confirmation of some local press speculation that the Turks
may offer you Incirlik as a logistics air cargo hub in
response to our long-standing request.


9. (C) The preoccupation with Iraq overshadows good bilateral
cooperation in other aspects of the GWOT: since 9/11 and the
November 2003 Istanbul attacks, our intelligence and law
enforcement cooperation has improved, although greater
Turkish attention to Al-Qai'da link support elements here
would be beneficial. Our militaries coordinate assistance to
Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their abilities to protect
important energy transportation routes. Turkey subscribes to
every arms control arrangement it is eligible to join,
including the Proliferation Security Initiative. Ankara has
been supportive of international efforts to press Iran to
meet its commitments to the IAEA, although strongly favoring
persuasion over coercion, while Gul and Erdogan have stressed
publicly good neighborliness and Iran's "credible" denials of
nuclear activity. The Turkish military provides
counterterrorism and other training to personnel from
Partnership for Peace partner countries and soon to Allies as
well. And Turkey will again assume the command of ISAF in
Afghanistan in February for a six-month period during which
they will significantly increase their contribution to this
important NATO mission.

HUMAN RIGHTS
--------------


10. (U) Since 1991, Turkey has adopted eight wide-ranging
packages of legal reforms and two sets of constitutional
amendments aimed at meeting EU-related human rights
standards. The legal reforms are designed to crack down on
torture, loosen restrictions on speech and assembly, reduce
the political influence of the military, and expand religious
freedom. Implementation of the laws has been slow. Elements
of the military, police, judiciary, and bureaucracy have
criticized some of the reforms as threats to national
security, and have resisted implementation. In some cases,
bureaucratic offices have drafted highly restrictive
implementing legislation. For example, Parliament lifted
restrictions on Kurdish language broadcasting, but the
subsequent Radio and Television Board regulation set strict
time limits and restricted such broadcasts to state-owned
media outlets.


11. (SBU) Turkey faces a long, difficult path to full EU
membership. Many here do not recognize how wrenching the
changes ahead will be. The EU has made it clear that it
expects accession talks with Turkey will take at least 10
years, and a number of Turkish officials privately
acknowledge the GOT will need that time to adopt the full EU
acquis. Turkey is expected to face difficulty in a number of
areas, including environmental standards, but the key is
still likely to be Turkey and the EU's adoption of real
religious freedom and tolerance.

REGIONAL ISSUES
--------------


12. (C) Under FM Gul's influence, Turkey has sought to
improve relations with Iran and with Arab neighbors,
including Syria, over the past year. PM Erdogan visited Iran
in July 2004 and Syria in December. Gul visited Israel and
Palestine in January 2005, a visit both Turkey and Israel
portrayed as an end to Turkish-Israeli public tensions in
2004, and Erdogan says he will visit Israel soon. Abu Mazen
is due in Turkey Feb. 1. Turkey still views itself as a
potential mediator between Israel and the Palestinians, but
has so far failed to produce any results. For now, bilateral
economic relations and intel cooperation remain strong.


13. (C) The GOT is a working partner in the Broader Middle
East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI). Turkey is a
co-sponsor, with Italy and Yemen, of the BMENAI's Democracy
Assistance Dialogue (DAD). While Gul consistently says the
right thing on the need for economic and political reform in
the region, we need to press them to develop an active
program to move the Democracy Dialogue forward. However,
most of the Turkish public, and even many Turkish politicians
and academics, believe BMENAI is a U.S. plan to control
Middle East oil and convert Turkey into a moderate "Islamic
state" as a "model" for the region.


14. (C) Turkey made a major policy shift on Cyprus to support
the Annan Plan in spring 2004, but feels aggrieved because
little has been done to ease the economic isolation of the
Turkish Cypriots. Relations with Greece continue to warm,
despite recent Greek complaints about Turkish air activity in
the Aegean. Greece gave firm public support to Turkey's EU
candidacy.


15. (C) Trade relations with Russia have ballooned in the
past several years. Turkey is strongly dependent on Russian
natural gas; during a December visit Putin reminded the Turks
of their energy dependence on Russia and proffered a
strategic partnership alternative to Turkey's ties with the
U.S. and EU. PM Erdogan immediately followed up Putin's
visit by visiting Moscow in January, again focusing on
expanding energy and commercial ties; Putin again proffered a
strategic alternative. Turkey has strong ties to Azerbaijan
and backs Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Turkey
will not open its border with Armenia or restore diplomatic
relations absent Armenian recognition of the border with
Turkey and concessions on occupied Azerbaijani territories.
The Turks publicly support Georgia's sovereignty and
territorial integrity, but have not been forceful vis-a-vis
Russian designs in Georgia.


16. (C) Believing that the incidence of HIV/AIDS is low and
is limited to sex workers and intravenous drug users, Turkish
officials are complacent about the AIDS threat, arguing that
Turkey's traditional family values make transmission to the
general population unlikely. However, high HIV infection
rates in neighboring countries (Russia, Ukraine and Romania)
pose a serious threat to Turkey. Although the Global Fund
has granted $300,000 to Turkey for public education programs
for high risk groups, the proposed creation of a regional
information and best practices sharing network among Black
Sea Economic Cooperation forum countries has not moved
forward.

ECONOMY
--------------


17. (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the
financial crisis of 2000-2001 and is growing at an annual
pace of around 8-9 percent. However, the recovery remains
vulnerable due to a large current account deficit (about 5
percent of GDP) and a large debt with a short maturity
structure. Unemployment and poverty remain high, and
ordinary people have not felt much benefit yet from the
overall macroeconomic improvement. Turkey remains too reliant
on Russian energy sources (a point the Russians are trying to
use as leverage for political gain). Macroeconomic success
has also bred a sense of complacency about the need to
persist with difficult reforms, such as privatization, and
reform of the banking, social security and tax systems.
These reforms are being addressed in the new three-year
standby program that the IMF and GOT have just agreed to.


18. (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility and
opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received
less foreign direct investment than other countries of
similar size and potential. Many in the Turkish elite are
convinced that there will be a flood of foreign investment in
the wake of the EU,s December decision to open accession
negotiations with Turkey in October. However, this is
unlikely to materialize unless more is done in the area of
structural reform. In addition, there appears to be a lack
of appreciation for the enormous challenges Turkey will
shoulder in the accession negotiations, for the fact that EU
accession will affect nearly aspect of their lives, and that
it may in the end be quite costly for Turkey to comply with
EU directives in environmental protection and other areas.
EDELMAN