Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA5448
2005-09-20 14:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

US OFFICIALS COOPERATION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT

Tags:  KTFN EFIN PREL TU PKK 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005448 

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR OTI
NSC FOR MCKIBBEN AND BROOKS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2009
TAGS: KTFN EFIN PREL TU PKK
SUBJECT: US OFFICIALS COOPERATION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGAINST PKK IN EUROPE

REF: ANKARA 5037

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005448

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR OTI
NSC FOR MCKIBBEN AND BROOKS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2009
TAGS: KTFN EFIN PREL TU PKK
SUBJECT: US OFFICIALS COOPERATION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGAINST PKK IN EUROPE

REF: ANKARA 5037

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4(b) an
d (d).


1. (C) Summary: In an important gesture of our preparedness
to work together with Turkey to shut down the PKK's European
support network, Washington analysts presented a list of PKK
financiers to an interagency group of Turkish officials. In
subsequent meetings, the Charge urged Finance Minister
Unakitan and senior MFA officials to react quickly to this
list and move forward on a plan to work with the Europeans.
Building on the high level enthusiasm expressed by Unakitan
and others, post will continue to press to get the Turks past
their skepticism about financial measures against terrorism
and bureaucratic stovepiping and inefficiency. End Summary.

USG Analysts Pass PKK Financiers List
--------------


2. (C) At an interagency bilateral meeting September 15,
visiting Washington analysts discussed how the U.S. and
Turkey could cooperate to encourage European governments to
disrupt the PKK's support network in Europe by, inter alia,
blocking accounts and freezing financial assets of PKK
financiers operating from their territories. The analysts
presented a preliminary list of PKK financiers and explained
we now expected Turkish ideas for the target list.


3. (C) The analysts suggested that Turkish counterparts
refine the list into a feasible number of targeted names that
could be used by law enforcement agencies. The analysts
pointed out that in many cases European law enforcement was
more likely to be able to go after PKK supporters on the
basis of criminal activity rather than as terrorist
financiers.

4.(C) The analysts also discussed the issue in separate
meetings with the Turkish General Staff (TGS) and the Turkish
National Intelligence Organization (TNIO).

Charge Reiterates at High Level
--------------


5. (C) Immediately following the interagency meeting, Charge
and EconCouns met with Minister of Finance Unakitan and MASAK
President Yarasli. The Charge reiterated U.S. readiness to
work with Turkey on a strategy against PKK financial support
in Europe. She urged a very quick response to the list

presented by the analysts. Unakitan recognized the
importance of the U.S. offer and was very appreciative.
Picking up the phone, he called Deputy Prime Minister Ali
Sahin and arranged to meet him that evening. Later the same
evening, Unakitan told the Charge at a social event that he
and Sahin had agreed to get back to us quickly.


6. (C) The following day, the Charge similarly pressed MFA
Deputy Under Secretary (and proposed Ambassador to
Washington) Nabi Sensoy for a quick response to the list.
Foreign Ministry officials have told us the MFA has working
on a reply to the broader (not just finance) non-paper EUR
DAS Bryza had provided at the beginning of September.

Comment: Devil Will be in the Details
--------------


7. (C) This offer to work together represents an important
gesture of U.S. seriousness to cooperate with Turkey against
the PKK and is a significant boost to our efforts to get away
from the sterile conversation over PKK in northern Iraq.
Though Turkish senior officials' reactions were positive,
they did not give much of a substantive reaction, needing
first to evaluate the U.S. approach and the list and
collaborate on an official GOT response.


8. (C) Going forward, there will be multiple challenges.
First, the tendency of the Turkish government to stovepipe
will continue to be a problem, both specifically with regard
to developing strong PKK case files and in the broader fight
against the financing of terrorism. Yarasli told us he did
not yet have legal authority to take an active role on terror
finance issues until the new MASAK law was passed, yet the
Minister has repeatedly directed us to MASAK on these issues
and MASAK is the Turkish FIU. In the September 15 meeting
Yarasli told us that the Turkish National Intelligence Office
had called him that morning to give its clearance to Yarasli
receving the analysts' list. Nor did TNIO attend the meeting
despite our specific suggestion through the MFA. The good
news is that our efforts are creating pressure for agencies
to cooperate more: the presence of MOJ, MFA and several
branches of the police at a MASAK-led meeting was
unprecedented, for example.


9. (C) A second challenge will be to overcome an attitude --
perhaps reflective of the Turks' technical weakness on
financial crime -- of skepticism about the utility of going
after PKK money flows from Europe. One official in the
meeting from the Turkish National Police's Intel Department,
for example, questioned the Washington analysts about the
practicality of targeting PKK finances given that the
decision-makers are in Iraq and the diffuse nature of the
financial collection network. Last, but not least, Turkish
law enforcement has a weak track record in putting together
evidence Europeans can actually use under their legal
systems. If the GOT swallows its pride enough to allow U.S.
legal experts to help the GOT prepare case files, the U.S.
experts will have their work cut out for them.

MCELDOWNEY