TURKS PREPARED TO ACCEPT EXISTING FRAMEWORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005236

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2015
TAGS: PREL ECON PGOV EU TU
SUBJECT: TURKS PREPARED TO ACCEPT EXISTING FRAMEWORK
LANGUAGE, BUT NO MORE

REF: ANKARA 5183

Classified By: A/DCM James R. Moore, E.O. 12958, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: In separate September 7 meetings with MFA
Deputy U/S Bozkir and U/S Tuygan, Charge learned that the
Turks are prepared to stomach some fairly tough language in
the Negotiating Framework, especially if they can get
slightly modified language in the Counter-Declaration,
linking Cyprus recognition to a comprehensive UN settlement.
They remain hopeful that October 3 will happen, are grateful
to the British for their statesmanship and professionalism in
moving the process forward, and hope they will have both
documents in their hands prior to October 3. It remains,
however, a tough slog, and the GOT is concerned with possible
opposition backlash and flagging public opinion. End summary.

Cyprus Recognition Language Remains a Problem
--------------


2. (C) During Charge's September 7 introductory call on
Turkish Deputy U/S Volkan Bozkir, who has overall
responsibility for EU within the MFA, Bozkir offered a
hands-on review of where the Turks stand on the two documents
on which the EU is currently working - the
counter-declaration and the Negotiating Framework. Per
Bozkir, the biggest stumbling blocks in the current version
of the counter-declaration remain:

--the requirement of "de jure normalization" with all EU
member states, stated separately from the references to a
comprehensive settlement on Cyprus, and

--the inclusion of a 2006 review.

These are both serious issues for Turkey. With respect to
the first point, Bozkir stated, if normalization and overall
settlement are not explicitly tied to one another in a single
paragraph, some could interpret it as a call for recognition
of the Republic of Cyprus, prior to recognition within the
framework of a comprehensive, UN-sponsored Cyprus settlement.
This would simply not be possible for Turkey. As to the
inclusion of a date one year hence for a review, this would
again raise the public profile of what should at that point
be routine negotiations. The GOT's goal, having gotten the
December 17 commitment to start negotiations, and then, they
hope, the actual start of negotiations on October 3, is to
remove this from the public eye. It should become routine.
Moreover, the EU has built-in mechanisms for regular review
in the form of progress reports; an explicit additional date
is not needed; it would be merely gratuitous. The Turks have
asked that it be deleted.


3. (C) As it stands, the draft language on Cyprus is
difficult domestically for the GOT. It could, Bozkir
related, cause an opposition coalition that developed after
December 17, and which consists of a mix of leftists,
nationalists, social democrats, Islamists and even some in
the military, to once again be highly critical of the
government. Other MFA officials have told us that PM Erdogan
is concerned about defections among his own AK party members
of parliament when the Additional Protocol to the Ankara
Agreement comes up for ratification. Public support for
Turkey's EU accession, while still substantial at around 65%,
has dropped from a high of 80%.


4. (C) Bozkir's expectation is that, however close CoReper
were to come to agreement on the counter-declaration, they
will leave it to Foreign Ministers to finalize - especially
the difficult point on Cyprus recognition - at a meeting the
British will convene o/a September 26. EU FonMins will take
up the nearly-finished Negotiating Framework at the same
time, he asserted, bringing that to closure as well. Bozkir
described this as "not good" for Turkey, but perhaps a
political necessity for the EU. He expressed great
appreciation for the UK's extraordinary and professional
efforts on Turkey's behalf.

Turks Willing to Live with Framework "As Is"
--------------


5. (C) The negotiating framework (the Framework) has
remained essentially unchanged for some time. The problem in
the GOT's view lies in Section 4, which goes further than the
spirit of December 17, turning elements into actual
requirements that must be met to continue negotiations.
These include references to Turkish-Greek relations, certain
political and economic criteria, and the improvement of
relations with the Republic of Cyprus.


6. (C) In addition, the Framework contains a separate clause
on the EU's absorption capacity. In Bozkir's view, this is a
clause of a different nature altogether, since it would
require the Commission to look into the capacity of the EU
during the course of the negotiations. The result could be
that, if the Commission determines the EU has insufficient
absorption capacity, the negotiations could be stopped dead
in their tracks through no fault on Turkey's part. However,
Bozkir concluded, the Turks have made it known that, in the
spirit of compromise, they are prepared to live with these
requirements as long as no new ones are added. The GOT could
not, he stressed, stomach any more.


7. (C) Bozkir's read is that, based on the College of
Commissioners, 20 of 25 members are prepared to leave it as
is. The five hold outs are France, Austria, Greece, Cyprus
and the Czech Republic. Of those, aside from the French,
only the Austrian FM has expressed herself, and would have
remained isolated, but for support from Prague. His sense
from his French counterparts is that they are pushing for
France to return to a more reasonable stance, but are faced
with the new political reality. The result is that they
continue to press in order to save face, but will, Bozkir
believes, likely stop with the counter-declaration. Still,
he remains wary of what the French may do.

They Need Both Documents Before October 3
--------------


8. (C) The GOT continues to be appreciative of British
efforts to bring both documents to closure prior to October
3, in particular because if FM Gul is to travel to Brussels
on October 3, he needs to be able to have the Framework in
hand. Otherwise, the Turkish Ambassador will represent
Turkey at the official opening. Bozkir assured Charge that
the GOT would be ready with its negotiating team when the
time came. Its structure as a secretariat would change with
the new parliament, as would its name and many of its faces,
and it would gain clout. Staffing, he stressed, would not be
a problem. The Turks would use appropriate ministries to
assist a smaller secretariat with various chapters. Bozkir
assured Charge that the Additional Protocol would not/not be
brought before parliament prior to October 3. At this point,
he concluded, they just need to get past the October 3
starting gate.


9. (C) In a separate meeting with MFA U/S Ali Tuygan the
same day, Tuygan admitted that the road to October 3 appeared
to be a harder slog than he had expected. In his
consultations in EU capitals, however, he had stressed the
need for the EU to agree on a Negotiating Framework and
counter-declaration in good time, to allow the GOT to be
prepared for October 3. FM Gul, he reiterated, could not fly
without such a mandate. However, a number of states had
pledged to Tuygan that they would be supportive and not
remain on the sidelines. "Every time," he lamented, "the joy
is taken out of it." After October 3, which Tuygan believes
will happen, there will be a new political reality on the
ground.

10 (C) Comment: We continue to make the point to the Turks
that they should keep their cool and continue to let the
British navigate these difficult waters. The Turks
appreciate the ongoing UK effort, as well as ongoing USG
behind-the-scenes support. The GOT is keeping a watchful eye
on the various EU players, though, and is not taking anything
for granted. End Comment.
MCELDOWNEY