DAS BRYZA'S AUGUST 25-26 VISIT TO TURKEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 005223

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2025
TAGS: TU PGOV PINS PREL
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S AUGUST 25-26 VISIT TO TURKEY

REF: A. ANKARA 4965


B. STATE 121751

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary: DAS Bryza attended a series of positive
meetings with Turkish officials to promote a renewed
strategic partnership between the US and Turkey. While
noting that the U.S.-Turkish relationship is broad and
multidimensional, Turkish interlocutors repeatedly stressed
the importance of the Iraq and PKK issues and warned that the
perception of continued USG inaction against the PKK is
undermining popular support for the U.S. in Turkey. End
Summary.


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MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GUL
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2. (C) In his meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister and
Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, DAS Bryza outlined his
vision for a shared U.S.-Turkish strategic partnership. Gul,
in turn, emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Turkish
relationship and asserted that good USG-GOT relations would
benefit the entire world.


3. (C) Gul expressed his concerns regarding the PKK and the
situation in Iraq. He is worried that the new constitution
has opened the door to the Kurds seizing Kirkuk and fears
that this will unbalance a delicate situation and fuel
extremism. Gul also encouraged the USG to strengthen the
hands of the Sunni minority in Iraq; he claimed that the
Sunnis are naturally closer to U.S. and Turkish values and
the Iraqi Shiites, in contrast, are "narrow-minded and
extremist". Gul warned Bryza that PKK terrorist operations
are fueling anti-Americanism in Turkey because the Turkish
public is increasingly associating the U.S. with the PKK,s
resurgence. Bryza underscored that the United States was
working against the PKK terrorists in Europe and Iraq through
the trilateral process. Efforts in Iraq should proceed from
our shared interests in a unified Iraq with a sovereign
government, which meant Ankara and Baghdad should work on the
PKK directly with each other, with the United States playing
a supporting role.


4. (C) Gul said Turkey is grateful for the USG,s help on
Turkey,s EU-membership bid. Gul claimed that Turkey,s
strategy is to do everything asked in the run up to October

3. Bryza encouraged the GOT to show restraint in responding
to the EU,s expected counter-declaration to Turkey,s July
28 statement of non-recognition of Cyprus. (Comment: Gul is
exaggerating. The GOT has redlines it is unwilling to cross
at this stage, e.g. recognition of Cyprus. End Comment.)


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MFA ON US-TURKISH RELATIONS, PKK, AND IRAQ
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5. (C) Deputy U/S Apakan said Turkey wants to develop and
broaden its bilateral agenda with the U.S. The MFA is in the
process of drafting a list which will provide the U.S. side
with suggested bilateral working groups. DAS Bryza welcomed
the expanded dialogue and said the U.S aim is to produce
tangible results.


6. (C) Apakan called the U.S. paper on addressing the PKK
problem in Europe "useful" and said the MFA is evaluating it.
He noted that the paper "addresses one aspect" of the PKK
problem; the other aspect is the PKK in Northern Iraq. There
is "no substitute for action" against the PKK in Iraq.
Apakan suggested the U.S. provide a paper with a timetable
for steps to cope with the PKK on the ground in Iraq. Apakan
said there has been no change on that score since the August
6 trilateral meeting: PKK infiltration from Iraq to Turkey is
unchanged; PKK flags still fly in Iraq; PKK leaders still
move about freely.


7. (C) DDG for Security Affairs Bicakli said Turkey has given
Iraqi authorities 137 Interpol "red notices" for PKK members.
International agreements and law require the Iraqis to
arrest on this basis, but they have refused. DAS Bryza
pointed out that Iraqi authorities said they need court files
before they can arrest. He urged the Turkish side to provide
the documentation the Iraqis want and which the Turkish side
agreed to provide during trilateral talks, thereby removing
an obstacle to the extradition process. Bryza also promised
that the U.S. would urge Iraqi authorities to arrest PKK
members.


8. (C) Middle East DDG Celikkol reiterated Turkish concerns
that the draft Iraqi Constitution will allow Kirkuk to become
part of the KRA (ref A) and asked that the U.S. use its
influence to prevent this. DAS Bryza replied that the U.S.
shared concerns about Kirkuk. At the same time, we support
Iraqi sovereignty and want to avoid dictating details in the
constitution drafting process. However, Bryza said we would
communicate with the Iraqis on this point and urged Turkey to
do so as well.


9. (C) Celikkol said the MFA has been in contact with all
Iraqi groups; for example, it recently hosted a mixed Sunni
and Shia delegation from Talafar. Celikkol claimed the MFA
consistently tells Iraqi groups to participate in the
political process and not support armed resistance.


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MFA ON ISRAEL/PALESTINE, CAUCUSUS, AND GREECE, CYPRUS
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10. (C) Celikkol called recent developments between Israel
and Palestine "encouraging" and said PMs Erdogan and Sharon
had spoken by telephone twice recently. The two FMs will
meet in New York. Celikkol said Turkey had offered a
security expert to assist in training PA security services
but the U.S. told the GOT to speak directly to the PA about
this. Celiikol said Turkey will supply what it can to the PA
security sector (ref B).


11. (C) Caucasus DDG Karslioglu told Bryza Turkey is
monitoring the run up to Azeri elections, including being in
touch with the opposition, whom they are encouraging to "play
by democratic rules." Turkey is also urging the Azeris to
accept reasonable Armenian offers to settle Nagorno-Karabakh;
he urged similar U.S. pressure on Armenia. The GOT is taking
the Kars/Tbilisi railroad idea "seriously," Karslioglu added.
Bryza suggested considering the merits of the Kars/Guymri
proposal as well, as a possible sweetener for a
Nagorno-Karabakh framework agreement.


12. (C) Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs DG Uman said
Turkish/Greek relations are progressing. He highlighted
trade, tourism and energy cooperation, and noted Aegean and
Cyprus issues have been "compartmentalized, with exploratory
talks on the Aegean continuing at the U/S level. Uman noted
that Greece has made a "strategic decision" to support
Turkey's EU candidacy. The Turks expect PM Karamanlis to
reschedule his postponed visit to Turkey. (Note: Greek First
Secretary Touloupas confirmed August 29 the postponement was

SIPDIS
for scheduling reasons, not politics. End Note.)


13. (C) Apakan requested that the U.S. urge Greece not to
insert stronger Aegean text into the EU Negotiating
Framework; he claimed the current text had been proposed by
the Greeks in December. Bryza outlined U.S. efforts to work
with Greece and other EU members states on this and other
issues related to the October 3 start of EU accession talks
with Turkey.


14. (C) Northeastern Mediterranean DDG Bilman said he
anticipates short and medium term problems with Cyprus in the
context of Turkey's EU accession process. Cyprus-related
text in the Negotiating Framework is "already unbearable" for
Turkey, Bilman added. He predicted any further changes will
jeopardize Turkish parliamentary ratification of the Ankara
Agreement extension protocol, not just with the opposition,
but also among ruling AKP MPs. Apakan added that an EU
counter-declaration abut Cyprus recognition would, in effect,
become part of the acquis. Bryza encouraged the GOT to
demonstrate restraint in responding to the EU
counter-declaration.


15. (C) Apakan and Bilman expressed appreciation for U.S.
measures for Turkish Cypriots and asked that those efforts
continue.

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DIRECTORATE OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS (DIYANET)
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16. (C) Bryza told Mehmet Gormez, Diyanet vice president,
that he recognizes that Turkey, with its unique history,
cannot serve as a "model" for other Muslim countries, but
could nonetheless provide "inspiration." Bryza said Turkey
permits religious diversity while at the same time
controlling Islamic extremism. The Diyanet, with its program
of carefully training state-employed imams, deserves much of
the credit. Bryza said he would like to learn how the
Diyanet accomplishes this, especially with regard to helping
Turkish emigrants remain connected to their Turkish culture,
thereby avoiding the alienation that plagues many other
Muslim immigrant communities (especially Moroccan and
Algerian) in Europe.


17. (C) Gormez said the Diyanet is a unique institution, and
he has had a difficult time explaining its role to
representatives of foreign governments. He said the Diyanet
is an integral part of Turkey,s secular democratic system.
The institution began as the agency responsible for
overseeing Islamic worship in Turkey. In the 1960s, when
Turks began immigrating to Europe and elsewhere, the Diyanet
branched out and began providing services to Turks abroad.
Gormez said that despite the rise of radical Islam in Europe,
no Diyanet mosque in Europe has been connected to any
terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, he said, the
Europeans have never expressed appreciation for the positive
role the Diyanet has played.


18. (C) Bryza noted that he would be traveling to Athens, and
asked whether he could ask the Greek Government to take any
steps that would enable the GOT to re-open the Ecumenical
Patriarchate,s Halki Seminary, closed by the Turkish state
in 1971. Gormez claimed that the Muslim minority in Thrace
faces greater restrictions on religious freedom than
Turkey,s Greek Orthodox. He said the 1923 Lausanne Treaty
establishes reciprocal rights for the two communities. As a
religious scholar, he said, he does not agree with the idea
that the rights of Greek Orthodox Turkish citizens should be
tied to the rights of a minority living in another country.
However, he said, Lausanne places certain legal restrictions
on Turkey. (Note: Gormez,s comments about Lausanne are
standard GOT arguments, although a number of scholars
disagree with this interpretation of the treaty. End Note.)



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TURKISH GENERAL STAFF
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19. (C) DAS Bryza called on the new TGS J5, MG Hilmi Akin
Zorlu, on Aug. 26. (Note: Zorlu was officially promoted to
LTG Aug 30. End Note.) Zorlu noted Iraq,s status as the
center of the GWOT, and urged the U.S. to work for a
democratic and secular state in Iraq, though he acknowledged
the latter "may take some time." He emphasized the need for
Iraqis to identify themselves as Iraqis first and a member of
an ethnic group (Kurd, Arab) or sect second. Zorlu asserted
that the PKK moves freely in northern Iraq, including raising
its front party,s flag in major cities, and asked "how can
Barzani and Talabani permit this?" He asked the U.S. to use
its influence with the Iraqi Kurds to limit the PKK,s
freedom of movement and ability to infiltrate Turkey to carry
out attacks. Bryza responded that we do discuss the PKK
frequently with the Iraqi Kurds, some of whom seem to
understand that the PKK issue may come back to hurt them if
they do not act to counter this terrorist threat.
Additionally, we are using the trilateral process to increase
the Iraqis, capacity to deal with this problem.


20. (C) Bryza outlined planned increased USG efforts to use
diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence assets to work
with Turkey on building cases against PKK terrorists and
operatives in Europe. Zorlu said he appreciated these
efforts. He contrasted long-standing U.S.-Turkey cooperation
on terrorism with Turkey,s more troubled relationship with
many European countries.

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NSC SECGEN ALPOGAN ON CYPRUS AND IRAQ
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21. (C) NSC SecGen Yigit Alpogan noted his appreciation for
US efforts to maintain EU member state support for the Oct. 3
start of Turkey,s EU accession negotiations. He stated that
if the EU imposes new conditions, Turkey will not be able to
continue discussions, adding that popular support for the EU
in Turkey has dropped from 76 percent to 69 percent in recent
months. He claimed the EU would not respond negatively to
Turkey,s declaration of non-recognition of southern Cyprus,
saying that there has been "EU silence. No problems. No
issues." Turkey is working to ensure there will be "smooth
sailing" at the COREPER and subsequent Gymnich.


22. (C) Alpogan said he advised the Greek Patriarch in
Istanbul that there would be no movement on Patriarchate
issues until after Oct. 3. He opined that there is "no hope
for Papadopolous" and said Turkey would do nothing to
recognize southern Cyprus before the start of talks. He
dismissed the idea that Papadopolous was looking for a quiet
way to re-engage in discussions on the Annan Plan. Bryza --
recognizing that the two issues were unrelated -- queried
whether Turkey might respond positively to a Greek action to
permit the opening of several mosques on western Thrace.
Alpogan agreed that the two issues were unrelated but
grudgingly affirmed the possibility of a positive response.
He also acknowledged the possibility of implementing parts of
FM Gul,s Cyprus proposal in the absence of agreement on the
entire plan, assuming buy-in from the non-governmental
community.


23. (C) On Iraq, Alpogan asked whether the US proposal for
action against the PKK in Europe signaled a shift of US
attention away from northern Iraq. Bryza explained the
two-track US approach, saying the US would need to work with
Turkey to make the case to European countries on the need to
close Kurdish stations like Roj TV in Denmark; to arrest PKK
leaders; and close down financial networks. At the same
time, the planned Sept. 8-9 meeting between US Generals Jones
and Abizaid and Chief of the Turkish General Staff Ozkok
provides an opportunity to discuss northern Iraq. Bryza
emphasized the integral role of the Iraqi government in any
action, the goal of which would be to eliminate an element
that threatens the stability of the country. He understood
the importance to the US and Turkeyof a sovereign, democratic
Iraq. Alpogan reiterated Turkey,s desire for "one, small,
tangible act," such as the capture of a few important and
well-known PKK leaders, to demonstrate US solidarity with
Turkey.


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PRESS BRIEFINGS
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24. (SBU) Bryza held two on-the-record sessions with senior
representatives of the Turkish media. His comments on the
PKK issue, Cyprus/EU, and discussions at the Diyanet
generated broad, and mostly positive, coverage. Key
newspapers such as Sabah and Milliyet focused on Bryza,s
"new initiative" to go after PKK terrorists, PKK-affiliated
media outlets, and PKK fund-raising in Europe. Although
Milliyet argued that Bryza,s remarks showed that there is
"nothing really new" in US policy on the PKK, most reports
were more positive. In a front-page story on August 26,
Sabah praised the U.S. commitment to "move into action"
against the PKK in Europe. Bryza,s comments on his
discussions at the Diyanet were misinterpreted by the Turkish
daily Aksam, which claimed that Bryza was advocating that the
U.S. and Europe become involved in training imams. Most
press accounts correctly reported Bryza,s statements that he
was seeking information from the Diyanet on how imams are
trained in Turkey and how the Diyanet interacts with Turkish
migrants in European countries. Bryza,s stand-up appearance
with diplomatic correspondents following his series of
meetings at the MFA was carried live by several Turkish media
outlets, including the news channels NTV and CNN-Turk. He
stressed the breadth of the U.S.-Turkish bilateral
relationship, and argued that the relationship had rebounded
from a difficult period earlier this year. His comments at
the MFA were carried widely and accurately in most Turkish
papers the following day. Bryza's visit was a significant
net plus in our efforts to achieve more positive media
coverage of U.S. policy and U.S.-Turkish relations in recent
months.
MCELDOWNEY