NEW DCHOD WANTS US TO TAKE ONE STEP TO DEMONSTRATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005222

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2025
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PINR TU IZ PKK
SUBJECT: NEW DCHOD WANTS US TO TAKE ONE STEP TO DEMONSTRATE
RESOLVE AGAINST PKK IN IRAQ


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) Summary: Turkish General Staff (TGS) Deputy Chief GEN
Isik Kosaner told the Charge on Sept. 7 that he wanted to
further improve US-Turkey mil-mil relations during his
tenure. He pointed to the expected Sept. 8-9 visit of EUCOM
CDR and CENTCOM D/CDR as a positive contribution to a
relationship that is marked by frank talk that produces
solutions to any problems. He called on the US to take a
"small" step against the PKK in northern Iraq that the
Turkish people could see. The Charge noted that expectations
for the EUCOM/CENTCOM visit were unrealistically high
(Kosaner agreed),and asked that TGS help lower them.
Kosaner thought the new constitution would serve to fracture
Iraqi unity rather than bolster it, leading to three states
in about eight years, he predicted. He also offered
condolences for the victims of Hurricane Katrina and evinced
enthusiasm for holding an early High Level Defense Group
(HLDG) meeting. End Summary.

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Generals' Visit and the PKK
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2. (C) During an initial office call by the Charge on Sept.
7, newly promoted and appointed TGS Deputy Chief GEN Isik
Kosaner reminisced about his time at Ft Bragg and expressed
condolences for the victims of Hurricane Katrina which he
likened to the disaster Turkey experienced in the 1999
earthquake near Izmit. Stating that he understood the
importance of the US in the world, he committed himself to
work for "even better" US-Turkey mil-mil relations.


3. (C) The Charge suggested that past problems be put behind
and that Kosaner focus on the future. The general averred
that there were no problems between our two countries'
militaries, although "I can't speak for the politicians," he
said. The military-to-military relationship was marked by
frank and open dialogue that could solve any problem. He
pointed to the expected Sept. 8-9 visit of EUCOM Commander
Gen Jones and CENTCOM Deputy Command Lt. Gen. Smith as a sign
of the health of the relationship.


4. (C) For that visit, the main subject will be PKK
terrorism, Kosaner continued. He believed he well understood
the US position, with the need to carefully maintain balance
between the various groups in Iraq. "If I were General
Abizaid, I would think the same way," he said. Nonetheless,
the Turkish people expected something to come out of the
EUCOM/CENTCOM meeting, and TGS wanted to satisfy that
expectation to restore friendly relations between the Turkish
and American peoples. He understood that the US could not
solve the PKK problem, but was looking for some step, such as
arresting a leader or stronger public statements condemning
the PKK, that the Turkish people could see and appreciate.
Two months earlier, TGS had heard the US intended to track
and capture PKK leaders; this would have been a good step,
but so far the Turks have not seen any results.


5. (C) The Charge agreed with Kosaner that open communication
was crucial to the health of the relationship. She also
underscored that public expectations for the EUCOM/CENTCOM
visit were unrealistically high. (Kosaner agreed.) There was
no button our generals could push that would make the PKK
problem go away, she said. (Kosaner again agreed.) The
Charge expressed appreciation for the statements Turkish
military leaders had made recently to lower expectations and
urged these continue. She previewed that she would be doing
the same later that day with reporters following her
afternoon meeting with MFA Undersecretary Tuygan (septel).


6. (C) The Charge noted that it was possible to act against
the PKK outside of Iraq, pointing to both the recent anti-PKK
operation carried out by authorities in Germany and the
measures that Turkey and the US might undertake in Europe
that we have been discussing with MFA officials. She asked
whether more might be done to secure Turkey's border with
Iraq. Kosaner lamented its difficult mountainous terrain,
comparing it to the difficulty the US has in stopping illegal
immigrants along the Mexican border or from Cuba. He said
efforts were needed on both sides. When asked who should do
it on the Iraqi side given our lack of troops in the area,
Kosaner asserted that there was a power vacuum there. The
Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga were friendly with the PKK.
Nonetheless, the Turks talk to the Iraqi Kurds, but the area
occupied by the PKK is outside their authority. The Charge
suggested that this issue be further explored at the
EUCOM/CENTCOM talks.

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Iraq's Future Uncertain
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7. (C) The Charge reminded Kosaner of Turkey and the US's
common goals of a democratic, stable and unified Iraq. As we
deal with the PKK issue, these goals should be kept in mind,
she suggested. That is why talk about "hot pursuit" and
similar operations raise concerns. Kosaner agreed that our
two countries share these goals, but he was pessimistic that
they could be achieved. He faulted the new Iraqi
constitution's establishment of a "weak central government,"
stronger federal entities, and local control over new oil
fields as evidence that "ethnic and religious divergence"
will increase and "federalism will lead to separatism."
Three new states which he expected to emerge in about eight
years, would be three new problems, undermining regional
stability.


8. (C) The Charge argued that the constitution would
strengthen Iraq's nascent democracy and encourage people to
see their future in a united country. Kosaner responded that
democracy cannot be imposed, but could only be understood by
"the man in the street" when the society was ready for it.
"We know (the Iraqis') thinking, expectations and character"
from centries of interaction with them." The Charge countered
with examples from the former Soviet Union, emphasizing that
Iraqis deserved a similar chance at democracy. Success will
only come with international cooperation. Kosaner agreed
that Turkey's interest was making Iraq a success, and he said
Turkey would continue to work for that "as long as we have a
unified Iraq to talk with." The Charge ended this discussion
by noting that the more Turkey and others engage the Iraqi
government, the more it legitimizes the government, the
better the government will become, and the more its prospects
of success will improve.

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HLDG
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9. (C) The Charge raised the USG's interest in reviving the
HLDG process. Kosaner said he was familiar with the HLDG
from a previous tour at TGS headquarters. He recalled that
it produced few results in those days, saying that the agenda
needed to be well prepared to ensure productive talks. It
can be a good channel for discussion, he said, and he wanted
to see it revitalized. (Comment: We will be seeing TGS/J5
Strategy Chief MG Savas Sept. 8 to discuss possible dates.)


10. (U) The Charge was accompanied by ODC-T Chief Maj.Gen.
Sutton, DATT COL Hrycaj and polmilcouns. Kosaner took the
meeting alone.

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Bio Note
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11. (C) Despite Kosaner's stint at Ft Bragg and other
international assignments, he is not comfortable in English,
at least, not yet. He had little or no difficulty in English
comprehension, but frequently switched to Turkish to express
complex thoughts. Our impression was his English is good
(not great),but rusty.
MCELDOWNEY