Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA5114
2005-09-01 14:00:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

STATE OF PLAY ON TURKEY-PKK

Tags:  PREL PTER PGOV MOPS TU IZ PKK 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005114 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2025
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS TU IZ PKK
SUBJECT: STATE OF PLAY ON TURKEY-PKK

REF: A. ANKARA 2973 (NODIS)

B. ANKARA 4186

C. ANKARA 5038

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005114

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2025
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS TU IZ PKK
SUBJECT: STATE OF PLAY ON TURKEY-PKK

REF: A. ANKARA 2973 (NODIS)

B. ANKARA 4186

C. ANKARA 5038

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: The PKK issue remains at the top of the
political agenda in Turkey. Ethnic tensions--along with the
death toll--are on the rise, while crowds at funerals of
soldiers killed in PKK attacks have added "Damn the USA" to
their traditional chant, "Damn the PKK." The Turks
appreciate increased U.S. intelligence and our offers of
enhanced law enforcement cooperation against the PKK in
Europe. But their central concern is the PKK's command and
control center in northern Iraq, and they continue to make
reference to potential unilateral action there. End summary.


2. (SBU) Renewed PKK violence in Turkey is consuming the
attention of the public, press, policy makers and military
leaders, and threatens our still-recovering relationship with
Turkey. From the Prime Minister and the CHOD, all through
the military and the bureaucracy, and increasingly among the
public, Turks ever more insistently are asking if the United
States is serious about helping Turkey deal with the PKK
terrorist threat emanating from northern Iraq. The press
highlights the funerals of Turkish soldiers killed by the
PKK, fueling the sense of outrage. Mourners now shout "Damn
the USA" along with timeworn "Damn the PKK."


3. (C) The violence has returned the "Kurdish problem" to the
fore of Turkish domestic politics. Prime Minister Erdogan's
visit to Diyarbakir earlier this month, itself a product of
the PKK's ramped-up violence, has sparked a debate about what
non-military measures should be taken to address the poverty
and feeling of disenfranchisement prevalent in the
predominantly Kurdish southeast. During his August 25-26
visit to Ankara, EUR DAS Bryza emphasized measures against
the PKK that Turkey and the U.S. could take together outside
of Iraq; this approach was well received by Foreign Minister
Gul, TGS/J3 MG Zorlu and the media. A long-time contact from
Hakkari (Turkey's southeastern-most province and a PKK

stronghold) told us Aug. 27 that Turkey's Kurds are fed up
with both the PKK and the military; the people are much more
interested in economic opportunity than the dream of an
independent Kurdish state. Yet the PKK still manages to
influence and/or intimidate the local population.


4. (SBU) Recent ugly incidents in Turkey are increasingly
evoking memories of the "bad old days" of the 1980s and
1990s. On Aug. 27, protesters who went to the local hospital
in Batman (deep in the southeast) to collect the bodies of
six PKK terrorists killed by Turkish security forces clashed
violently with police, resulting in the death of a protester
and many injuries on both sides. Mobs in Trabzon and Izmir
reportedly attempted recently to lynch PKK suspects. The
press further reported Aug. 31 that security forces arrested
nine DEHAP (pro-Kurdish party) activists for calling a PKK
terrorist killed in Turkey "a martyr." The Chief of the
Turkish Land Forces, GEN Yasar Buyukanit, reflected in an
Aug. 30 speech that the unrest threatened to turn Turkey into
"another Palestine," referring to an intifada-type
resistance. U.S. policy and inaction against the PKK in
northern Iraq is played out in the context of this political
tension.


5. (S/NF) Privately, Turkish officials tell us they
appreciate that we are providing intelligence support for the
Turks' struggle against this terrorist organization in Turkey
and that we are forming a plan to pursue diplomatic,
intelligence, and law enforcement measures in Europe. But
the Turks rightly point out that the PKK's command and
control center is in Iraq, where it appears that the
organization operates relatively unencumbered.


6. (C) While it is hard to pinpoint exactly how many Turkish
soldiers and civilians have been killed since the PKK revoked
its unilateral cease-fire in June of last year, we have heard
estimates that range as high as 150. The PKK has also
expanded its attacks on civilians by bombing buses and
passenger trains, or the tracks in order to make the trains
derail. The PKK almost always attacks through the use of
IEDs, rarely taking on the Turkish military, Jandarma or
police in firefights.

7. (SBU) The PKK has also moved into tourist areas, killing
five civilians (including two foreigners) in the July 16 bomb
attack in the western resort town of Kusadasi, and seriously
wounding a Dutch tourist in the July 23 bombing at an
Istanbul restaurant.


8. (C) While the Turks still hold out hope that the U.S. (or
the ITG) will take steps against the PKK in Iraq, the
military has increasingly been looking at options for taking
unilateral steps. The CHOD, GEN Hilmi Ozkok, previewed this
thinking during Amb. Edelman's May 25 farewell call (ref a).
Ozkok outlined the increase in violence in Turkey, and said
that Turkey may once again have to resort to cross-border
operations against PKK camps in northern Iraq. Then-D/CHOD
GEN Ilker Basbug subsequently discussed cross-border
operations and the concept of "hot pursuit" at length with
then VCJCS Gen Pace on June 8 at the Pentagon. Basbug then
gave a lengthy press conference in Ankara on July 19, in
which he argued that under international law Turkey has the
right to take unilateral action if a terrorist threat is
emanating from Iraq. He drew a sharp distinction between hot
pursuit (chasing PKK terrorists who attempt to escape from
Turkey into Iraq) and cross-border operations, which would be
larger actions to include attacking PKK camps in northern
Iraq (see ref b).


9. (C) COMMENT: Despite our efforts to promote Turkey-Iraq
dialogue on this issue through trilateral talks, and our
initiative to increase cooperation with Turkey in dealing
with PKK activities in Turkey and in Europe, we still face
the potential that the Turks may feel compelled to take
unilateral military steps in northern Iraq. They are now
balancing this impulse--and the pressing need to do and say
something publicly--against the significant negative
ramifications this would provoke from the ITG, the EU, and
us. However, should the situation continue to worsen, we
cannot assume that Turkey would forego taking such action
indefinitely.
MCELDOWNEY