GOT WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY FOLLOWING THROUGH ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005109

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TU OSCE
SUBJECT: GOT WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY FOLLOWING THROUGH ON
KURDISH INITIATIVE

REF: ANKARA 4842

Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney; reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: Political observers widely credit PM Erdogan
with breaking new rhetorical ground on the Kurdish issue in
the context of his recent visit to Diyarbakir. But contacts
say they doubt the GOT is prepared to follow through on the
initiative. Members of the (PKK-related) Democratic Peoples'
Party (DEHAP) have praised the PM's statements on the
"Kurdish problem," which they view as an indication that the
PM is willing to address issues on their agenda, such as a
broad amnesty for PKK militants. However, our contacts say
any government perceived to be following such a path would
quickly lose support. Military leaders, who pressured
Erdogan to address the issue, are concerned that the PM used
vague language that could be interpreted as supporting the
concept of a separate Kurdish identity; their concerns appear
to be reflected in a National Security Council (NSC)
statement stressing the "integrity" and "indivisibility" of
the country. End Summary.

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PM Uses New Rhetoric on Kurds...
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2. (U) Politicians and pundits continue to debate the meaning
and importance of PM Erdogan's recent visit to Diyarbakir and
public comments on the issue of Turkey's Kurds (reftel).
Erdogan has been widely credited with "breaking the memorized
rhetoric" regarding the Kurdish issue. A number of contacts
have told us Erdogan went farther than previous PMs in
addressing the subject by referring to a "Kurdish problem,"
indicating (though indirectly and vaguely) that the GOT has
made mistakes regarding the issue, and assuring the public
that the problem will be resolved through democratic means.
However, our contacts question whether the GOT can turn the
new rhetoric into a new reality.


3. (C) DEHAP members have praised the PM's initiative.
(Note: DEHAP is widely believed to be linked to the PKK. Its
members deny any direct links; they claim they share the
PKK's long-term goals while rejecting violence as a means to
achieve them. DEHAP leaders recently decided to close the
party and join a new successor party. End Note.) DEHAP
President Tuncer Bakirhan acknowledged to us that DEHAP
officials told party supporters in the southeast not to turn
out for Erdogan's August 12 speech in Diyarbakir, to express
the party's skepticism about the PM's sincerity. Only about
700-800 people attended the speech. Nevertheless, he said
DEHAP supporters were encouraged by the PM's message.

4. (C) Bakirhan believes Erdogan took a step toward a new,
more flexible approach to the Kurdish issue. He said PKK
leaders were caught off guard by the PM's initiative, and
felt compelled to respond by announcing a one-month cessation
of operations. He averred that the public, weary of the
conflict, is ready for a new approach, as indicated by the
absence of public criticism of Erdogan's initiative beyond
nationalist circles. Bakirhan noted that even members of an
association representing the families of security forces
killed by the PKK gave their blessing to Erdogan's effort.

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...But Lacks Follow-Up Plan
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5. (C) Turkey's (generally leftist) Kurdish human rights
activists also praise the PM, although they are more
skeptical than Bakirhan that the GOT will follow through.
Yusuf Alatas, president of the Human Rights Association, and
Yilmaz Ensaroglu, former president of the human rights
organization Mazlum Der, said Kurdish issues have never been
high on the agenda of the ruling AK Party (AKP). Since
coming to power in 2002, the AKP government has taken small,
grudging steps on Kurdish language and cultural rights, and
that only at the direct urging of the EU. As a result, they
said, the GOT lacks a program for addressing Kurdish issues
and is not prepared to follow up on Erdogan's promising
remarks. "Universities and NGOs need to start holding
conferences to discuss Kurdish cultural rights and the
problems of the southeast," Ensaroglu said. "We have been
afraid to debate sensitive issues like these, and as a result
we have no ideas about how to resolve them." Alatas said he
wants to believe the PM is sincere, but in any case the AKP
government cannot resolve the Kurdish problem on its own; any
new initiative that is not supported by the Turkish state
will have no chance.


6. (C) Observers widely credit the State, in the form of the
military, for pressuring Erdogan to address the Kurdish
issue. In a series of public statements, including a July 19
speech by General Basbug, then deputy chief of the Turkish
General Staff, military leaders have emphasized the need for
a multi-pronged approach to PKK terrorism, including economic
and social initiatives in addition to military force. With
these statements, the military has subtly called attention to
the absence of a GOT program for the southeast, where rampant
unemployment, poor education, and backward social traditions
create a breeding ground for the PKK.

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Military Uneasy with Ill-Defined Statements
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7. (C) But the military and other state elements appear
uneasy with what they consider the careless nature of
Erdogan's remarks. The PM's comments, while groundbreaking,
were vague -- for example, he did not define what he meant by
"Kurdish problem," nor did he say what "mistakes" the State
had made. Amidst the praise, there has been criticism from
some who argue that Erdogan's words could be interpreted in a
manner harmful to Turkey's interests. Former President
Demirel, for example, is among those who have argued that by
referring to the "Kurdish problem," Erdogan reinforced the
divisions in Turkish society, possibly strengthening the
hands of separatists. Others have argued that the PM's
pledge to resolve the issue through democratic means could
imply setting aside the use of military force against the
PKK, or even negotiating with the terrorist organization.
Indeed, when the PKK responded to Erdogan's Diyarbakir speech
by declaring a one-month cessation of operations, some of
Erdogan's critics charged that he had already unwittingly
raised the PKK's status to the level of interlocutor.


8. (C) Following its August 23 meeting, the NSC, comprising
civilian and military leaders, issued a statement emphasizing
the "integrity" and "indivisibility" of the country, while
also calling for a multi-faceted campaign against terrorism.
Sema Kilicer, political officer at the European Commission
Representation to Turkey, told us she views the statement as
a reflection of the military's desire to define the limits of
any approach to the Kurdish issue. The message, she
believes, is that the military wants the government to take
on the social/economic aspects of the campaign against
terror, but without referring to a separate, Kurdish identity
or completely removing the restrictions on Kurdish language
and cultural expression. Military leaders have also
repeatedly emphasized that the government must operate within
the Constitution, which emphasizes the "indivisibility of the
Republic" (a mantra here) and the status of Turkish as the
official language.

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Next Steps Could Prove Risky for GOT
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9. (C) Faruk Demir, a Turkish political analyst, and Suavi
Aydin, Hacettepe University anthropology professor and expert
on Anatolian minorities, told us they believe Erdogan set a
trap for himself with his ill-prepared comments, into which
he may fall if his next steps are not more careful. Demir
and Aydin said DEHAP members are encouraged by Erdogan's
statements because they are hopeful the PM is indicating a
willingness to pursue some of the items on the DEHAP agenda,
such as negotiations with the PKK, a general amnesty for PKK
militants, the release of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan from
prison, and a constitutional amendment citing Turks and Kurds
as co-founders of the Republic. Bakirhan acknowledged as
much to us, listing each of these examples as long-term goals
of the party.


10. (C) The problem for Erdogan, Demir and Aydin agreed, is
that any government perceived to be considering negotiating
with the PKK or elevating the status of Kurds in the
Constitution would quickly lose both public support and its
grip on power. How, then, can Erdogan follow through on his
initiative without appearing to cross these red lines? "No
one, including Erdogan, knows what the government will do
next," Aydin said.

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Comment: GOT Not Prepared to Follow-Through
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11. (C) Though Erdogan struck many of the right chords during
his initiative, we agree with our contacts' assessment that
the GOT is not prepared to follow through. Erdogan made no
specific proposals, other than directing the High Board of
Radio and Television to remove obstacles to Kurdish-language
broadcasting on local media outlets. Though welcome, this
would have little impact in the southeast. A longstanding
Embassy contact, an attorney from the southeastern province
of Hakkari, noted that Kurds in the southeast already receive
several Kurdish-language TV channels broadcasting from
abroad. What Kurds in the region really want, she said, is
an amnesty for their sons and daughters with the PKK in the
mountains. That appears no more likely today than before
Erdogan's trip to Diyarbakir.


12. (C) The obstacles facing Erdogan are heightened by the
recent increase in PKK activity. As long as Turks are
feeling frustrated and powerless in the face of a perceived
PKK resurgence, the GOT will remain hyper-sensitive to
allegations that it lacks resolve in the fight against
terrorism.
MCELDOWNEY