TURKEY-EU: FURTHER CONCERNS OF EU DIPLOMATS IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004777

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS TU EUN EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY-EU: FURTHER CONCERNS OF EU DIPLOMATS IN
ANKARA REGARDING OCT. 3 START DATE AND TURKISH APPROACH

REF: A. ANKARA 4716

B. PARIS 5471

C. ANKARA 4619

(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (b,d).

1, (C) Summary: A range of EU diplomats in Ankara has
expressed concern to us not only about Turkey's road to the
Oct. 3 harmonization start date but also about the
willingness of Turks to adapt to EU standards of religious
freedom and tolerance and rule of law. End summary.


2. (C) Further to reftels (A-B),we have followed up with UK
and Danish DCMs and Dutch Polcounselor to gauge EU
assessments of how solid the Oct. 3 date is for the start of
Turkey's harmonization process.


3. (S) UK Deputy Head of Mission (strictly protect -- he
asked not to be quoted),normally relentlessly upbeat about
Turkey's candidacy and UK support, expressed deep concern to
us Aug. 12 about whether the Oct. 3 start date will hold. He
sees the French using the early August de Villepin and Chirac
statements as a bargaining chip to seek broader language on
the open-endedness of Turkey's accession process at the
late-Aug./early Sept. COREPER and Gymnich meetings to discuss
the framework negotiation document. He is concerned that the
French are also signaling these intentions to the Greeks and
Greek Cypriots to encourage the former to push for stiffer
language in the Aegean paragraph and the latter for stiffer
language in the Cyprus paragraph. He also sees the Danes as
wavering.


4. (S) Compounding the challenge is the absence of people to
consult with at FCO and throughout Europe in mid-August and
the consequent difficulty of tracking French maneuvers and
developing a counter-strategy, he noted. Any change to the
current language on open-endedness will bring a sharp
reaction by the Turks. However, even if the UK in its
presidency could in the end persuade the GOT to swallow such
language, any change to the Aegean and Cyprus paragraphs will
overload the circuits and the Turks will refuse to show up in
Luxembourg on Oct. 3, he opined. The UK in its presidency
will find it difficult to deflect a concerted approach to
load up the framework document since the argument that the
Turks would balk will only encourage the French and others to
persist.


5. (S) Looking at the issue from another angle, UK DHM
affirmed that his Embassy and London prefer to see PM Erdogan
and especially FonMin Gul as committed to the EU. At the
same time he acknowledged that Gul, Erdogan advisor Cuneyd
Zapsu, and other favorite British interlocutors could be
consummate barbarian handlers and that it would be prudent to
pay more attention to the radical Islamist strands in Gul's
background.


6. (S) Moreover, Turkish ministries are unprepared to begin
screening and harmonization, he noted. He also admitted that
Erdogan's failure to visit any EU capital from Dec. 17 until
his July 21-22 visit to London, his five month delay in
appointing a chief negotiator (and then his appointment of a
minister who, "while considered cuddly in EU capitals," has
no clout in the Turkish Cabinet),his refusal to let Gul play
an active lobbying role since Dec. 17, and the resignation of
EU Secretariat SecGen Murat Sungar (ref C) raise questions
whether the AKP government is using the EU process to pursue
a hidden agenda. He agreed that religious intolerance in
Turkey is a problem that will only become bigger in the
accession negotiation context.


7. (C) Danish DCM and Dutch Polcounselor both expressed
concern to us Aug. 11 and 12 that the AKP government's
approach to the EU is alienating some EU member states.
Dutch Polcounselor added that the GOT's behavior has killed
the willingness of Commission bureaucrats to tip off the
Turks about how to overcome legal or procedural roadblocks in
Commission deliberations. They both noted that Erdogan's
behavior at Brussels on Dec. 17 and the Turks' refusal to
share the text of their declaration of non-recognition of the
Republic of Cyprus even with the UK presidency have also
created a negative impression, although Danish DCM opined
that in the end the Turkish government's language on
non-recognition should have been mild enough to have calmed
most EU nerves. Danish DCM confirmed, however, that the
French have circulated a non-paper to EU member states (ref
B) questioning whether accession negotiations can start if
Turkey is unwilling to recognize all 25 member states.

8. (C) Contrary to the view of Dutch Polcounselor (and UK
PolChief) that the European Court of Justice has ruled that
both goods and services are covered under Customs Union
agreements, and thus that Turkey will have to allow Republic
of Cyprus flagged vessels access to ports and airports,
Danish DCM, a legal expert on EU goods and services
regulations, averred that the Turks can tie up the issue for
years by working Customs Union dispute-settlement procedures.


9. (C) Aug. 11 Turkey,s chief EU negotiator Babacan
announced a series of high-level Turkish visits to EU
capitals to explain Turkey,s approach to (1) the extension
protocol, including its Cyprus non-recognition declaration,
and (2) the negotiation process. UK PolChief previously told
us the Turks will target, inter alia, Paris, the Hague and
Vienna (ref A). Dutch PolCounselor told us MFA U/S Tuygan
will arrive in the Hague Aug. 18. However, Dutch
PolCounselor is concerned that the Turkish initiative may be
too late to influence the Aug,. 25 COREPER, given his view
that most EU capitals will have already decided on their
COREPER strategies.


10. (C) Both our Danish and Dutch interlocutors emphasized
that Turkey's lack of religious tolerance or religious
freedom will be a serious, perhaps the most serious, barrier
to EU entry. Neither thinks the Turks are going to be
willing to change for a long time. Danish DCM confirmed our
impression that the German DCM and press counselor, two of
the more active EU diplomats here, share this assessment that
Turkey is seriously retrograde in religious tolerance. Dutch
PolCounselor added that the Turkish attitude toward rule of
law, even among MFA bureaucrats who should know better, is
equally disturbing. His MFA interlocutors treat rule of law
as a criterion to be checked off rather than as an essential
pre-condition.


11. (C) Comment: With the exception of the Dutch Ambassador,
departing after six years here, EU Ambassadors remain
publicly upbeat about Turkey's progress. Since Dec. 17,
however, the most active EU DCMs and Counselors have become
much more pessimistic about the willingness of Turkish
authorities to understand and adapt to EU realities. End
comment.
MCELDOWNEY