TURCO-RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT: SEVEN HOURS OF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004751

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON TU RS
SUBJECT: TURCO-RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT: SEVEN HOURS OF
ERDOGAN-PUTIN TALKS IN SOCHI

(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: In the context of booming trade with Russia
(heavily in the latter's favor) and growing emotional
understanding between Turks and Russians, PM Erdogan
continues to feel that he is building a partnership of equals
with Putin. What is lacking in Turkey is any rational
analysis of Russia's aims toward Turkey or the political cost
of Russia's dominance of natural gas supplies. End summary.


2. (U) Islam-oriented ruling AK party (AKP) used the
mostly-captive Turkish media to trumpet PM Erdogan's
"private" July 17-18 visit to Putin at Sochi, the two
leaders' fourth meeting since December 2004, as a smashing
success.


3. (U) The banner headline and photo in July 19 Islamist
"Yeni Safak", AKP's de facto party organ, sums up AKP's spin:
"Bush Couldn't Have Had This Photo Taken: In their 4.5 hour
conversation, Erdogan and Putin took up commercial and
political subjects. In contrast to U.S. President Bush, who
had his picture with Erdogan taken while sitting down owing
to their difference in height, Putin had their picture taken
while walking together." The photo, showing Erdogan
swaggering with his left hand in his jacket pocket, was used
by "Yeni Safak" to project the image of Erdogan as a
self-confident equal of Putin.


4. (U) Aside from the July 17 dinner conversation the talks
included a July 18 breakfast and an exchange while walking in
Putin's garden. Sukru Kucuksahin, a columnist with deep
sources in the Turkish State and a reputation for reliable
journalism, reports in August 11 "Hurriyet" that Erdogan
accepted Putin's offer to accompany him alone (with just two
bodyguards) to a party for two and a half hours after the
dinner. Kucuksahin reports that Putin tried to ply Erdogan
with wine while performer Nikolai Baskov sang.


5. (C) Gaining a detailed readout of the meetings has been
complicated by the restricted attendance in the meetings.
Erdogan excluded MFA personnel, a point which MFA
interlocutors have awkwardly admitted to us. Egemen Bagis,
an AKP MP whom Erdogan has normally used as a foreign policy
advisor or as a translator to/from English, told us he was
excluded from the July 17 dinner. As we understand it,
Erdogan continued his practice of avoiding official
notetaking on the Turkish side.


6. (S) However, "Yeni Safak"'s coverage, sycophantic as it
was, gives us some clues to the thrust of the talks. In
addition, we have spoken to Turkey's pre-eminent national
security analyst, an exceptionally reliable contact for the
past three years. From his 12 years in military
intelligence, including assignments in the Prime Ministry,
the National Security Council, and the national police
academy, he maintains an extensive network in the Prime
Ministry and Turkey's three main intelligence organizations.
Given that his previous readouts of sensitive meetings have
proven exceptionally reliable, we include his summary of the
visit based on a readout he got from what appears to be a
source in the Turkish National Intelligence Organization
(TNIO, which accompanies the Prime Minister's security detail
and, as we understand, is in a position to learn the content
of meetings through various means).


7. (S) According to our contact's readout, Erdogan took only
Energy Minister Guler with him to the dinner; Erdogan allowed
the Russians to provide the interpretation both ways. Putin
was accompanied by a foreign policy advisor. Erdogan
reportedly asked for a reduction in the price of Russian
natural gas through the Blue Stream (Black Sea) pipeline.
Putin refused, saying that Russia had raised the price for
Ukraine and Georgia, and Erdogan should thank him for not
raising the price for Turkey. Putin then reportedly pushed
for Turkish agreement to extend the Blue Stream pipeline to
Israel. Erdogan reportedly agreed, but was rebuffed when he
asked for an arrangement under which Turkey would sell the
gas to Israel; Putin insisted that Russia sell the gas to
Israel and that Turkey take only a transit fee (according to
August 10 news reports, Russia's price offer to Israel is
below the price Russia charges Turkey). At the same time,
hinting that Russia does not look favorably on growth of
Ceyhan as an energy hub, Putin reportedly expressed
reservations about a Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline to bypass the
Straits.


8. (C) On trade, Putin reportedly held out the prospect of
raising the current $10 billion annual two-way trade figure
-- heavily in Russia's favor -- to $25 billion in several
years. According to "Yeni Safak", Erdogan expressed thanks
for Russia's decision to lift a ban on imports of Turkish
fruits and vegetables (Putin had refused to take Erdogan's
phone call on the subject a couple of weeks earlier). Putin
pressed Erdogan to show political support for Russian
investors, including Alfa Group, which has just concluded a
murky $3 billion deal leading to a sizable minority share in
Turkey's leading cellphone operator Turkcell, and other
companies now interested in the privatization of Turkey's
major refinery and leading steel company. Putin also
promoted the Kamov, Russia's entry in the long-delayed tender
for a major attack helicopter contract.


9. (S) Our national security contact said Putin dangled the
possibility of Turkish membership in the Shanghai Five, which
Erdogan greeted favorably. Putin reportedly then spoke
against U.S. democratization efforts in the Caucasus and
Central Asia, calling these efforts a plot to bring
destabilization to both regions. He suggested instead to
Erdogan that Russia and Turkey cooperate in the Caucasus and
Central Asia "according to local conditions." On Cyprus,
merely repeating the standard Russian position of support for
the UN, Putin made no commitments regarding breaking the
isolation of northern Cyprus. Putin reportedly made a vague
commitment to cooperate with Turkey on the PKK; in return
Erdogan reportedly undertook tighter control of Chechen
activities in Turkey.


10. (C) "Yeni Safak" Ankara bureau chief Mustafa Karaalioglu,
who accompanied the delegation, told us July 28 that Erdogan
was deeply affected by the hospitality and amount of time
Putin gave him and dazzled by the allure of a further boom in
trade. Karaalioglu described Erdogan as convinced he has
established an exceptionally solid rapport with Putin. In
Karaalioglu's view Erdogan does not see Putin's drive to
increase Russia's already dominant share of natural gas
supplies to Turkey or Putin's bid sharply to raise Russia's
share of FDI in key sectors such as natural gas distribution,
refining, steel and telecoms as having any relevance for
Turkey's sovereignty or independence.


11. (C) Comment: For the AKP leadership and for many Turkish
businessmen expanding relations with Russia is mainly a
matter of making money. Likewise, since bribery and
kickbacks are an accepted part of doing business in Turkey,
Turkish businessmen see conditions in Russia as normal.
Novelty and the prospect of gain attract Turks and distract
them from bad memories they would otherwise prefer to dwell
on: relations with Russia are new and potentially lucrative
in the most material of ways, and thus Turks see no reason to
think of what the Russians have done to the Tartars since
1552, what Putin's attitude is toward Muslims, what the
Russians are doing in Chechnya.


12. (C) Comment cont'd: There's an emotional component as
well. Turks see Russians as a huge and powerful nation that
has a right to dominate the Caucasus and Central Asia and
shares both a similar sense of having been a great empire now
disrespected by the West (the Rappallo syndrome) and a
preference for spontaneity, a trait the Turks think is
lacking among Westerners. Erdogan sees himself as a world
statesman and is influenced by the thick pile of Putin's red
carpet.


13. (C) Comment cont'd: What is missing both in AKP and --
with rare exception -- across the Turkish press, academe and
think tanks are any rational analyses of Russia's aims toward
Turkey or its internal problems. Erdogan seems indifferent
to the political ramifications of Russia's dominant position
in natural gas supplies and Russia's interest in buying up
distribution networks. The press and academe are dominated
by leftists who have been unwilling to break their ties to
Marxist second- and third-worldism. Moreover, the Dogan
group, Turkey's largest media group, wants to protect its bid
to open a television station in Russia; "Zaman", Samanyolu
TV, and the Writers and Journalists Foundation, the
newspaper, TV channel, and professional association of the
Islamist movement of Fethullah Gulen, want to protect the
Gulen chain of schools in Russia and the Gulen "mission" to
convert Russia (and all three have admitted to us that they
pull their punches on Russia with these aims in mind); the
Cukurova Group, owners of "Aksam", "Tercuman" and SkyTurk TV,
wants to protect the interests of its mobile telephone
company Turkcell. With rare exception, think tanks are
wrapped up in paranoid anti-Western emotionalism (the 1920
Sevres Treaty syndrome) and are attracted by the "Eurasia
alternative" to the West.


14. (C) Comment cont'd: As long as Turks see profits ahead,
feel awe at Russia's size, respond positively to Putin's
masterly stroking of their emotional complexes, and choose to
feel aggrieved by U.S. and EU policies, relations with Russia
will continue to improve.
MCELDOWNEY