REACTION TO TURKISH DECLARATION OF NON-RECOGNITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004716

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY EU
SUBJECT: REACTION TO TURKISH DECLARATION OF NON-RECOGNITION
OF CYPRUS

REF: A. ANKARA 4486


B. PARIS 5307

C. PARIS 5350

(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Turkey's July 29 declaration that is does
not recognize the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) (ref A) has raised
little controversy among EU diplomats in Ankara: it is what
most expected, and not as extreme as some feared. Turkish
media cautiously welcomed the protocol and non-recognition
declaration. Turkish reaction to French PM de Villepin's
August 2 statement implying accession negotiations cannot go
forward absent recognition (refs B and C) has been
restrained. EU diplomats here, including the UK, expect
Cyprus-related objections to be resolved before October 3,
but worry about attempts by the French and others to make
textual changes to the negotiating framework for Turkey.
After October 3, demands that Turkey open ports and airports
to the ROC will become a serious issue. End Summary.


Turkish Declaration Raises Little Controversy
--------------


2. (C) Turkey's July 29 declaration that extension of the
Customs Union does not constitute recognition of the ROC has
raised little controversy among EU diplomats in Ankara. The
declaration was along the lines most expected and not as
extreme as some feared. The French DCM claims that the
declaration is a "new element" that calls into question
Turkey's will to implement the protocol, but this flies in
the face of the fact that the declaration was
widely-discussed beforehand -- and in the face of her own
apparent surprise at PM de Villepin's reaction to it.


3. (C) In the end, no one, not even term President and
Turkey supporter UK, saw the declaration text before its
release. MFA Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs A/DDG Bilman
would not even let junior diplomats in his own department
work on it. However, UK Ambassador Westmacott held extended
discussions with Bilman and his boss, Deputy U/S Apakan, and
made specific recommendations on the text.


4. (U) Turkish media cautiously welcomed the protocol
signing and the non-recognition declaration. Cuneyt Ulsever,
a columnist for "Hurriyet" who has been highly critical of
the Erdogan government in recent weeks, wrote that the
government "should be congratulated" on the move. Oktay
Eksi, another "Hurriyet" columnist with strong links to the
Turkish secular establishment, welcomed the signing as
another step toward EU membership talks, but expressed
concerns about EU reaction to Turkey,s declaration and the
long-term implications of the protocol for Turkish Cypriots.
The pro-Government Islamist "Yeni Safak" hailed the start of
the "countdown to EU negotiations," highlighting the Prime
Minister,s comments that Turkey is "rolling up its sleeves"
for an EU process that will be "as delicate as knitting
lace." The paper also reported Foreign Minister Gul,s claim
that Turkey had "fulfilled its commitment of December 17" and
his assertion that there are "no more obstacles" in Turkey,s
path to accession talks. A sour note was sounded by the
leftist-nationalist "Cumhuriyet" which stressed that the
protocol had been signed "despite every warning." The paper
raised the possibility of an EU counter-declaration and
predicted that Cyprus could veto Turkey,s accession talks
despite the Government's action. All media noted the
criticism of opposition party leaders to the signing of the
protocol, but with the exception of "Cumhuriyet," major
dailies gave the naysayers short shrift.


5. (C) According to UK PolChief Miller, FM Gul was pleased
by the Turkish media reaction.

Restrained Reaction to de Villepin Statement
--------------


6. (C) Turkish reaction to PM de Villepin's August 2
statement that opening negotiations is not "conceivable"
absent Turkish recognition of the ROC has been restrained.
PM Erdogan said he was "saddened" by the news, but he and PM
Gul have both avoided extreme rhetoric. We will encourage
Turkish officials to continue along these lines and avoid
giving ammunition to EU Turkey-skeptics before October 3.


7. (C) Our EU contacts here ascribe de Villepin's statement
to French domestic politics instead of a serious intention to
block the October 3 opening of negotiations absent Turkish
recognition of the ROC. Miller and the Danish DCM both
expect ostensible French Cyprus-related objections to be
resolved after the August 25 COREPER and September 1-2
Gymnich meetings.


8. (C) In the wake of the extension protocol, the
non-recognition declaration, and de Villepin's statement,
Turkish MFA U/S Tuygan told the UK that the MFA is
considering a swing through selected EU capitals (possibly
including Paris, Vienna and the Hague) by either him or FM
Gul. Timing is a question mark; Ankara and EU capitals are
in an August vacation lull.

Next Steps
--------------


9. (C) The UK is preparing a draft counter-declaration for
discussion at the August 25 COREPER. According to PolChief
Miller, the declaration will welcome Turkish signing of the
extension protocol; note the unilateral nature of the Turkish
non-recognition declaration; and note that the ROC has
acceded to the EU. It may also include a statement that the
members states look forward to implementation of the
extension protocol.


10. (C) EU diplomats here expect the ROC to push the EU to
require Turkey to open its ports and airports to the ROC
before October 3, but do not anticipate this will succeed.
However, port and airports will become a deadly serious issue
after October 3. The Turks fiercely oppose this,
particularly when "TRNC" port and airports remain closed to
EU trade. Unilateral Turkish concession on this score will
spark a firestorm of domestic criticism. Miller hopes the EU
can give the GOT a Cyprus-related political concession to
serve as a fig leaf for opening ports and airports.


11. (C) Contradictory statements from GOT officials make it
unclear whether the GOT intends to submit the extension
protocol for parliamentary ratification. If the GOT does
decide to submit the protocol, parliament can ratify by
simple majority. We expect that, if the GOT does submit the
protocol to parliament, it will not do so before October 3;
Miller agrees. PM Erdogan's AKP has 355 of 550 deputies, but
the numerical advantage could be weakened in the event of
more controversy between Turkey and the EU on issues like
ports and airports or the content of Turkey's negotiating
framework.

Concerns About the Negotiating Framework
--------------


12. (C) Although he expects Cyprus issues will not in the
end block the October 3 opening of negotiations, the
well-connected Danish DCM is worried there is not enough time
before October 3 to resolve anticipated French, Austrian,
Greek and ROC demands for changes to the negotiating
framework text. UK PolChief Miller calls this "doable"
before October 3 but admits the UK is nervous about France.
The UK Embassy expects that the French will use what they
will portray as a concession in dropping Cyprus-related
objections to push for a tougher text. Miller told us the
French have not yet proposed specific textual changes, but
she anticipates the French will seek to expand language on
the open-ended nature of negotiations, a hot-button issue for
the Turks.
MCELDOWNEY