Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA4486
2005-08-02 14:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY-EU: AKP GOVERNMENT SIGNS ADDITIONAL

Tags:  PREL PGOV TU CY EUN EU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004486 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2006
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY EUN EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY-EU: AKP GOVERNMENT SIGNS ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOL, REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS


(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney; reasons: E.O. 12958
1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004486

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2006
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY EUN EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY-EU: AKP GOVERNMENT SIGNS ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOL, REFUSES TO RECOGNIZE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS


(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney; reasons: E.O. 12958
1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: By its July 29 signing of an additional
protocol extending the 1963 EEC-Turkey Ankara Agreement to
the EU's 10 newest members, Turkey appeared to have fulfilled
the remaining pre-condition for an Oct. 3 start to accession
negotiations. However, the ability of the UK as EU
Presidency to hold down EU member states' reaction to an
attached Turkish declaration that does not recognize the
Republic of Cyprus and Turkey's determination not to open its
ports to Greek Cypriot vessels absent a lifting of the Greek
Cypriot embargo on northern Cyprus is unclear at this stage.
End summary.


2. (U) In signing an additional protocol ("Adaptation
Protocol") to the 1963 EEC-Turkey Ankara Agreement July 29,
Turkey's AKP government extended the Agreement's reach to the
EU's 10 newest members, including the Republic of Cyprus.


3. (U) At the same time, the AKP government issued a six-part
declaration (text below, para 8) re-affirming long-standing
Turkish positions that: (1) Turkey will continue to support
the UNSYG's efforts toward a comprehensive Cyprus settlement
leading to a new bi-zonal partnership state; (2) the Republic
of Cyprus referred to in the protocol is not the partnership
state founded in 1960; (3) the Greek Cypriot authorities'
legal and administrative authority extends only over the
territory south of the buffer zone, Turkey will continue to
consider that the Greek Cypriots have no authority over the
Turkish Cypriot people, and Turkey will treat the Greek
Cypriot authorities' actions according to these two
considerations; (4) Turkey's signature, ratification, and
implementation of the protocol does not signify recognition
in any manner of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the
protocol and Turkey's rights and obligations under the 1960
Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance, and Establishment continue;
(5) Turkey's relationship with the "TRNC" remains unchanged.


4. (C) Discussing the Turkish declaration on the margins of
an Aug. 1 meeting with EUR DAS Bryza, a visibly nervous

deputy U/S Apakan, the MFA's Cyprus wallah, said Turkey had
been obliged to issue the declaration but had striven to be
as nuanced and non-confrontational as possible. Neither he
nor DG (A/S equivalent) for the Americas Alpar could gauge
what the EU reaction might be, but instead both wrapped
themselves in wishful thinking that the EU would not react
harshly or even issue a comment supplementary to the UK
Presidency's July 29 response that the EU recognizes only the
Republic of Cyprus.


5. (C) Asked how the EU might react to exclusion of Cypriot
vessels from Turkish ports, Apakan argued that the Customs
Union does not cover transportation or other services, i.e.,
Turkish trucks are restricted in their transport of goods to
EU markets. Therefore, the EU should not balk. Furthermore,
the Greek Cypriots have restricted Turkish Cypriot commerce
since 1963. The Greek Cypriots claim to represent the whole
island and the EU recognizes the Greek Cypriots as the
Republic of Cyprus. How can the EU permit an embargo on one
of its parts, Apakan asked. In any event, Greek Cypriot
goods can enter Turkey. And if the Greek Cypriots end their
embargo on the north, then, he opined, the Turkish government
might well reconsider its position on port access. In this
regard, Turkey's end-May proposal to open all ports in Cyprus
to all goods was a reflection of Turkey's constructive
willingness to find a solution.


6. (U) In a statement following Turkey's signing, FonMin Gul
reiterated that, by signing the additional protocol, the
Turkish government considers it has fulfilled all
pre-conditions for accession negotiations to begin Oct. 3.
However, Gul added that the AKP government will submit the
protocol for parliamentary approval after Parliament
reconvenes Oct. 1, thus appearing to signal the EU that
Turkey has "options" if the negotiations do not start on Oct.

3. Turkish press broadly reported EU Enlargement Commissioner
Rehn's Aug. 1 statement that no obstacles remain to opening
accession negotiations Oct. 3. However, they have begun to
pick up reports quoting French PM de Villepin saying that
Turkey will have to recognize the Republic of Cyprus before
talks can begin Oct. 3 and that the start date could
otherwise be delayed. The de Villepin statement is likely
further to goad those in Turkey, e.g., CHP on the left and
MHP on the right, who have accused the AKP government of
selling out national interests by signing the additional
protocol.



7. (U) Text of "Declaration by Turkey on Cyprus" (MFA English
version):


1. Turkey remains committed to finding a political
settlement of the Cyprus issue and has clearly demonstrated
its resolve in this regard. Accordingly, Turkey will
continue to support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General
towards achieving a comprehensive settlement which will lead
to the establishment of a new bi-zonal partnership State. A
just and lasting settlement would greatly contribute to
peace, stability and harmonious relations in the region.


2. The Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol is not
the original partnership State established in 1960.


3. Turkey will thus continue to regard the Greek Cypriot
authorities as exercising authority, control and jurisdiction
only in the territory south of the buffer zone, as is
currently the case, and as not representing the Turkish
Cypriot people and will treat the acts performed by them
accordingly.


4. Turkey declares that signature, ratification and
implementation of this Protocol neither amount to any form of
recognition of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the
Protocol; nor prejudice Turkey's rights and obligations
emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of
Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment of 1960.


5. Turkey reaffirms that its existing relationship with the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus remains unchanged by
becoming a party to the Protocol.


6. Pending a comprehensive settlement, the position of
Turkey on Cyprus will remain unchanged. Turkey expresses its
readiness to establish relations with the new partnership
State which will emerge following a comprehensive settlement
in Cyprus.


MCELDOWNEY