Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA4364
2005-07-27 14:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

CHARGE DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH SENIOR MFA OFFICIALS,

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER MOPS TU IZ SY 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004364 

SIPDIS

BAKU PLEASE PASS TO EUR DAS BRYZA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS TU IZ SY
SUBJECT: CHARGE DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH SENIOR MFA OFFICIALS,
DELIVERS STRONG MESSAGE ON SYRIA

REF: A. ANKARA 4187

B. ANKARA 3844

C. ANKARA 4186

D. ANKARA 4260

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004364

SIPDIS

BAKU PLEASE PASS TO EUR DAS BRYZA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS TU IZ SY
SUBJECT: CHARGE DISCUSSES IRAQ WITH SENIOR MFA OFFICIALS,
DELIVERS STRONG MESSAGE ON SYRIA

REF: A. ANKARA 4187

B. ANKARA 3844

C. ANKARA 4186

D. ANKARA 4260

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Koruturk told
Charge July 25 that Turkey hopes the Sunni Arabs will return
soon to constitutional negotiations. He rebutted Kurdish
criticism of Turkish outreach efforts, expressed concern that
the Kurds may be agitating for Turkish troops to leave
northern Iraq, and reported that Shia and Sunni leaders in
Talafar had reached an agreement to end sectarian violence.
Koruturk expressed frustration over increased PKK activity in
Turkey, but agreed that the issue must not divide Turkey and
the U.S. and that Turkey would act to preserve and strengthen
stability in Iraq. Charge delivered a strong warning on a
possible visit by Syrian President Asad to Turkey. End
summary.


2. (C) GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Osman Koruturk called in
Charge July 25 to discuss Iraq and Syria; he was joined by
his deputy, Ethem Tokdemir, and Deputy Director General for
the Middle East Safak Gokturk. Koruturk began by thanking us
for providing good meetings during his July 5-6 visit to
Washington (ref a). Koruturk repeated the importance of
Sunni participation in the constitutional process (ref b),
and hoped that the Sunni representatives on the
constitutional committee would soon return to the table.
Koruturk reported that his Iraqi Sunni Arab contacts have
told him that a full investigation of the assassination of
the two Sunni committee members would reassure them; he added
that some Sunnis believe the Kurds are behind the murders
(over the Kirkuk issue).

Criticism of Turkish Outreach Efforts
--------------


3. (C) Koruturk sought to deflect apparent Kurdish criticism
of the constitutional seminar the Turks held July 12-13. He
said the Iraqi Kurdish press had accused the Turks of holding
a secret meeting without KDP and PUK representatives to

pressure the other communities in Iraq to hold firm on Kirkuk
and the PKK issue. Koruturk asserted that the participants
did not discuss Kirkuk and that the Iraqi
co-organizer--Ghassan al-Atiyyah of the Iraqi Fund for
Democracy and Development--had chosen the Iraqi participants
with an eye toward reconciliation. (NOTE: The PUK
representative to Turkey had complained about the Kurds'
apparent exclusion from the seminar to PolMilOff. END NOTE.)

Kurds Pressing for Turkish Troops to Leave?
--------------


4. (C) Koruturk expressed concern that the Kurds are seeking
to press Turkish military units in northern Iraq to leave.
His information (Kurdish press articles calling for the
Turkish forces to leave, a petition drive, and meetings
between KDP leader Masoud Barzani's brother, Nihat, and PKK
front parties) echoed what TGS had provided to us July 19
(ref c),but Koruturk was either unaware of or did not
mention TGS's further claims to us that the PKK was planning
to attack Turkish positions in Iraq.

PKK Frustrations
--------------


5. (C) Charge cited recent public statements by Turkish
officials, including FonMin Gul and PM Erdogan, on the issue
of "hot pursuit" of PKK terrorists over the border into Iraq,
and noted that a press debate on this sensitive issue was
exceptionally unhelpful. She emphasized that both sides must
work together to educate the Turkish public on what the U.S.
has done and is doing to fight the PKK, and that we should
not fight out issues such as hot pursuit in the press.
Koruturk responded that D/CHOD GEN Basbug had in fact
attempted to cool down the rhetoric in Turkey by
acknowledging that CF have orders to arrest PKK leaders in
Iraq (refs c and d),but asked why USG spokesmen had denied
this.


6. (C) DDG Gokturk noted that Iraqi officials seem to have
ceded control of the border to Kurdish authorities; these
same authorities, he asserted, are themselves cooperating
with the PKK. Koruturk added that the GOT is particularly
frustrated by the knowledge that it is capable of taking
military action against the PKK in northern Iraq, but is
constrained by its respect for Iraqi sovereignty since the
fall of Saddam and the presence of a legitimate government in
Baghdad. Charge urged that the PKK issue not be allowed to
divide us, and that Turkey not react by taking "rash steps."
This is a delicate time for Iraq, and we do not need a
"conflagration" involving Turkish troops in northern Iraq.
Koruturk answered that he is working for precisely the same
ends.

A Peace Deal in Talafar?
--------------


7. (C) Koruturk asserted that Sunni and Shia leaders in the
northwest Ninewah city of Talafar had reached an agreement to
cease sectarian violence and also not to support the
insurgency there. He noted that a group of leaders from both
sides had presented their plan to DPM Chalabi in Baghdad.
Koruturk recalled that Turkey had been working to bring many
of the same leaders to Ankara to meet FonMin Gul in an effort
to stop the fighting, but "perhaps this will not be necessary
now." He believed some Sunnis in Talafar were supporting the
insurgents to gain their assistance against the Shia.
Koruturk urged that any potential CF action in Talafar not
turn into a "Fallujah-type" operation; this would inflame
Turkish public opinion.

Syria: No Firm Answer on an Asad Visit
--------------


8. (C) Koruturk and Gokturk noted the recent visit of Syrian
Deputy FonMin al-Muallim to Turkey, and provided a condensed
readout of his meetings here (more in ref d). Koruturk
rehearsed his argument that the U.S. should follow Turkey's
policy of "persistent dialogue" with Syria with an eye toward
achieving measurable results, such as a renewed
U.S.-Iraq-Syria border agreement. Gokturk reported that it
is not yet decided whether Syrian President Asad will visit
Turkey.


9. (C) Charge warned that Syria is seeking to manipulate
Turkey by exploiting high-level contacts such as Turkish
President Sezer's April 13-14 visit to Damascus and the
prospective Asad visit here. The regime uses Turkey to show
cracks in the international consensus that Syria must stop
interfering in Lebanon, must stop supporting Palestinian
rejectionists and terrorists, and must stop providing aid and
comfort to terrorists who operate in Iraq. It is not only
the administration that is concerned about Ankara's course
here: Many friends of Turkey in Congress, in various lobbies,
in the press, and in other countries are dismayed by the
prospect of Asad's visit to Turkey. Charge added that the
U.S. has so far sought to deal with this matter privately and
not in the press. Nor did the U.S. object when the Syrian
Interior Minister visited Istanbul to attend the recent Iraq
neighbors' meeting. But, she argued, the Syrians will use
high-level, bilateral ties with Turkey as a wedge against the
will of the international community.

Comment: Why Are We Here?
--------------


10. (C) Koruturk had few specifics on his mind other than
fairly weak press reports about Kurdish pressure to get
Turkish troops out of Iraq, urging us to keep the Sunni Arabs
involved in the constitutional process, and points we've
heard repeatedly on Syria. We are a bit mystified as to why
he called this meeting. Charge was nonetheless able to use
the opportunity to directly go after Turkey's threadbare
Syria policy. End comment.


11. (U) Iraq REOs minimize considered.
MCELDOWNEY