TURKEY-EU: STEP BY STEP TOWARD TURKISH SIGNING OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 004296

SIPDIS

EMBASSIES BAKU AND TBILISI PLEASE PASS DAS BRYZA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU CY EUN EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY-EU: STEP BY STEP TOWARD TURKISH SIGNING OF
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE ANKARA AGREEMENT


(U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney; reasons: E.O. 12958
1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: The UK Embassy hopes UK lobbying will have
steered the Turkish government to sign the additional
protocol to the Ankara Agreement shortly after the July 27
Blair-Erdogan meeting in London. At the same time, the UK
has been pressing Turkish authorities to issue Turkey's
expected reaffirmation of non-recognition of the Republic of
Cyprus in a way which will not throw commencement of Turkey's
harmonization process off the October 3 start date. Turkish
MFA EU general directorate assures us the text will
faithfully reflect UK recommendations. However, enough
elements remain uncertain that the UK is taking nothing for
granted. End summary.


2. (C) UK Embassy polchief affirmed to us July 26 that her
government hopes the Turkish government will sign the
additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement shortly after the
July 27 Blair-Erdogan meeting in London.


3. (C) The UK aims to use the July 27 meeting to gain clarity
on how Turkey proposes to reaffirm its non-recognition of the
Republic of Cyprus and to dissuade Erdogan from any language
that some in the EU could consider too harsh, especially any
language that would interpret the additional protocol as
giving Turkey the right to deny entry to its ports and
airfields for Cypriot vessels. The UK has been advising the
Turkish authorities, both in the MFA and at the political
level (FM Gul),that it is not proper for Turkey to comment
in its declaration on how it intends to implement the
additional protocol; if Turkey intends to interpret the
protocol in any restrictive manner, it should make its
intentions known subsequently through the EU Commission's
legal mechanisms.


4. (C) A complicating element is Erdogan's attitude, polchief
added. There is some concern in London that Erdogan, who,
despite continual travel, has not visited any EU country
since the December 2004 EU summit, is not focused on the
delicacy of the issue or even on Turkey's EU candidacy in
general. Erdogan has indicated that he intends to use his
meeting with Blair to talk about "more important" issues such
as Iraq, terrorism, and anti-Muslim sentiment. UK Ambassador
told Charge July 25 that he was waiting to see whether Gul
would arrange for him to fly with the PM to London in order
to be able to brief Erdogan on the need for prudence.


5. (C) If a satisfactory signing appears to be in the offing,
the procedure would be for the UK permrep to the EU, on
behalf of the EU, to sign a copy of the additional protocol
and present it to the Turkish permrep in Brussels. The
Turkish permrep would then sign and return the protocol,
along with a Turkish declaration that its signature does not
constitute recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.


6. (C) UK polchief acknowledged that the UK will be taking a
risk in signing the additional protocol before it knows the
content of the Turkish non-recognition declaration. However,
this is the deal the UK has worked out with Turkey, and in
any event it might be better not to be presented beforehand
with a Turkish text which could put the UK in an awkward
position. In any event, the Cypriots are pressing for a
COREPER meeting immediately after the signing to issue a
counter-declaration, but the UK has deflected this pressure,
polchief said. Instead, depending on the tone and content of
the Turkish declaration, the UK may issue a statement
reaffirming that the Republic of Cyprus is an EU member state
and the only internationally-recognized authority on the
island. The UK would then suggest a COREPER meeting for
sometime in mid-August.


7. (C) Turkish MFA EU general directorate DDG Turkmen averred
to us late July 26 that the Turkish non-recognition statement
takes into account the UK recommendations and should be
reasonable enough in tone to satisfy both Turkish legal
exigencies and EU opinion. In outlining the text to us,
another excellent contact of ours also asserted that the
Turkish statement will be concise and leave room enough for
both Turkish public opinion and the EU to live with it.
MCELDOWNEY