SCENESETTER FOR JAN.31-FEB.1 VISIT OF UNDER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000426

SIPDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS TO EU/SE DOUG SILLIMAN, PM DAS KARA BUE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2029
TAGS: OVIP PREL MARR TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JAN.31-FEB.1 VISIT OF UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY DOUG FEITH TO ANKARA

SIPDIS

REF: A. ANKARA 242

B. ANKARA 356

Classified By: Ambassador Eric. S. Edelman, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Your visit will extend a series of January
visits by Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, NATO Supreme
Allied Commander General Jones and Commander of Central
Command General Abizaid, and will provide an opportunity to
echo their pledge that the US will fight all forms of
terrorism in Iraq and to confirm the Secretary of Defense's
commitment to a strong security partnership between the US
and Turkey. Turkish government and public unhappiness with
the coalition effort in Iraq and the failure of the US to
live up to perceived promises to combat the PKK threat in
northern Iraq, together with Turkey's focus on achieving its
EU membership aspirations, have created strains in a
bilateral relationship that has not completely recovered from
Turkey's March 1, 2003 vote against allowing a northern front
for coalition efforts in Iraq, and the July 4, 2003 arrest of
Turkish Special Forces near Suleymania. Despite these
tensions, however, Turkey has remained supportive of the
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),offering troops for Iraq,
allowing the transport of fuel and humanitarian supplies to
Iraq, refueling operations for both Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and troop
transit from Iraq at Incirlik, accepting the command of ISAF
VII in February, and establishing a Center of Excellence for
the Defense Against Terrorism (COE-DAT). Turkey is poised to
play an active role in the Proliferation Security Initiative
and continues to encourage Iran to abandon its nuclear
weapons ambitions. Military equipment sales suffered in 2004
with the cancellation of three tenders but these are being
re-issued and US firms may participate. Turkey is also
upgrading most of its F-16 fleet. End Summary.

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THE DOMESTIC SCENE
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2. (C) You arrive in Turkey as we are recalibrating our
bilateral engagement. Iraq-related issues will top your
Turkish interlocutors' agendas. The GOT shares our goals of
a stable, democratic, unified Iraq, but our intervention
there is unpopular and has generated Turkish concerns over
lack of US action against the PKK in northern Iraq, Kurdish
separatism and designs on Kirkuk, and attacks against Turkish
truck drivers. Bilateral relations were poisoned by grossly
distorted media coverage of the Fallujah operation late last
year. Turkey has given valuable help on Iraq; however, our
security relationship is fragile. The EU's December decision
to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October will
help keep reform moving forward, but Turkey faces a long,
difficult path to accession.


3. (S) Despite resentment and suspicion of AKP by the
military and other elements of the secular elite, Erdogan
appears unassailable; he has a two-thirds majority in
parliament; he remains highly popular; his government
continues to reform Turkey's political and social space -- at
least on the books; and he has pursued an activist foreign
policy. The only effective opposition is the military, and
TGS Chief Ozkok is reluctant to take on the government
publicly for fear of derailing Turkey's EU accession and
thereby losing popular support for the military. Instead,
his TGS has gone along with EU-mandated reforms which have
reduced the military's institutional methods of applying
political influence. The lack of a credible political
opposition means the military lacks an important tool to
effect change behind the scenes as well.


4. (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the
financial crisis of 2000-2001 and is growing at an annual
pace of around 8-9 percent. However, the recovery remains
vulnerable due to a large current account deficit (about 5
percent of GDP) and a large debt with a short maturity
structure. Unemployment and poverty remain high, and
ordinary people have not felt much benefit from the overall
macroeconomic improvement. Macroeconomic success has also
bred a sense of complacency about the need to persist with
difficult reforms, such as privatization, and reform of the
banking, social security and tax systems, all of which are
being addressed in a new three-year IMF standby program.


5. (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility and
opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received
less foreign direct investment than other countries of
similar size and potential. Many in the Turkish elite are
convinced that there will be a flood of foreign investment
now that the EU has decided to open accession negotiations
with Turkey in October 2005. However, this is unlikely to
materialize unless more is done in the area of structural
reform. In addition, there appears to be a lack of
appreciation for the enormous challenges Turkey will shoulder
in the accession negotiations, for the fact that EU accession
will affect nearly aspect of their lives, and that it may in
the end be quite costly for Turkey to comply with EU
directives in environmental protection and other areas.

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Bilateral Relationship
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6. (C) Over the last year, US relations with Turkey, which
had not fully recovered from the March 2003 parliamentary
vote against allowing the passage of the 4th ID into Iraq,
and the July 2003 arrest and hooding of Turkish Special
Forces near Suleymania, Iraq, slipped further. MFA
Undersecretary Tuygan told the Ambassador January 18 that the
only significant problem in Turkey-US relations was Iraq. In
fact, regular reports of the death of Turkish truck drivers,
a barrage of media disinformation about coalition operations
in Tal Afar and Fallujah, anger over perceived US inaction
against the PKK, and suspicions about US support for Kurdish
designs on Kirkuk and separatism in northern Iraq -- fanned
by statements by PM Erdogan and Foreign Minister Gul alleging
excessive use of force and civilian casualties -- have
whipped up already negative public opinion about the US.
Last month, the government made some statements to try to
alleviate the situation and the mission is making a concerted
effort to encourage the government and media to speak on the
basis of fact rather than fiction. However, the Turkish
General Staff has remained silent and the negative
perceptions -- in the press, among the public and within the
ranks of the bureaucracy and military -- persist, making
bilateral cooperation in all aspects of our relationship
harder to effect than in the past.


7. (C) However, the EU decision on December 17 to begin
accession negotiations with Turkey on Oct. 3, 2005, may have
provided the starting point for a small, but perceptible
positive shift in relations. While government officials
still refrain from publicly supporting US policies or actions
in Iraq, they have been adding less fuel to the fire. In
meetings with DepSecState Armitage and General Abizaid, both
Turkish government and military officials reaffirmed the
importance of our bilateral relationship and called for close
dialogue on issues of mutual interest.

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Iraq Dominates the Agenda
--------------


8. (S) You will arrive in Turkey one day after the Jan. 30
elections in Iraq. The Turkish government shares the goal of
a unified, prosperous, democratic Iraq, at peace internally
and with its neighbors, and has contributed to international
pressure on the Sunnis to participate in the elections.
However, the Turks worry about long-term US staying power in
Iraq, that events there could spiral out of control, and that
Ankara could be faced with either a Shia-dominated government
that they assert will tilt dangerously toward Iran, an
intensified movement toward an independent Kurdish state
emanating from northern Iraq, or both. Turkish leaders will
seek your assurance that the USG, and our military, remain
committed to ensuring a stable -- and unified -- Iraq
whatever the outcome of the elections.


9. (C) Ninety percent of the Turkish public opposed the
effort to oust Saddam Hussein and sentiment against coalition
operations in Iraq still runs deep. Most Turks get their
information on events in Iraq from a press that is biased
against the US-led effort and full of reporting based on
unsubstantiated half-truths or lies, (much of it sourced from
al-Jazeera or similarly biased sources) as well as a steady
stream of reports on the kidnapping and killing of Turkish
truck drivers (over 70 deaths as of January '05). Despite
the presence of Turkish Liaison Officers (LNOs) assigned to
Task Force Olympia (TFO) and MNF-I who received up-to-date
reports on the October 2004 coalition action in Tal afar,
both the Turkish public and government expressed outrage at
the operation, based on false stories of civilian casualties
and violent US treatment of residents. To address the
misinformation, and in hopes that Turkish officials would do
likewise, the mission established a system of providing
periodic cleared information on coalition operations to
Turkish government and military officials, and to the press.
This effort may have contributed to Turkish military silence
during the subsequent operation in Fallujah and the less
vitriolic Turkish government response. Your visit will make
an important contribution to this effort.


10. (C) Turning a corner?: The December death of five Turkish
policemen enroute to Baghdad to take up security duties at
the Turkish Embassy shocked the country. The Turkish
government and military made a point to thank the US for the
swift TFO response, including killing or capturing of some
insurgents, aiding the wounded and repatriating the bodies of
the policemen killed. Additionally, the Turkish military was
quick to tell the mission that Turkish First Army Commander
General Tolon's accusations of US responsibility did not
reflect the Turkish General Staff position. Turkish press
reporting on the incident was generally factual. The
November establishment of trilateral (US/TU/IZ) talks on
Turkish truck driver safety, with the participation of
Multinational Force - Iraq (MNF-I),opened the door to
cooperative information sharing and other efforts to support
the drivers.

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PKK - Unfulfilled Promises and New Direction
--------------


11. (S) Turkish government and military leaders understand
that responsibility for dealing with terrorists within Iraq's
borders will increasingly pass to the Iraqis, and their
agreement to host the Jan. 11 trilateral PKK talks was a
positive sign that they will work together with the Iraqis on
this shared problem. Still, they, and the public at large,
remain bitter over their perception that the US has taken no
steps in Iraq to fulfill President Bush's June 2004 pledge
that that country will no longer be a base for terrorist
operations against Turkey and they expect the US to remain
engaged in the effort. Some in the military harbor the
belief that the US acquiesces to (or supports) the PKK's
presence in Iraq, continually citing unsubstantiated reports
of US/PKK meetings. However, when pressed, they are unable
to provide any names or specifics. (NOTE: We also know that
the military uses our lack of action against PKK/Kongra-Gel
to needle the current AK Government.)


12. (S) When confronted with this issue, you should make
reference to the Jan. 11 trilateral talks where, with the US
role in Iraq more one of facilitator than actor, the Turks
and Iraqis focused on concrete steps to pave the way for
actions against the PKK, including establishing an
intelligence-sharing mechanism and holding a legal experts
meeting after the Jan. 30 elections to discuss issues related
to closure of PKK front offices and media outlets in northern
Iraq and the handling of known PKK terrorists who are
arrested. Septel we are providing suggestions on how to
convey a more serious anti-PKK posture to the Turks, given
our continuing inability to focus resources in Iraq on this
problem.

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Global War on Terrorism
--------------


13. (C) Despite our policy differences, Turkey has provided
valuable assistance and cooperation to GWOT. Ankara offered
to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq in October 2003 (an offer
we declined),approved the use of Incirlik Air Base for
tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions for both OEF
and OIF, authorized the transit of US troops on rotation from
Iraq, and permits the transit of fuel, coalition supplies and
humanitarian goods (from its inception until the end of CY04,
over USD 2.5 billion in coalition sustainment and
humanitarian assistance.) In addition to urging all Iraqis
to participate in the Jan. 30 elections, Turkey is active in
reconstruction efforts, including providing electricity for
Iraq, and training in Turkey for Iraqi diplomats and (as its
contribution to the NATO training mission) Iraqi Security
Forces. Turkey will take command of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) VII in Afghanistan from
February to August 2005, during which time it plans to
contribute over 1,600 troops. Ankara is also ready to renew
its offer to lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team in
Afghanistan, but location is again proving to be a problem --
the GOT wants to take over a PRT in the north, while the
Alliance needs PRTs elsewhere to fulfill ISAF expansion
requirements.


14. (C) Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, the US and Turkey
coordinate military assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan,
improving their abilities to protect important energy
transport routes. Turkey subscribes to every arms control
arrangement it is eligible to join, including the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),under which it is
considering hosting an exercise in 2006. (We had hoped that
the Turks would hold this in the Black Sea, especially given
their own OAE-like Operation Black Sea Harmony and their
leadership in focusing the BLACKSEAFOR organization on
prevention of trafficking. However, they have been reluctant
to facilitate non-littoral states' operations in the Black
Sea and the PSI exercise looks likely to occur in the
Mediterranean.) Ankara has also been supportive of
international efforts to press Iran to meet its commitments
to the IAEA, although they are more inclined to persuasion
than coercion, fully backing the EU-3 dialogue. Turkey has
also taken seriously information about Turks' involvement in
the AQ Khan network and is moving toward prosecution of these
individuals.


15. (U) The Turkish military's Partnership for Peace Training
Center provides counterterrorism and other training to
personnel from PfP partner countries. The military is
establishing a NATO COE-DAT that will provide more
specialized training opportunities for both NATO partner
nations and Allies. They have also offered training at the
COE-DAT as Ankara's contribution to NATO's Iraq training
mission.

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CYPRUS and NATO/EU
--------------


16. (C) The European Union at the December 17 Summit agreed
to open accession talks with Turkey in October, marking a
major step forward in anchoring Turkey's future and in our
strategic vision for Turkey and the region. However, before
talks begin, the EU expects Turkey to sign a protocol
extending the EU Association agreement to the 10 new EU
members, including the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey is
dissatisfied with the EU's handling of this issue, with
several European leaders indicating publicly that extending
the protocol would constitute recognition of the Republic of
Cyprus. Moreover, Turkey sees the EU as failing to fulfill
its pledge to ease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots
following their vote in favor of a settlement last April. As
a result, Ankara is blocking Cyprus' entry into
nonproliferation regimes that the EU desires to include all
its members. Similarly, taking a legalistic view of North
Atlantic council decisions related to Berlin Plus, the GOT is
blocking Cyprus from participating in NATO-EU fora,
effectively stymieing dialogue between the two organizations.
While some Turkish officials recognize how keeping NATO and
the EU apart hurts Turkey's interests, to date Cyprus policy
has won out over alliance management considerations within
the GOT.

EDELMAN