Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA4215
2005-07-20 17:12:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKISH MILITARY ON PKK: CALM DOWN PUBLIC

Tags:  PTER PREL MOPS PGOV TU IZ EUN PKK 
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S E C R E T ANKARA 004215 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2025
TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS PGOV TU IZ EUN PKK
SUBJECT: TURKISH MILITARY ON PKK: CALM DOWN PUBLIC
RHETORIC AND GET SERIOUS ON COUNTERMEASURES

REF: ANKARA 4186

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (a),(b),(d)

S E C R E T ANKARA 004215

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2025
TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS PGOV TU IZ EUN PKK
SUBJECT: TURKISH MILITARY ON PKK: CALM DOWN PUBLIC
RHETORIC AND GET SERIOUS ON COUNTERMEASURES

REF: ANKARA 4186

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (a),(b),(d)


1. (S) Summary: In an extended one-on-one meeting
July 20 with Turkish D/CHOD Basbug, Charge cautioned
against an accelerating public dispute between Turkey
and the US over PKK countermeasures, including &hot
pursuit8 into Iraq. Basbug agreed on the importance
of calming down public rhetoric and pointed to his own
remarks to the press on July 19 that had been intended
to do just that. At the same time, he stressed the
dire nature of the PKK problem that Turkey is facing,
and warned that lack of real action by the United
States against PKK safe havens in northern Iraq would
undermine relations with Turkey in the short term
while also threatening medium and long-term stability
in Iraq. Basbug stated emphatically that he was not
calling for a US military assault against the PKK
camps, but rather USG interventions to convince
Iraqi Kurdish leaders to constrain PKK operations.
Basbug stressed Turkish understanding that &hot pursuit8
would necessitate prior Iraqi consent and characterized
this as a course of last resort. He is looking to the
September meeting in Ankara with CENTCOM Commander
Abazaid and EUCOM Commander Jones to provide an answer
to the Turkish request for hot pursuit options.
End Summary.


2. (S) Following several days of frenzied press
coverage on the PKK issue, Charge called on Basbug to
urge that he and other Turkish officials take action
to quiet the public controversy. Charge pointed to
the barrage of press coverage in both Ankara and
Washington on the issue of Turkish hot pursuit of PKK
terrorists into Iraq and stressed that allowing the
controversy -- and the dangerous rhetoric -- to continue
would be very destructive. Basbug agreed and noted
that his July 19 press briefing had been specifically
designed to calm things down. He explained that his
prepared remarks had focused on the nature of the PKK
problem in Turkey and had contained nothing about hot
pursuit and the United States. When asked about hot
pursuit during the Q&A, he stressed Turkey,s
understanding that Iraqi consent would be required
and noted that this was a course of last resort.
In response to a query about US actions against the PKK,
Basbug noted that the US, despite operational constraints,
very much wanted to help Turkey and he cited the &new8
order to capture PKK (actually, the addition of PKK
names to the high value target list in Iraq) as
evidence of US good intentions.


3. (S) When Charge pointed to inflationary remarks
made by Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Gul
on &hot pursuit8 earlier in the day, Basbug said that
they were both traveling outside Turkey and suggested
that once they saw his own statement, their rhetoric
would tone down.


4. (S) Basbug said that the upcoming September meeting
of Generals Abazaid and Jones in Ankara was of critical
importance. He argued that we must use this meeting to
resolve ) positively ) the hot pursuit issue and other
PKK-related operational questions. In particular, he
noted the need to shut down the C-4 depots in Iraq
being used by the PKK in their current wave of attacks
in Turkey. Basbug also suggested that he would be
prepared to consider joint operations against the PKK
within Turkey. He replied that he would certainly
be willing to consider the matter, along with specific
options further, but caveated his response by noting
that the final decision would rest with CHOD Ozkok.


5. (U) Iraq REOs minimize considered.


MCELDOWNEY