TURKEY AND THE PKK: RAISING THE HEAT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004186

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2025
TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS PGOV TU IZ EUN PKK
SUBJECT: TURKEY AND THE PKK: RAISING THE HEAT

REF: A. ANKARA 3954

B. ANKARA 3456

C. ANKARA 4183 (DAO ANKARA IIR)

Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (a),(b),(d).

Summary
--------------


1. (S/NF) Both the Turkish Deputy CHOD and MFA spokesman
publicly confirmed July 19 that Turkey reserves the right to
conduct cross-border operations against the PKK in northern
Iraq. Additionally, the D/CHOD, GEN Ilker Basbug, reported
that the U.S. has ordered the arrest (or capture) of key PKK
leaders (ref a). The Turkish military has told us privately
that the PKK is planning attacks--with KDP peshmerga
assistance--against Turkish military positions in northern
Iraq. The Special Forces commander for these Turkish forces
asserted Turkey would retaliate not only against the PKK but
against those peshmerga who assisted the PKK; a TGS senior
officer told us, however, that TGS had not taken such a
decision. End summary.

Basbug: Cross-Border Ops Are Up to Us
--------------


2. (S) TGS Deputy CHOD GEN Ilker Basbug told the press July
19 that while the United States understands Turkey's concerns
regarding the PKK's presence in northern Iraq, the USG has
been indecisive. He added, however, that "the U.S. has given
an order for the arrest/capture of the PKK leadership" in
Iraq. (NOTE: The Turkish verb Basbug used can mean either
"arrest" or "capture." END NOTE.) Early Turkish press
stories reported that Basbug also indirectly answered CJCS
GEN Myers July 14 comments (that Turkey must take up the
question of cross-border operations with the ITG) by stating
that Turkey has the right under international law to resort
to such a step if necessary. Additionally, Basbug
distinguished between "hot pursuit" into northern Iraq (to
pursue PKK terrorists who commit crimes in Turkey) and a
possible "cross-border operation" (presumably to attack PKK
targets). "If Iraq does not do what is necessary," Basbug
stated, "a cross-border operation would be justified." He
noted that discussions with Iraq regarding the PKK are
ongoing.


3. (S/NF) Basbug's comments on cross-border operations have
come in the middle of a swirling press cycle on the PKK
issue. The TGS leadership and PM Erdogan met for five hours
July 1 to discuss the security situation in southeast Turkey.
Subsequent to the meeting, and in reaction to a story
quoting an unnamed U.S. official as cautioning Turkey against
any operations in Iraq, Erdogan has taken a harder public
line on the PKK issue, telling the press July 13 that Turkey
reserves the right to carry out operations against the PKK in
Iraq if necessary.

Deadly Bombings in Tourist Areas Add Fuel to the Fire
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4. (C) While the Turkish press has steadily reported on
military and PKK casualties in the southeast this spring and
summer, terrorist bombings in the western Turkish resorts of
Kusadasi (July 16) and Cesme (July 10) have drawn
international attention, particularly the Kusadasi bombing,
which killed five people. Turkish authorities believe both
bombings were carried out by the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks,
which the Turks assert is a PKK front group.

Turks Privately Warn Us of Possible
Conflict in Northern Iraq
--------------


5. (S) On July 16, the Commander of Turkish Special Forces in
northern Iraq, BG Umut Kalender, called in the U.S. LNO to
report intelligence that the PKK is planning to attack
Turkish forces in Iraq on or after July 20. During the
two-hour exchange, Kalender further stated that a "nephew" of
Masoud Barzani met with PKK leadership in the past week and
told the PKK that "they knew what they had to do," meaning it
was time for the PKK to make these attacks. Kalender said
there was ample evidence that the KDP supports the PKK, and
that in the event of PKK attacks against Turkish positions in
Iraq, Turkish forces would not only defend themselves but
would also retaliate against KDP peshmerga who have assisted
the PKK. Kalender held up a list of potential KDP targets
(but did not allow the LNO to read it).


6. (S) Kalender went on to say that Turkish attempts to
coordinate "hot pursuit" against the PKK in northern Iraq has
not gone anywhere, and characterized recent USG statements as
negative. According to Kalender, the PKK feel perfectly free
to operate with impunity in northern Iraq. Kalender's staff
made a point to tell the LNO how angry Kalender was at the
intelligence he had received, and the staff followed up twice
to be sure the LNO had reported his conversation with
Kalender to Ankara. For a fuller report on this meeting,
please see ref c.


7. (S) On July 19, Chief, ODC Turkey, Maj. Gen. Peter Sutton
called on TGS Acting J3 Maj. Gen. Mehmet Eroz to follow up.
ODC Chief explained that the LNO in Silopi had reported his
conversation with Kalender, but we sought TGS's views on
whether the intelligence Kalender cited was credible. Eroz
responded that a KDP newspaper in Iraq had reported on a
two-phase effort to remove Turkish troops from northern Iraq:
a 50,000-signature petition, followed by hunger strikes and
demonstrations near Turkish military sites. Additionally,
Eroz stated that the Turks have learned that "a close
relative" (NOTE: He did not say "nephew," as Kalender did.
END NOTE.) of Masoud Barzani had held meetings with the PKK,
and this relative had urged the PKK to prepare to attack
Turkish outposts in northern Iraq. Eroz surmised that the
PKK would pursue terrorist action if the peaceful means
outlined in the KDP newspaper were to fail. (COMMENT: This
would almost certainly push any attack beyond the July 20
date noted by BG Kalender. END COMMENT.)


8. (S) Eroz stated that he did not know if the intelligence
report Kalender cited was reliable, but "it could be true."
ODC Chief asked Eroz to confirm Kalender's statement that if
the PKK attacked Turkish forces, Turkey would also retaliate
against those who cooperated with the PKK. Eroz responded
that Turkish forces would defend themselves, and then
"commanders and generals" would evaluate any attack and
determine an "appropriate response."

Comment: Turks Again Seek to Transfer Pressure to Us
-------------- --------------


9. (S) As the military campaign in the southeast intensifies
and now shifts to tourist areas, Turkey is once again feeling
intense heat. In turn, the Turks are looking at the U.S.,
the EU, and--both grudgingly and to a lesser extent--at the
Iraqis to try to relieve the pressure. On the EU front,
Turkey can ill-afford to "take off the gloves" in the
southeast (i.e., return to its heavy-handed 1980s and 1990s
counterinsurgency tactics) for fear of alienating the
Europeans; an uncoordinated cross-border operation into
northern Iraq would likely have the same effect, especially
as our chief coalition partner (the UK) holds the EU
presidency. As we have said before, a Turkish military
incursion into northern Iraq (except in the unlikely event of
Iraqi and coalition agreement) would be a policy disaster for
the GOT. It could be argued, though, that if pushed to
exasperation by continued PKK attacks, AKP's lack of a
coherent policy, and lack of U.S. action in northern Iraq,
the military might at some point undertake such a move.


10. (S) This Mission has consistently argued since 2003 (most
recently ref b),that there are significant, non-kinetic (or
low-level kinetic) actions that we can take against the PKK
in northern Iraq. (Additionally, we understand Washington is
devising steps to cooperate with the Turks on diplomatic,
intelligence, and law-enforcement steps we can take in
Europe.) Steps in Iraq could include: shutting down PKK
offices (or front party offices) in major Iraqi cities where
there is already strong CF and/or ISF presence, as well as
arresting senior PKK leaders when they emerge from the
mountains and into major Iraqi cities in the north. We can
alleviate the pressure on the Turks--and on our
relationship--by agreeing to carry out missions such as
these. Should this current press controversy continue and
accelerate, the PKK issue will once again threaten to
overshadow our increasingly constructive relationship on
Iraq. End comment.


11. (U) Iraq REOs minimize considered.
MCELDOWNEY