REPORT OF MEETING BETWEEN DOE INTERNATIONAL THREAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004037

SIPDIS

DOE FOR JSCHWARTZEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2015
TAGS: ENRG IZ KNNP OTRA PARM TRGY TU JO
SUBJECT: REPORT OF MEETING BETWEEN DOE INTERNATIONAL THREAT
REDUCTION PROGRAM AND TURKISH ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY (JUNE
28, 2005)

Classified By: Pol-Mil Counselor Timothy Betts, reason 1.4 b/d.


1. (U) Summary: Members of the DOE Office of International
Radiological Threat Reduction Program (IRTR) visited Ankara
June 28, 2005 to discuss with officials of the Turkish Atomic
Energy Authority (TAEK) shared concerns for the security of
radioactive materials in the region and to explore
opportunities for cooperative activities in the area of
radiological threat reduction. Following detailed discussions
it was agreed that the initial area of Radiological Threat
Reduction cooperation with Turkey should focus on the problem
of radiological safety in Iraq and the high volume of
radioactive contaminated material that is stopped at Iraq's
borders. DOE would explore the possibility of involving
Jordan as well. (Comment: Concurrent independent activities
by DOE (IRTR) and State complement this meeting in gaining
further regional cooperation with Iraq.) End Summary.


2. (U) Members of the DOE Office of International
Radiological Threat Reduction Program (IRTR) visited Ankara
June 28, 2005 to meet with officials of the Turkish Atomic
Energy Authority (TAEK). The purpose of the visit was to
conduct initial meetings with TAEK to discuss shared concerns
for the security of radioactive materials and to explore
opportunities for cooperative activities in the area of
radiological threat reduction. Joseph Schwartzel from the DOE
HQ, Stephen Musolino from Brookhaven National Laboratory and
EXBS Advisor comprised the U.S. delegations which met with
TAEK officials. Schwartzel outlined IRTR's responsibilities
and accomplishments. These include ongoing projects with
over 40 countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally with
IAEA or Interpol, across a spectrum of radiological threat
reduction activities including: regional partnerships,
technical exchanges, cooperation projects with Interpol and
the IAEA, and physical security work at a variety of
facilities, like medical clinics, irradiation facilities, and
storage facilities in over 30 countries.


3. (U) The primary Turkish interlocutor was the TAEK
President Mr. Okay Cakiroglu. Cakiroglu explained TAEK's
active approach towards radiological threat reduction in
Turkey with numerous activities under the Turkish National
Security Strategic Plan for Vulnerable Radiological Sources,
including radiological source inventory, increased facility
security measures, regional seminars conducted with IAEA,
national training courses, installation of radiation
detectors and an independent Security Committee at TAEK.
Cakiroglu also explained steps Turkey has taken to control
radioactive materials within their borders, including
regulations, laws, licensee compliance inspection, training,
and cooperation with police and customs officials. Cakiroglu
concluded his remarks by commenting that while the United
States is now seeking Turkey's assistance in the area of
Radiological Threat Reduction within the region and is
acknowledging Turkey's position as a leader in the Region, it
is strange that the United States does not appear to be
interested in being involved in the development of Peaceful
Nuclear Energy in Turkey due to the lack of effort to ratify
the 5-year old Agreement with Turkey for the Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy.


4. (U) Cakiroglu then moved on to discuss Turkey's primary
radiological concern: the lack of control of radiological
materials by its neighbor, Iraq. Turkey has experienced a
significant number of radioactive contaminated shipments
arriving at it's border crossing with Iraq since June 2003.
This most frequently involves contaminated scrap metal
shipments originating in Iraq. Turkish authorities detect
the radioactive material contained in truck cargo, and then
deny the vehicle entry into Turkey. Frequently the
contaminated materials are simply dumped along the side of
the road inside Iraq, creating both a radiological security
and safety problem. This situation has probably resulted in
radioactive sources being left in an uncontrolled manner in
these debris piles or elsewhere in Iraq. While, TAEK
recognizes this problem, they have not been able to establish
any communications with the relative nuclear authority in
Iraq.


5. (C) EXBS Advisor inquired about the relationship that
TAEK has with other neighboring government Nuclear
Authorities. Cakiroglu responded that he has been encouraged
by the Turkish government to establish communications with
the Armenia Nuclear Authority, mainly due to close proximity
of an Armenia nuclear power plant to the Turkish border.
Although, he has attempted to establish communication both
through Georgia and the IAEA, none of his attempts have
succeeded. Cakiroglu added that he has been instructed not to
attempt to establish communication with the Iranian Nuclear
Authority, due in large part to the suspicion that Iran could
be involved in violations of IAEA and UN mandates against
non-proliferation and uranium enrichment and Turkey does not
want to appear to condone this activity. Finally, Cakiroglu
stated that Turkey's relationship with Greece, Syria,
Bulgaria and Georgia are good and that they do share
information when appropriate. Turkey also has worked
cooperatively with authorities in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and other Central Asian nations concerning nuclear
safety.


6. (U) Schwartzel and Cakiroglu agreed that the first
efforts of radiological threat reduction cooperation should
focus on ways to assist the Iraqi government to achieve
better control of radioactive materials in Iraq. Cakiroglu
stated that TAEK has resources, facilities and expertise to
train Iraqis in the principles of radiological safety,
security, regulation and control. TAEK is also willing to
host or assist in organizing conferences, seminars and
training courses for Iraqis to share expertise in security
and control of radioactive material.


7. (U) Schwartzel and Cakiroglu concluded the meeting by
agreeing that IRTR and TAEK would cooperatively develop a
plan of action and milestones to assist the Iraqi government
to achieve positive control of radioactive materials within
Iraq, prevent contaminated shipments from leaving Iraq or
being dumped close to their borders. DOE would also
investigate the inclusion of the Jordanian Nuclear Authority
in these activities, in hopes that a regional effort would be
more successful in Iraq. Once this issues with Iraq has been
brought under control, Cakiroglu stated, it will be easier
for TAEK to focus its attention on more regional activities
to reduce the radiological threat.


8. (U) DOE/IRTR cleared this message.
MCELDOWNEY