TURKS DENY GO IT ALONE POLICY IN THE BLACK SEA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004013

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2030
TAGS: PREL MARR ECON EU RO TU NATO
SUBJECT: TURKS DENY GO IT ALONE POLICY IN THE BLACK SEA

REF: A. BUCHAREST 1432

B. ANKARA 3953

Classified By: PolMil Counselor Timothy A. Betts for reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d)


1. (C) Summary: An MFA official and a Turkish admiral
admitted to us June 30 that RADM Kadir Sagdic's comments on
the margins of a Harvard Black Sea Security Conference
earlier that month (ref A) were "extreme" and did not reflect
GOT policy. They credited his comments to personal views
prompted by frustration with Romanian political-level
resistance to greater maritime cooperation with Turkey in the
Black Sea. End summary.


2. (C) MFA International Security Affairs DDG Fatih Ceylan
agreed to meet PolMilCouns one-on-one on June 30 to discuss
statements by Turkish Admiral Kadir Sagdic on Turkey's Black
Sea maritime security policy at the June 7-10 Harvard Black
Sea Security Conference in Chisinau. At Ceylan's request
just prior to the meeting, TNFC/N5 Strategy Chief RADM (LH)
Cem Gurdeniz joined as well.


3. (C) PolMilCouns informed Ceylan and Gurdeniz of what
Sagdic had told US participants on the margins of the
Chisinau conference, drawing from ref A, para 2, He noted
that this differed from what Ceylan and Gurdeniz had
previously explained to us was Turkey's policy and from what
Turkish Navy Commander ADM Ornek had told USNAVEUR ADM Ulrich
earlier in the week (ref b).


4. (C) Ceylan, holding a copy of Sagdic's prepared remarks
for the conference, said "this is Turkey's policy," not what
Sagdic told our SECI Coordinator. Both he and Gurdeniz
thought Sagdic had poorly chosen his words; when he described
NATO policies regarding PfP as "dictatorial," he likely meant
"declared" or "directed". After an extended discussion, they
conceded that his language was "extreme."


5. (C) Regarding Turkey's "going it alone," both Gurdeniz and
Ceylan said that was not possible. Currently, Turkey's
OAE-like Operation Black Sea Harmony (BSH) covers only 45% of
the Black Sea. Other littorals must participate to gain
complete coverage of the sea. In this regard, they were
critical of Romania. Gurdeniz repeated what he had said
during the Ornek-Ulrich meeting: Turkey alerts the Romanians
when suspect vessels enter Romania's territorial waters, but
Bucharest does nothing with the information. They neither
shadow the vessels nor report on their destination and cargo.
Turkey had invited fellow NATO members Romania and Bulgaria
to join BSH before the other littorals in the hope of giving
the operation more of a NATO flavor before the others joined.
Neither Bucharest nor Sofia indicated any interest, so BSH
was opened to other littorals. Now Russia and Ukraine have
indicated a desire to join and still no word from the two
Allies.


6. (C) Ceylan explained that Turkey had worked for two years
to convince Russia to join BLACKSEAFOR (BSF). Moscow had
been reluctant to place its vessels under the command of
others during BLACKSEAFOR activations. The Russians'
agreement to do so was a first for the Russian Navy. When
they were considering participation in BSH, the information
sharing elements concerned them. Finally, the Turks
convinced them to join. Throughout this process, the
Russians were learning the NATO concepts and vocabulary the
Turks use, contributing to the broader Russian-NATO
relationship. But while Russia was becoming more comfortable
with NATO, it was still wary of the Alliance's intentions.
He argued that as Russia became more confident in its
relationship with NATO, it would be open to more engagement
by the Alliance and regional Allies. He noted Russia's
acceptance of foreign observers for the next BSF activation
ceremony as a significant step. He predicted that Russia
might accept the deployment of foreign observers to
participating ships in 2006. This step-by-step approach
would eventually lead to Russian acceptance of NATO
activities in the Black Sea.


7. (C) Gurdeniz added that with 10,000 Russian flagged
vessels transiting the Turkish Straits every year together
with the threat of Chechen terrorism, Russia's cooperation on
maritime security was essential for Turkey. Turkey had no
objection to US activities in the Black Sea that conformed
with the Montreux Convention, but believed a formal NATO
presence would bring to an end Russia's cooperation. This in
turn would increase the risk to shipping through the Straits
-- an important international energy corridor that passes
through the heart of Istanbul.

8. (C) After Gurdeniz's departure, Ceylan confided that
another possible reason for Sagdic's defiant tone was the
deep frustration the Turkish Navy felt towards Romania. The
navy-to-navy relationship is fine, with the Romanian navy
requesting and receiving considerable assistance from their
Turkish colleagues in support of Romania's participation in
OAE. However, the Turks believe Romania's political
leadership is blocking their navy's greater participation in
regional Black Sea efforts, instead pressing for NATO to rush
into the region.


9. (C) Comment: Sagdic's reported comments do represent
Turkish policy regarding the here and now. They do not,
however, reflect what both civilian and military officials at
all levels tell us in Ankara are Turkey's long-term goals for
the region. While the Turks are proud of their creations in
the Black Sea -- BSF and BSH -- and want to preserve their
leadership role, they also have a genuine desire to keep
Russia positively engaged in cooperative maritime security.
We are hopeful that the consultations between NATO's Maritime
Component Command Naples and the Turkish Navy (ref b) will
improve the transparency of BSH and make the Turks'
profession of its "NATO affiliation" closer to a reality.
End comment.
MCELDOWNEY