Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA3954
2005-07-07 13:08:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

GEN BASBUG AND CHARGE DISCUSS IRAQ, PKK, BILATERAL

Tags:  PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ IR SY PKK 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003954 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2025
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ IR SY PKK
SUBJECT: GEN BASBUG AND CHARGE DISCUSS IRAQ, PKK, BILATERAL
RELATIONS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003954

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2025
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ IR SY PKK
SUBJECT: GEN BASBUG AND CHARGE DISCUSS IRAQ, PKK, BILATERAL
RELATIONS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (S) Summary: Deputy TGS Chief GEN Ilker Basbug believes
that MNF-I has a new order to "track and capture" PKK
personnel in Iraq. (We are checking.) He thought this was a
positive indication of US intentions towards the terrorist
group. The Charge told Basbug she would have an answer soon
to his request for more information on IEDs. Basbug accepted
ODC-T Chief MajGen Sutton's offer to ask JAC Molesworth if
they could evaluate the causes of the recent PKK violence.
He quizzed CDA about where the differences between the US and
Turkey over Syria lie; when she mentioned politicians'
statements he dropped the subject. He was unsure of the
impact of Ahmadinejad's election on Turkey-Iran relations,
but did not believe Iran would walk away from the EU-3
negotiations. End summary.

Bilateral Relations
--------------

2. (C) The Charge paid an initial call on DCHOD Gen Basbug on
July 5. Recalling that the last High Level Defense Group
(HLDG) meeting was in November 2003, Basbug encouraged the
Charge to work with his successor (he expected to be
reassigned in August) to hold another HLDG in the near
future. The Charge agreed that these meetings were
important. She noted that the cargo hub at Incirlik Air Base
was working smoothly, and that both sides would need to
ensure that cooperation at the local level continued after
the changes in command expected at the base this summer.

PKK: "Track and capture" and IEDs
--------------

3. (S) Basbug told the Charge that he had talked to VCJCS Gen
Pace on June 30. He already knew about the fragmentary order
"CENTCOM issued" two to three months earlier regarding the
handling of PKK terrorists detained during normal coalition
operations. However, during the call with Gen Pace, he said,
the VCJCS "said something different." He recalled Gen Pace
as saying that there had been a meeting of the intelligence
community on the PKK and that there was a new "direct order"
or "specific order" to US forces to collect information and

conduct operations targeting the PKK -- "track and capture,"
was what Basbug said he heard. Basbug was heartened because
this "indicates a positive intention" even though concrete
results may require some more time. The Charge said that she
had not seen this order, but undertook to look into it.


4. (C) Looking forward to the Washington visit by GOT Iraq
Coordinator Osman Koruturk, the Charge noted that the US was
also working on other tracks against the PKK, such as
encouraging the Europeans to address front offices and
sources of PKK finances and establishing a trilateral
(US-TU-Iraq) intelligence sharing mechanism.


5. (C) The Charge recalled that the US still owed Basbug an
answer to his request to Gen Pace in Washington for IED
countermeasures. CHOD GEN Ozkok had also raised this with
visiting USNAVEUR Commander and Joint Allied Forces Naples
Commander ADM H.G.Ulrich (septel). Basbug recalled receiving
a pamphlet on the subject. The Charge noted that the USG
owed Turkey more on this score. She undertook to have a more
satisfactory response "in a matter of days," noting that JCS
and EUCOM staff were actively working it. (Note: A JCS team
is expected in Ankara the week of July 17.) Basbug agreed
that this was an important issue for the TGS.


6. (C) Returning to this subject later in the discussion,
Basbug turned to ODC-T Chief MajGen Sutton and asked for his
assessment "from a military point of view" of the reasons
behind the increase in IEDs in Turkey. General Sutton
reported that he had not seen any intelligence on the issue,
but offered to ask JAC Molesworth for its assessment of
whether the PKK has developed IED capability via direct links
with the insurgents in Iraq or by simple observation of open
sources. Basbug agreed. He and TGS/J3 LTG Metin Yavuz
Yalcin expressed satisfaction with the functioning of the
intelligence fusion cell EUCOM created in Ankara last year.


7. (C) The Charge asked Basbug for his assessment of what is
causing the increased PKK violence in Turkey. He said TGS
was still attempting to determine the answer. However, it
was either an effort to keep the organization together
("terrorist organizations cannot survive without taking
action") or represented a reconciliation of the PKK's
previously divided leadership, with those advocating a more
active/violent approach winning the day. Upon further
reflection, he offered a third alternative: central control
has weakened and individual cells are operating autonomously.


CENTCOM/EUCOM Visit
--------------

8. (C) Basbug said that CENTCOM Commander GEN John Abizaid
and EUCOM Commander Gen James Jones' expected visit in
September "was another development." The Charge responded
that their coming was positive and expressed the hope that
the visit would produce tangible results. Basbug agreed,
saying that something that could be shared with the public in
Turkey would be important. He and the Charge agreed to share
thoughts in the weeks ahead about how this might be achieved.

Iraq/Syria/Iran
--------------

9. (C) Basbug asked about the current situation in Iraq,
particularly regarding the constitution drafting process.
The Charge reviewed the difficult issues to be faced,
including how to define federalism, but noted the progress
made in including Sunnis in the drafting committee. Basbug
quizzed the Charge on the process, asking whether the US
wanted an Iraq based on federalism (answer: yes),whether the
central government would be strong or weak (answer: in
control of security and resources),and whether Kirkuk's
status would be "solved" in the constitution (answer: it will
be "addressed").


10. (C) The Charge recalled raising Syria with Turkish
politicians, and relayed to Basbug continuing USG concern
about differences in approach between Turkey and the US.
Perhaps feigning surprise, he inquired about the differences.
He asserted that Turkey shared the US goals of stopping
Syrian or Syrian-based interference in Lebanon, Iraq and the
Israeli-Palestinian issue. "Whenever we talk to Syria, we
warn them that these are serious issues they must address."
He asked why the US did not have a trilateral mechanism with
Syria and Iraq to discuss border and other issues. The
Charge responded that the real issue is Syrian actions and
the need to press Damascus to take appropriate concrete
measures.


11. (C) The Charge asked Basbug for his read on Mahmud
Ahmadinejad. Basbug said it was not an easy question. He
recalled that Rafsanjani had been a radical reformer when he
was first elected and he is now a moderate. In fact, "we
wish a more moderate man had been chosen," but one "can't
second guess the Iranian people." Ahmadinejad was reportedly
close to the religious hierarchy, but Turkey would need to
make a proper assessment to draw real conclusions. The
Charge noted concern at Ahmadinejad's remarks on the nuclear
issue, but Basbug thought that Iran's nuclear program had
widespread support and statements would not be significantly
different if someone else had been elected. He also did not
believe Ahmadinejad would walk away from the EU-3 process.
Yet, he allowed that if Ahmadinejad reverted to "old
strategies," he could impact (negatively) Turkey-Iran
relations. He asked that when the USG has an assessment of
him that we share it.
MCELDOWNEY