Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA3890
2005-07-06 16:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY WILL ISSUE CYPRUS NON-RECOGNITION

Tags:  PREL CY TU EU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003890 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2015
TAGS: PREL CY TU EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY WILL ISSUE CYPRUS NON-RECOGNITION
DECLARATION

REF: A. ANKARA 427


B. ANKARA 879

C. ANKARA 1856

D. ANKARA 3558

E. BRUSSELS 2533

F. 1 JULY 2005 SCOTT/MARCIEL/SKINNER E-MAILS

(U) Classified by A/DCM James Moore, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003890

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2015
TAGS: PREL CY TU EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY WILL ISSUE CYPRUS NON-RECOGNITION
DECLARATION

REF: A. ANKARA 427


B. ANKARA 879

C. ANKARA 1856

D. ANKARA 3558

E. BRUSSELS 2533

F. 1 JULY 2005 SCOTT/MARCIEL/SKINNER E-MAILS

(U) Classified by A/DCM James Moore, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Turkey is determined to issue a written
declaration that extending the Ankara Agreement to the ten
new EU members does not constitute recognition of the
Republic of Cyprus (ROC). Domestic criticism that it does
constitute recognition is pushing the Turks toward tougher
non-recognition language, posing the risk that member states
or the Commission will question whether Turkey has fulfilled
the EU requirement to extend the Agreement. This could
possibly block the opening of negotiations. As of July 5,
the Turks had not shared their proposed non-recognition
declaration text with anyone, not even the UK. We urged the
MFA to do so, and to use the most moderate language possible.
Turkey and some member states are also at odds about the
modalities for extending the Agreement. End Summary.


Turks Firm On Written Declaration
--------------


2. (C) The Turkish MFA continues to firmly state that Turkey
will soon extend the Ankara Agreement to the ten new members,
including the ROC. The MFA is equally firm that Turkey will
issue a written declaration that their extending the Ankara
Agreement to the 10 new EU members does not constitute
recognition of the ROC (refs a, b, c, d).


3. (C) Given continuing domestic criticism that it does
constitute recognition, we see little chance Turkey can be
persuaded otherwise. Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs
A/DDG Bilman called the idea of no declaration "impossible."
He claims he is getting "hate letters" over Turkey's
commitment to extend the Agreement to the ROC. Bilman
likewise dismissed the idea of an oral declaration, saying it
will have "no meaning." UK Embassy PolChief Miller says a
minority of member states hope for an oral declaration.


4. (C) Bilman says the Turks are looking for "legal
certainty" that extending the Agreement cannot be construed
as recognition. The MFA has consulted with several
international lawyers (not Turks, according to Bilman) about
what language will guarantee that. European Commission

Ankara Political Head Dawson and Miller think the Turks are
wrong on the law, saying that Commission and UK lawyers agree
that recognition cannot occur without Turkey actively
intending it. However, according to Dawson, the Turks
continue to believe they can be "tricked" into recognition.


5. (C) Despite earlier statements, it now appears the Turks
are prepared to live without EU acknowledgment of their
non-recognition declaration. Bilman acknowledged this was
Turkey's "original position," but said he was not sure "if
this (EU acknowledgment) will happen." He then dropped the
point.

Turks, EU Have Not Discussed Specific Language
-------------- -


6. (C) Bilman, Miller and Dawson confirm Turkey has so far
not shared its proposed text with the Commission, nor even
with the UK, its strongest EU supporter. Miller tells us the
UK has asked to see the text before the Turks give it to the
Commission, but had not seen it as of July 5. Dawson said
the Commission has not discussed specific language because it
does not want to encourage a Turkish declaration, and because
the Turks are reluctant to share the text. UK Ambassador
Westmacott has spoken to MFA U/S Tuygan and Deputy U/S Apakan
regarding the text. They promised his ideas will be taken
into account. We urged Bilman to consider at least sharing
the text with the UK; he said he would consider this but was
non-committal.


7. (C) Acknowledging this is an issue for Turkey and the EU
to resolve, we also urged A/DDG Bilman to use moderate
language in the declaration, the minimum possible to achieve
Turkey's aims. Bilman replied that several EU diplomats here
have urged the same thing, but none has told him what
language would be acceptable or unacceptable. Per ref e, we
suggested that, as a starting point, stating that the
protocol does not change Turkey's position would be
preferable to stating that Turkey does not recognize the ROC
and only recognizes the "TRNC."


8. (C) Bilman recalled that upon signing the EU Constitution
Treaty, Turkey sent a letter to EU High Representative for
Common Foreign and Security Policy Solana referring to -- but
not reiterating -- the MFA's May 1, 2004 statement regarding
"Southern Cypriot Greek Administration's Accession to the
EU." The May 1 statement said, in part, "Greek Cypriots" do
not represent Turkish Cypriots, do not have authority over
the whole island, and cannot be accepted as the legal
government representing all the island (we have e-mailed a
copy to the Department, USEU and Embassy London). Bilman
hinted that the coming Turkish declaration might again refer
to, but not reiterate, the May 2004 statement. However, even
such a reference could be a problem -- Dawson also recalled
the May 1 statement, terming it "not particularly
encouraging."


9. (C) Whatever the language of the non-recognition
declaration, the Turks will have to be careful. While
domestic criticism pushes them toward tougher, legally
bulletproof text, both Miller and Dawson warn that extreme
language will fuel doubts by members states about Turkey's
intent to implement the extension protocol, or raise
questions about the credibility of Turkey's ostensible
agreement. In effect, it would call into question whether
Turkey has fulfilled the requirements for the opening of
negotiations. The worst case, according to Dawson, would be
if the Commission legal service comes to such a conclusion.


Letter Exchange v. Signing
--------------


10. (C) The Turks and some member states are also not in
agreement on the modalities of how Turkey will extend the
Ankara Agreement to the ten new members, including the ROC.
The Turkish MFA wants a low-key exchange of letters to avoid
inflaming domestic opponents; they want to avoid a
high-publicity signing ceremony. However, according to UK
PolChief Miller, the letter exchange idea "won't fly in
Brussels." Although the Commission itself is neutral on this
point, Dawson also notes signing is important to some member
states. Some member states will not agree to a letter
exchange, pointing out the December Summit conclusions
require Turkey to "sign." In addition, Turkish refusal to
sign could furnish another cause for some member states to
question Turkey's commitment to implement the protocol.


11. (C) There is a middle ground: Turkey could sign the
extension protocol without a ceremony. Miller said the FCO
proposed this to MFA Deputy U/S for European Affairs Bozkir
during his July 1 visit to London, but Bozkir still insisted
on a letter exchange.
MCELDOWNEY