UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO VISITS TURKEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003387

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015
TAGS: PREL EPET ENRG ECON TU UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO VISITS TURKEY

(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter;
reasons: E.O. 12958 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: President Yushchenko's June 6-8 visit to
Turkey, his first since becoming President, focused mainly on
commercial issues. The two sides signed six agreements,
including on energy, transport, and combating crime.
Although Turkey claims to support Ukraine's EU and NATO
aspirations, the GOT -- consistent with its Moscow-centric
policies -- did not pursue the subjects of democratization,
open markets and military assistance during the visit. End
Summary.


2. (U) Yushchenko met in Ankara with PM Erdogan, President
Sezer, and Turkish parliament Speaker Arinc. Turkish Foreign
Trade Minister Tuzmen presided over a meeting of the
bilateral joint economic council in Ankara, and Yushchenko
met in Istanbul with Turkish business representatives and the
Ecumenical Patriarch. MFA Energy Department Tug
characterized the Ukrainian approach as one of presenting a
long list of "off-the-shelf" ideas and projects. The Turkish
side committed to general cooperation on energy, including
natural gas, but, contrary to media reports, she asserted
that the two sides did not agree to any specific project,
such as transshipping Iranian gas through Turkey to Ukraine.

Six Agreements Signed
--------------


3. (U) During the visit, the two sides signed agreements on
energy, nuclear energy, railroads, scientific cooperation,
combating crime, and readmission of persons. According to
media reports, the energy agreement covered petroleum, gas
and electricity. MFA energy expert Tug described the energy
agreement as a general framework covering operation and
construction of power plants and energy networks, and
exchange of energy expertise. The nuclear agreement covered
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but no specific project.


4. (U) According to media reports, the two sides reportedly
agreed to discuss cooperation in transporting Iranian natural
gas to Europe. On the Odessa-Brody pipeline, Akinci said the
Turks thanked Yushchenko for the Ukrainian decision to
re-reverse the route away from the Black Sea, restoring the
original plan for the pipeline to transport oil from the
Black Sea to Poland. The Turks welcomed this decision as
helping to keep down tanker traffic through the Bosphorus.

Democratization Not Discussed
--------------


5. (U) During his May 2005 visit to Ukraine, PM Gul promised
Turkish support for Ukraine's democratization process and
attempts to build a more open economy. However, starting
with the 2004 election campaign in Ukraine, Turkey's support
has been a day late and a dollar short, remaining purely
verbal, according to two of the handful of Turkish analysts
who follow Ukraine.


6. (U) In a June 10 briefing for diplomats. Turkish MFA
Eastern Europe Department Head Solendil claimed that Turkey
is committed to Ukraine's democratization, free market
orientation, and integration with Western institutions.
Yushchenko welcomed what he termed Turkey's support for
Ukraine's democratization in November-December 2004 and
European aspirations during his June 7 remarks at a meeting
sponsored by the paranoid nationalist think tank ASAM.
However, obviously weary he spoke without conviction in
slurred Ukrainian (by contrast, his interpreter's Ukrainian
was as clear and melodious as a bell). He also tried to
balance his pro-democracy and Western-oriented remarks by
stating that Ukraine values its relations with Russia, a
point which the Russian political counselor later told us was
greeted with great pleasure by his embassy.


7. (U) Turkey and Ukraine have a "joint action plan" for
bilateral relations. However, because it was signed in 2004
before the Orange Revolution, the plan includes no items
related to democratization, according to MFA Europe DG
Akinci, who briefed together with Solendil. Akinci
dismissively glossed over our question about Turkey's support
for democratization by stating that the subject of Ukrainian
democratization did not come up in any of Yushchenko's
meetings: "The Ukrainians did everything themselves. They
did not need our help." Akinci added condescendingly that
since both countries are trying to become EU members, Turkey
stands ready to share its EU experience with Ukraine.
Democratization in other areas, including the Caucasus, Iran
and Iraq was not discussed because "we concentrated on
bilateral issues."


8. (U) Likewise, the two sides did not discuss any concrete
cooperation to help Ukraine's NATO membership aspirations.
Akinci asserted that Turkey "definitely" would support
Ukraine if it asked for help. BLACKSEAFOR also was not
discussed, according to Akinci, because it is "too detailed"
to be discussed at that level.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The absence of any discussion of democracy or
integration with the West with the President of
newly-democratizing Ukraine is striking. It reflects a
Turkish foreign policy still unused to and uncomfortable with
democratic change in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and
Central Asia, and focused on strengthening political as well
as economic relations with Moscow while concentrating only on
seeking economic benefits from countries it sees as lying in
a Russian sphere of influence. The MFA briefing once again
underscored what we have experienced time and again when
engaging Turkish interlocutors in Akinci's bailiwick on ways
to support the Euro-Atlantic avocation of Eastern Europe and
the Caucasus. Akinci, who is reportedly slated to be
appointed Turkish ambassador in Kyiv, has consistently
emerged in our discussions as a Moscow-centric devotee of
what a pre-eminent American analyst of the region calls
"stabilnost' uber Alles". End Comment.
EDELMAN