FRENCH AND DUTCH "NO'S": MINIMAL INITIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003105

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PHUM TU EUN EU
SUBJECT: FRENCH AND DUTCH "NO'S": MINIMAL INITIAL
CONSEQUENCES FOR TURKEY, BUT SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES AHEAD

REF: ANKARA 3032

(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Ruling AKP and most pundits and media
channels say they have taken the French and Dutch "no" votes
in stride and opine that the results will not affect Turkey's
Oct. 3 start date for EU harmonization. Markets have reacted
in a similarly low-key way. However, in the midst of
continuing GOT drift and inability or unwillingness to find a
workable modus vivendi with core institutions of the Turkish
State, a broad range of contacts sees considerable negative
consequences for Turkey down the road. End summary.


2. (U) GOT leaders (e.g., FonMin Gul) and Turkish
commentators and markets have reacted in a low-key way to the
French and Dutch rejections of the EU Constitution.


3. (U) In May 30 comments to the press while on an official
visit to Bahrain, Gul asserted that the French referendum has
no bearing on Turkey's Oct. 3 accession harmonization start
date. Initial Turkish market and political commentary has
focused on what pundits see as the two salient aspects.
First, that the French "no" stemmed more from anti-Chirac and
anti-globalization sentiments than from anti-Turkish
feelings. Second, that it is not the result of
harmonization, i.e., possible membership, but perhaps not
achievable for 10 years or more, but the process that matters.


4. (C) Having discounted the possible no votes in the week
running up to the referendum, Turkish markets have thus
shrugged off the implications in subsequent trading. While
one of the leading London investment bank analysts of Turkey
characterized this reaction as "cynical" in the face of what
he sees as major difficulties ahead for the EU, Turkey's
candidacy, and the Turkish economy, other analysts point to
continuing high global liquidity still banking on Turkish EU
convergence and pleased to take advantage of the relatively
high Turkish yields.


5. (C) A survey of contacts among ruling AKP MPs reveals a
standard line: the AKP government is determined to move
ahead, preparations for the start of harmonization are broad
and energetic, and the appointment of Economy Minister
Babacan as chief negotiator was timely and appropriate.


6. (C) However, EU diplomats and Turkish political analysts
point to significant challenges ahead for Turkey.


7. (C) In looking forward to Embassy Berlin's assessments, we
turned to the German Embassy press attache, whose views are a
bellwether for the EU diplomatic community here. Having
noted the negative effect on the EU of the GOT's pressure to
force postponement of an alternative-view university
conference on the Armenian tragedy (reftel),he followed up
May 30 with a two-pronged assessment of the French referendum
consequences for Turkey.


8. (C) First, he predicted that a more self-absorbed EU will
be less willing to abide Turkish slippage on reform. Second,
Turkey appears to be its own worst enemy. In this regard, he
returned to the problem of Turkish drift. PM Erdogan's
"elusive" discounting of Justice Minister and GOT spokesman
Cicek's menacing comments about the conference on the
Armenian tragedy as merely Cicek's personal opinion does not
answer the question of what the GOT's official view is.
Schroeder's mania for stability (the press attache recalled
that Schroeder's three honorary doctorates reflect his
preferences since they are from universities in Russia,
China, and Turkey, three countries which prize "stability
uber Alles") may well be overriden by a keener post-German
election focus on just how democratic Turkey is...or isn't.


9. (C) Pre-eminent Turkish national security analyst Faruk
Demir, leading political analyst Aydin Kanat, and seasoned
journalists with good contacts in both the political arena
and core institutions of the State (e.g., "Sabah" Ankara
bureau chief Asli Aydintasbas, "Hurriyet" columnist Sukru
Kucuksahin) have all drawn our attention to other troubling
aspects of the GOT's drift which are likely to affect the EU
accession process.


10. (C) First is a willingness to provoke core institutions
of the Turkish State in ways which challenge basic Ataturkist
tenets of the Republic. The AKP government's passage of an
amendment to the new penal code which in effect renders
meaningless any sanctions against unregistered Koran courses
is the latest in what has been a series of provocative steps
aimed at the secular system as defined by the State (e.g.,
the fall 2004 attempt to criminalize adultery, the spring
2004 attempt to ease entry of graduates of Islamic preacher
high schools into universities). Second is the AKP
government's lack of vision or strategy to deal with poverty,
corruption, the PKK, or the Kurdish question. These
problems, together with the concern over attempts to
undermine the secular order from within, are the ones CHOD
Ozkok underscored in his landmark, nationally-televized April
20 speech as being of terminal concern to the Turkish State.
Third, calling into more open question AKP's sincerity about
EU accession, is the more and more open deprecation of the EU
by Erdogan and others, with Erdogan expressing doubt May 30
to the AKP central executive board whether there would be an
EU in 10-15 years.
EDELMAN