Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA3035
2005-05-27 15:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

AMERICAN-TURKISH COUNCIL BRINGS DEFENSE/SECURITY

Tags:  OVIP PREL PINR TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003035 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2020
TAGS: OVIP PREL PINR TU
SUBJECT: AMERICAN-TURKISH COUNCIL BRINGS DEFENSE/SECURITY
HEAVYWEIGHTS TO WASHINGTON

REF: ANKARA 2911

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003035

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2020
TAGS: OVIP PREL PINR TU
SUBJECT: AMERICAN-TURKISH COUNCIL BRINGS DEFENSE/SECURITY
HEAVYWEIGHTS TO WASHINGTON

REF: ANKARA 2911

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: MOD Gonul, DCHOD Basbug and NSC SecGen
Alpogan will all be in Washington June 5-7 for the American
Turkish Council's annual conference. (It is possible that
Alpogan may postpone his visit due to the heavy traffic of
Turkish visitors that week.) While we understand many
officials in Washington are appropriately focusing on the
visits of PM Erdogan and FM Gul in this same time period
(septel),the three security/defense officials will need to
hear messages that are consistent with one another and with
those Erdogan and Gul will receive on the state of the
relationship and the necessary Turkish steps to put it back
on an even keel. With Gonul, Basbug and Alpogan, expressions
of appreciation for their public words and Turkey's support
for us in Iraq and Afghanistan would also be appropriate.
End Summary.

--------------
The Principals
--------------


2. (C) The American-Turkish Council (ATC) annual conference,
June 5-7 this year, will bring several senior GOT defense and
security officials to Washington at the same time Prime
Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Gul are there. They
are:

-- Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul: Gonul is one of the few
consistent supporters of a strong U.S.-Turkish relationship
within the Turkish cabinet. He has spoken out publicly in
support of our bilateral relationship, recently staging a
press conference with the Ambassador to mark the conclusion
of an agreement with the USG on upgrading Turkey's F-16 fleet
to underscore an example of positive bilateral cooperation.
Unfortunately, Gonul is not a heavyweight in the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP) or on Turkey's defense
policy. The Ministry of National Defense that he heads is an
agency that handles the GOT's defense budget, personnel
matters and major procurements. Even on procurements, his
influence is limited as the military develops requirements
and the Undersecretariat of Defense Industries (SSM)
negotiates contracts. While SSM reports to Gonul, its
current head, Undersecretary Murad Bayar (who is also
attending the ATC),is close to Gul, who brought him back

from the U.S. to head SSM. Without a policy role on defense
matters, significant decisions are worked out between TGS and
government agencies, or between CHOD General Hilmi Ozkok and
PM Erdogan directly. Yet, as MOD and as one of the few AKP
members the military can work with, Gonul can act as a bridge
between the two. We understand that the Turkish Embassy is
seeking an appropriate appointment in the Pentagon for him.
If this does not work out, we would urge senior USG officials
attending the ATC, particularly those from DOD, to seek him
out for a brief exchange.

-- NSC Secretary General Yigit Alpogan: Alpogan is the first
civilian secretary general of the National Security Council
in that institution's history. A former ambassador to Greece
and deputy undersecretary of foreign affairs -- and a staunch
secularist -- Alpogan is an accomplished diplomat who is
trying to carve out a role for himself and his institution
after EU-mandated reforms downgraded the military's role and
stripped the NSC of its previous authority. (NOTE: We
understand some in the Turkish military now view the NSC
merely as a disaster coordination center. END NOTE.) He has
brought in a number of MFA officials and new civilian
analysts in an effort to build up an independent policy
analysis capability. Unlike his somewhat reclusive 4-star
predecessors, Alpogan is out on the diplomatic circuit in
Ankara, and his trips this month to Israel and next month to
Washington are unprecedented for a NSC secgen. He has also
spoken publicly in support of the US-Turkey relationship. As
he has fewer policy axes to grind than other bureaucratic
players in Ankara, we believe the USG should encourage and
support Alpogan's institution-building efforts. At the same
time we need to remain realistic about how far he will be
able to take the NSC as an institution given the
organization's new designation as a policy advisory body.

-- Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) Ilker
Basbug: Basbug has been at the forefront of TGS's efforts to
move beyond the 2003 disappointments on March 1 (Parliament's
failure to grant passage of our troops) and July 4 (our
arrest of Turkish Special Forces personnel in Suleymania).
His January 26, 2005 press conference in which he succinctly
emphasized the breadth and importance of the Turkish-American
relationship set the standard for subsequent statements by
the military, the bureaucracy and the government which
stemmed the tide of rising anti-Americanism here. Basbug has
a realpolitik view of the world, emphasizing shared interests
more than shared values as the basis for international
cooperation. He is proud of the good relations he has
cultivated with his principal American counterparts, VCJCS
Gen Pace and EUCOM DCDR Gen Wald. He is expected to leave
Ankara this August to become commander of the 1st Army in
Istanbul, an essential step towards becoming head of the TGS
-- a position most observers believe he will receive in 2008.

--------------
Common Themes: Bilateral Relations,
Appreciation for Cooperation
--------------


3. (C) Since the beginning of the year, each of these three
has spoken out in support of our bilateral relationship with
greater conviction and sincerity than we have seen from
Erdogan and Gul. While this may change the way we address
the three, it will be important that they leave Washington
with the same understanding of the state of the relationship
that the two AKP leaders receive. Thus, USG interlocutors
should express appreciation for the positive statements these
three have made and their impact on stemming the slide of
public support in Turkey for bilateral cooperation. But our
message must also underscore that consistent and insistent
GOT moves to rebuild and maintain public support for the
relationship are essential if we are to have the productive
partnership both governments desire. This will require
continuous efforts on the part of both capitals.


4. (C) Our message on the relationship will carry more weight
if we acknowledge the valuable cooperation we currently
receive from Turkey, without making our interlocutors think
that Turkey is indispensable. Words of thanks would be
appropriate for the use of Incirlik for tanker aircraft and
the logistics hub that should begin operations June 1, for
orchestrating a positive visit by Iraqi Interim Prime
Minister Ja'afari, for organizing a PSI exercise in May 2006,
and for taking on the command of ISAF for a second time.

--------------
Specific Subjects: Iraq, EU, Military
Modernization, BMENAI
--------------


5. (C) Some issues to address with these interlocutors might
include:

-- Iraq: Iraq dominates our bilateral agenda. Our
operations there remain highly unpopular with the Turkish
public and our will to see the process we started to its
conclusion is doubted by many within the bureaucracy and
military. While Basbug has access to information on
developments from liaison officers with CENTCOM and MNFI,
Alpogan will likely be decidedly less well informed.
Nonetheless, both will be intently interested in the latest
developments in Iraq and our strategy to effect a stable,
united, prosperous Iraq. Kirkuk and ongoing operations in
Talafar and Mosul will be of particular interest. The
continued presence of the PKK/Kongra Gel in northern Iraq and
persistent reports of increased PKK attacks in Turkey will
also be on their minds. It will be important especially in
Basbug's meeting with VCJCS Gen Pace that the two address
this issue (see septel/notal). Turkey continues to reach out
to various political groups in Iraq, offering training to
political parties; encourages trade and other business ties
despite the security risks; and is increasing its engagement
with Iraqi authorities in Baghdad as demonstrated by
Ja'afari's May 19-21 visit. The ITG has indicated that it
will send ISF personnel to a training course in Turkey, which
may be the ice breaker required for Ankara to send trainers
to Iraq as part of the NATO Training Mission. We recommend
that Washington officials express appreciation for Turkey's
support of the ITG and the development of democracy in Iraq.
(Note: Ankara's attitude toward our Iraq policy showed
significant improvement after the results of the January 30
elections were announced.) At the same time, officials
should encourage faster disbursement of the $50 million in
development assistance Turkey has pledged and forgiveness of
Iraq's outstanding $1.6 billion debt to Turkey along the
lines of the Paris agreement.

-- EU: The sudden appointment of State Minister Ali Babacan
as EU negotiator after months of policy drift was likely
motivated by fear about anti-Turkish drift in France and the
Netherlands and political developments in Germany and their
likely impact on Turkey's EU accession process. In fact,
developments in Europe and the slippage in the GOT's reform
efforts and standards since December 17 cast new questions
about the GOT's intentions and Turkey's chances for
membership. A significant number of military leaders have
been skeptical about the EU's willingness to accept Turkey
and worried about damage to the secular nature of republic by
EU-mandated reforms. It will be important, therefore, to
encourage Basbug and even Alpogan and Gonul to stay with the
process. We should also offer the US's continued assistance
and support with the EU, but we should be clear that Turkey
must take the lead; we should support Turkey's initiatives
and not act as Turkey's proxy.
-- Military Modernization/Transformation: More with Gonul
and Basbug than Alpogan, USG officials should emphasize the
need that we move forward with military modernization and
transformation in a way that ensures we have the
interoperability necessary to operate effectively together.
The "Peace Eagle" AEW&C aircraft procurement from Boeing and
the "Peace Onyx" government-to-government brokered F-16
upgrade programs are good examples to follow. However, the
recent RFP for attack helicopters, containing provisions that
could effectively exclude American competitors, raised
questions about whether the Turkish procurement agency, which
falls under Gonul's authority, remains interested in working
with us. Although the RFP was recently revised after Boeing
laid out a long list of concerns, company representatives are
skeptical that the changes were sufficient to permit the
company to bid. Beyond the terms and conditions of this
specific RFP, Turkey has developed a reputation among
American defense companies as one of the most difficult
customers in the world, with procurement officials constantly
looking to squeeze more out of companies, even after
contracts are signed, and with decisions influenced by
politics and offsets more than capabilities and value. As a
result, three companies have closed their local offices and
others may follow suit.

-- BMENAI: With Alpogan, a discussion of the Broader Middle
East and North Africa Initiative along the lines we suggest
for PM Erdogan and FM Gul (septel) would be useful. It would
be useful to note to Alpogan that the most cogent and
positive Turkish analysis of BMENAI and the benefits of
Turkish participation came not from the government but from
CHOD Ozkok's April 20 nationally-televised address (reftel).
EDELMAN