Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA2839
2005-05-20 07:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

SE TURKEY: DSM EXPERIMENT DRAGS ON

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM TU OSCE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002839 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TU OSCE
SUBJECT: SE TURKEY: DSM EXPERIMENT DRAGS ON

REF: A. ANKARA 2525

B. 04 ANKARA 6994

C. 04 ADANA 0147

Classified By: Political Counselor John W. Kunstadter for reasons 1.4 (
b) & (d).

THIS CABLE IS FROM AMCONSUL ADANA.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002839

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TU OSCE
SUBJECT: SE TURKEY: DSM EXPERIMENT DRAGS ON

REF: A. ANKARA 2525

B. 04 ANKARA 6994

C. 04 ADANA 0147

Classified By: Political Counselor John W. Kunstadter for reasons 1.4 (
b) & (d).

THIS CABLE IS FROM AMCONSUL ADANA.


1. (C) Summary: DEHAP leaders have yet to realize their
hopes of creating a new, national-level, moderate political
party from the Democratic Society Movement (DSM) announced
last fall. One observer attributes the delay to both the
PKK,s popularity and pro-Kurdish politicians, need to
recalculate based on the ECHR,s May 12 ruling on Abdullah
Ocalan,s 1999 trial. Many contacts claim any &new8 party
would just be DEHAP by a different name. The Acting Mayor of
Diyarbakir, however, claims that precinct-level elections for
the new entity will be held within two weeks. Meanwhile, the
Diyarbakir Governor continues to build dialogue with civil
society, while lamenting the lack of a common GoT policy in
the region. In the current polarized political climate,
exacerbated by violent clashes and the ECHR ruling, it is
unlikely that a DEHAP facelift can have a meaningful impact
in the short term. End Summary.


2. (C) Late last year leaders of the pro-Kurdish Democratic
Peoples, Party (DEHAP) told emboff they were planning the
formation of a new party that they hoped would be legally
established by April 2005 (Ref A). The new political
initiative, referred to as the Democratic Society Movement
(DSM),was initially announced in October by the four Kurdish
former DEP MP,s (including Leyla Zana),and was later
endorsed by DEHAP leadership. Despite the desired timetable
laid out last year, the new party has yet to materialize.

Why the Delay?
--------------


3. (C) In response to queries about the delay in the
development of the DSM, Hakkari human rights attorney Rojbin
Tugan told consulate officers in a May 6 meeting that the
emergence of any new, moderate political force is hampered by
the PKK,s popularity (septel),and by voices in the
government and State that label all discussions of the
Kurdish problem as ultimately linked to the PKK agenda, and
therefore terrorist-tainted. While former DEP deputies (and

potential DSM leaders) Leyla Zana and Hatip Dicle are still
quite popular in the region, &their8 movement has not been
able to come up with any fresh ideas, Tugan said.


4. (C) Zana and Dicle lost some support last December, she
added, when they signed on to a declaration by Kurdish
intellectuals and then seemed to regret doing so, accusing
the drafters of having amended the declaration after they had
signed it. (Note: That declaration, entitled &What do the
Kurds want in Turkey?8, was published in an advertisement in
the International Herald Tribune on December 9, 2004. In it,
signatories called for a new Turkish Constitution that
recognizes the existence of Kurdish people, as well as for a
general amnesty to establish a climate of reconciliation, and
a program of economic development for southeast Turkey.
According to Tugan, these views express what is in the hearts
of &90 percent8 of the Kurds in the region. End note.)


5. (C) Tugan noted that the delay in formally announcing the
transformation of the DSM into a new party may also be
partially attributable to the May 12 European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) ruling on Abdullah Ocalan,s 1999 trial (Ref
B). DSM leaders may have been waiting to see the reaction of
all sides to such an announcement, Tugan explained, and
preparing to tailor their response accordingly. (Note: The
ECHR,s ruling was received with little reported or observed
GOT-local populace confrontation on May 12, however the
eventual GoT response to the ruling could yet provide a spark
for nationalists of all stripes to react, per reftel B. End
note.) She also hinted that the delay in announcing the
party may be due to internal disputes as to who will be its
leader.

We,re Working On It
--------------


6. (C) Despite the delays, Acting Mayor of Diyarbakir Yusuf
Akgun told PO on May 9 that plans for further DSM development
were still rolling along, and that precinct elections for
local councils would take place within two weeks. &This
will be an organization from the ground up,8 he said,
explaining that the ward/precinct level councils would then
elect town level bodies, leading to provincial and eventually
national-level leadership decisions. In response to PO
queries as to whether this was the beginning of a new party
or a transformation of DEHAP that would feature the same
personalities, Akgun would only responded that it all
depended on the will of the people. &We can,t know because
we haven,t had elections yet.8 He also noted that a GOT
decision on whether or not DEHAP would be shut down would be
instrumental in determining the future of DSM. (Note: In
PO,s meeting with the DEHAP Acting Mayor, the only media
representatives invited to cover the meeting were from Gun
TV. End note.)

Been there, done that
--------------


7. (C) Several other contacts, including an advisor to the
Mayor of Diyarbakir, the Diyarbakir Human Rights Association
president and an independent businessman, said they saw the
DSM going nowhere slowly. The DEHAP Mayor of Dogubeyazit,
one of Turkey,s and DEHAP,s few female mayors, said the
movement would simply be DEHAP by another name, and
explicitly regional in character. Akgun remained on message,
however, throughout his discussion with PO. Though he was
unable to state clearly whether DSM would remain a movement
or become a party, or whether it would replace or be a new
version of DEHAP, Akgun averred that whatever it turned out
being, it would be a national-level, not regional, entity,
though it would strive to keep the Kurdish issue on the
national agenda. (Note: This echoes language used by
contacts last fall per Ref C. End note.) &We will cross
bridges and reach out to others,8 he insisted, but did not
provide specifics on how that would be achieved when
specifically asked.

Diyarbakir Governor: Building Dialogue
--------------


7. (C) Separately, Diyarbakir Governor Efkan Ala told PO in a
May 10 meeting that he was working hard to establish dialogue
with different sectors of civil society. (Note:
Non-governmental contacts, including the HRA Diyarbakir
branch president told PO the Governor was experiencing some
success in that regard and creating favorable impressions.
End note.) Ala half-heartedly claimed the TRT
Kurdish-language broadcasts were manifestations of increased
language rights in Turkey, but he acknowledged that the GoT
could do more in regard to mother tongue demands. He said
that a &day when Kurds can see other languages than Turkish
used in some courses in state schools and in private media
would be a logical future development.8 He seemed unsure
whether he could predict use of Kurdish in future public
political dialogue in Turkey when PO pursued the issue.


8. (C) He also seemed to indicate that the Ministry of
Interior did not always see eye to eye with the Turkish
military,s strategy in the region. &Not everyone sees
things the same way,8 he said, lamenting the lack of an
NSC-like national level process whereby common GoT policy
could be forged. (Note: He expressed specific interest in
the U.S. National Security Council approach and its
mechanics. If Ala,s International Visitor program
nomination is approved, this may be considered in terms of
program suggestions. End note.) Ala accepts the notion that
both the GoT and the PKK have contributed to a &with us or
against us8 situation in which there is little space for any
independent political expression in the region.


9. (C) Comment: The already polarized political climate in
southeast Turkey is being exacerbated by ongoing clashes
between the PKK and security forces, as well as by the May 12
ECHR ruling on Ocalan,s retrial. The ECHR ruling may be
creating broad, non-elite expectations in the region, in
light of the popularity that Ocalan continues to enjoy.
There is potential for this development to be misinterpreted
by his supporters in southeast Turkey, and subsequent
disappointment about his non-release could be turn into
something more, depending on GoT reaction to the ECHR ruling.
Under such conditions, it is unlikely, if not impossible,
that DEHAP leaders, like Diyarbakir mayor Osman baydemir, and
other pro-Kurdish politicians, such as Leyla Zana and Hatip
Dicle, will have much success going the &moderate8 route
and pushing a national-level party where the &Kurdish
issue8 is but one agenda item. Unfortunately, a DEHAP
facelift ) the most likely outcome of the elections Akgun
mentioned ) will not have any meaningful impact on the
political scene. In the meantime, public mood seems to be
indicating growing desperation at the prospect of another
summer regional conflict. End comment.
EDELMAN