TURKS PREPARING FOR PKK SPRING OFFENSIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 002314

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2025
TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS PREF TU IZ IR SY
SUBJECT: TURKS PREPARING FOR PKK SPRING OFFENSIVE

REF: ANKARA 1484

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para. 17.

Summary
--------------


2. (S) The GOT appears to be convinced that the PKK is going
to carry out its first "spring offensive" in southeast Turkey
since 1999. Press and intel reporting indicate the Turks
have moved two commando brigades toward the Iraq border in
order to hunt PKK terrorists and deter attacks. MFA and TGS
contacts have--to a degree--been forthright in expressing
their concern to us about the offensive. Should the Turks
take more than minimal casualties, we will again feel strong
public and political pressure to address the PKK's continuing
presence in northern Iraq, and the issue will again dominate
the agenda here when we have other crucial matters to pursue.
We recommend Washington address this issue with the ITG, at
the very least by urging the new government to resume
trilateral talks as soon as possible. End summary.

Spring Offensive on the Way?
--------------


3. (S) Until it had declared a unilateral cease fire in 1999,
the PKK had traditionally carried out a "spring offensive" in
Turkey every year. The PKK revoked the cease fire in June
2004; according to GOT figures about 100 soldiers and
civilians and another 100 PKK terrorists were killed last
year. We evaluate that the GOT--including the
military--believes the PKK is gearing up for a spring
offensive in southeast Turkey. It appears that the Turks are
taking a proactive approach (with some help from us) and
hunting for insurgents, especially in areas along the Iraqi
border.


4. (S) As the mountain snows melt, it becomes easier for PKK
terrorists to infiltrate across the Turkish border and
execute attacks. Press and intel reporting indicates that
the Turks have moved two commando brigades to the Sirnak and
Hakkari provinces close to the Iraqi border. According to
these reports, the Turks are concerned that a number of PKK
terrorists have infiltrated from Iran and (especially) Iraq
to carry out attacks in southeast Turkey. According to press
reports, there has been "heavy" fighting in the Cudi
Mountains area as the Turkish security forces have sought to
find PKK terrorists before they can carry out attacks.


5. (SBU) The press is also reporting on a "major" battle with
PKK terrorists on April 14 in Siirt province. According to
these reports, the fighting involved two brigades and 2,000
local village guards. A Turkish first lieutenant, two
Turkish senior sergeants, a village guard, and 21 alleged PKK
members were killed. The Turkish forces reportedly destroyed
five terrorist shelters and captured 19 Kalashnikov rifles, 1
sniper rifle, 2 Bixi machine guns, 54 hand grenades, over
4,400 rounds of ammunition, 12 anti-personnel mines, 5
anti-tank missiles, 4 KG of C-4, 3 KG of TNT, first aid
equipment, documents, 3 tons of foodstuffs, and other
materials.

SE Turkey Officials: We're Dealing with Mosquitoes,
the Swamp is in Northern Iraq
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Amid press reports of security operations against PKK
terrorists in southeastern Turkey, Adana consulate's poloff
visited government security officials in Mardin and Sirnak
provinces April 13-14. Meetings were cordial, but yielded
few details about official views on the magnitude of the PKK
threat in the region. The Sirnak Security Director, when
queried about what his office is up against, focused instead
on the need for action against the PKK in Iraq. "We're
dealing with mosquitoes here," he said, "but the swamp is in
northern Iraq." He stated that in addition to dealing with
the terrorists in the Qandil Mountains, the Makhmour camp
should be shut down, too. When poloff pointed out the
cooperation that had taken place to date between the U.S. and
GOT on combating the PKK, he did acknowledge that he had
followed those developments "with great pleasure."

7. (C) Sirnak's security director reported 14 PKK attacks in
towns around Sirnak province during the last year and did not
seem inclined to accept that only now in spring were attacks
getting worse. Sharing a border with Iraq, Sirnak is one of
the provinces most seriously affected by PKK terrorism, he
said. He claimed that PKK members are crossing back and
forth across the border, implying that approximating their
numbers in Turkey is futile.


8. (C) Mardin's Security Director, however, estimates 48-50
PKK terrorists are active in Mardin province, and claims
numbers increase as one heads east. Despite having an idea
about PKK numbers and locations in Mardin, apprehending them
is challenging, he said, due to their "guerrilla warfare"
tactics. He did expect an uptick in PKK attacks with the
arrival of spring.

Mountain Operation vs. Mountain Festival
--------------


9. (C) Security officials were at pains to assure us that
traveling in the region presented no danger to us and indeed,
the atmosphere in Mardin and Sirnak's city centers seemed
quite normal on the surface. Occasional signs of increased
military activity in the region did manifest themselves,
however. For reportedly the first time, armed personnel
carriers and security forces were prominently stationed at
the turn-off from the main Gaziantep-Urfa road to Halfeti on
the left bank of the Euphrates, the home district of Abdullah
Ocalan. A security checkpoint between Cizre and Sirnak had
appeared since poloff last visited the region several months
ago and while departing Sirnak town, we saw a military
helicopter overhead. For part of poloff's trip, the police
"follow car" we are accustomed to seeing during travel in the
provinces was armored.


10. (C) The population is definitely noticing the change in
atmosphere, according to contacts in Silopi on the Iraqi
border. A UNHCR staffer stationed there told us tension in
the area has been growing since March 21, when security
operations began. In the past two weeks alone, he said, the
press had reported one mine attack and three skirmishes
between the PKK and security forces in the Sirnak/Mardin
area. "Four incidents in ten days: that is not
insignificant," he said. Additionally, he said, pro-PKK Roj
TV is full of PKK commanders promising the organization will
be active, using primarily ambushes and IEDs. With the start
of operations, UNHCR had hoped to monitor the condition of
families in the area that had returned voluntarily to Turkey
from the Makhmour camp, but last week's planned monitoring
trip was canceled as the security situation in the mountains
outside of Sirnak continued to decline. (NOTE: Despite the
talk of tension and reports of a major security operation on
Sirnak's Cudi Mountain, reportedly up to 15,000 people
attended a first-ever, DEHAP-organized Cudi Mountain Festival
outside of Silopi o/a April 9-10. Contacts stated that it was
a peaceful event, with no interference by security forces.
END NOTE.)

Buyukanit Grabs the Spotlight...
--------------


11. (SBU) Thus far Turkish political and military leaders
have not commented much on the record on the spring offensive
issue, with one notable exception. Land Forces Commander GEN
Yasar Buyukanit (who will likely become CHOD in 2006) told
the press in March that the PKK's strength within Turkey had
reached the same level as in 1999, when Abdullah Ocalan was
captured. Likely seizing on the opportunity to needle the
government for failing to persuade the U.S. to take military
action against the PKK in northern Iraq, Buyukanit said "Now
Iraq is being restructured. Do we have any say? No. Do we
have an Iraq policy? No." Both PM Erdogan and FonMin Gul
reacted defensively to Buyukanit's comments; they essentially
responded that Turkey indeed has an Iraq policy, but gave few
specifics. Gul took a formalistic approach, saying that only
the CHOD and DCHOD had the right to speak for the Turkish
military.

...But Turks Tight-lipped on Plans
--------------

12. (S) While embassy contacts acknowledge to us that a
spring offensive concerns them, they are also tight-lipped
about specific steps the Turkish military is taking to combat
the threat. The Turks are typically unwilling--some have
said to the point of paranoia--to discuss with us military
activity within Turkish territory. Indeed, the Chief of the
Intelligence Department of the TGS J-2, RADM Ergun Mengi,
called in the DATT on April 14 to accuse the ARMA of asking
"inappropriate" questions at an April 8 discussion with J-2's
COL Mohamed Karazdiken. In fact, the ARMA had asked nothing
about Turkish troop movements in Turkey, and only asked for
the Turks' evaluation of the likelihood of a spring
offensive. Karazdiken replied that TGS is concerned about a
spring offensive, but also that the PKK's increased activity
was a normal occurrence. (COMMENT: We find this statement
somewhat at odds with the limited activity last year. END
COMMENT.)


13. (C) On April 11, PolOff and PolMilOff called on Ali
Findik of MFA's Intelligence Directorate to discuss the PKK.
New to his portfolio (and visibly nervous),Findik gave few
specifics except to state his concern that recent discoveries
of high explosives in southeast Turkey may indicate that the
PKK is planning "unconventional" attacks in Turkey. The
targets of such attacks might include tourist centers or even
the Straits, but Findik also noted that attacks against
European tourists in Turkey would be against the PKK's
interests, since it would turn European popular opinion
against the Kurdish cause. Findik handed us a GOT non-paper
on the PKK (text in para. 18).


14. (S) Both the GOT non-paper and J-2's Karazdiken
emphasized the importance of the PKK conference which took
place in early April in northern Iraq; they believe the PKK
will plan the outlines of its campaign there. We assume
normal liaison as well as EUCOM's intelligence fusion cell
with the Turks here in Ankara will serve as a useful venue to
pass on intelligence we gather from the conference.

Comment: PKK Can Threaten to Our Priorities with Turkey
-------------- --------------


15. (C) We cannot assess the reality of a PKK offensive, but
we are convinced that the Turks have concluded that an
offensive is underway and, moreover, that it is facilitated
and directed out of Iraq. Although most senior Turkish MFA
officials and senior military officers have a realistic
understanding of why the USG has not taken action so far
against PKK elements in northern Iraq, the proliferation of
conspiracy theories means many attach other motives to their
perception. We often hear allegations that the USG is
supporting the PKK, laying the foundations for the creation
of an independent Kurdistan, and trying to dismember Turkey.


17. (C) If anti-PKK activity or a spectacular attack results
in significant Turkish casualties--and especially if there
are terrorist attacks on civilian targets in urban or western
Turkey--we should expect an increase in anti-American finger
pointing, a further decline in cooperation with the USG, and
additional pressure on the U.S. to take direct action against
the PKK in northern Iraq, or to let the Turks do so
themselves. This would be further accentuated by the
increased PKK presence along the Turkish border in northern
Iraq.

Action Request: Renew the Trilateral Process, Request
Action of ITG
-------------- --------------


17. (C) Therefore, once there is an ITG in place, we
recommend pressing them to agree quickly to resume trilateral
talks on the PKK, and pursuing the following additional items
with the ITG and KRG to increase pressure on the PKK:

--Declare the PKK officially a terrorist organization;
--Declare the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party a PKK front
party and close down its offices in Iraqi cities;

--Issue Iraqi arrest warrants for PKK leaders known to be in
Iraq (the leaders have already been listed in MNF-I
lookouts);
--When ISF manpower levels permit, work with UNHCR and Turkey
to secure Makhmour refugee camp and pursue an orderly process
for durable solutions, including repatriation;

--Shut off PKK supply lines and secure the Iraqi border in
areas where the PKK/Kongra-Gel is present;

--Work with the ITG and KRG to encourage the KDP and the PUK
to make statements condemning the PKK and to take steps to
limit the movement and resupply of PKK cadres and camps;

--Initiate with Turkey a joint information operation designed
to take advantage of the splits within the PKK and to further
weaken the organization.


18. (C) Text of MFA paper on the PKK

BEGIN TEXT (Note internal paragraph numbering)

CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS

PKK/KONGRA-GEL ACTIVITIES


1. The threat of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL still remains a reality
for Turkey. Despite a number of structural changes within
the organization, the PKK continues to follow instructions
issued by Abdullah Ocalan.


2. To date, the terrorist organization numbers some
5,800-6,000 armed militants. These militants can be divided
according to their geographical locations: Iraq
(2,900-3,200),Turkey (1,700-1,800),Iran (400),Syria and
Lebanon (80-100).


3. Although the organization has transferred some of its
militants to the Hakurk, Haftanin and Kunera regions (of
Iraq),Qandil Mountain still remains its main base and serves
as the headquarters of the organization. The PKK/KONGRA-GEL
retains all kinds of infrastructures and logistical support
in this part of Iraq.


4. The PKK/KONGRA-GEL is increasing its activities in Iraq:
its affiliates, the Democratic Solution Party and the
Democratic Construction Party participated in the Iraqi
elections. Such participation is important to legitimize the
PKK/KONGRA-GEL's position. As the organization is
experiencing difficulties in recruiting new members, it has
started to recruit new cadres from the Makhmour Camp in Iraq.


5. The PKK/KONGRA-GEL has recently intensified its armed
activities. The organization possesses around hundred
land-to-air missiles (SA-7B). The organization has stored
significant amounts of explosives (C-3, C-4 etc.),of which
the Turkish security forces seized 300-400 kilograms in 2004.


6. The PKK/KONGRA-GEL has accumulated an annual sum of 16
million euros over the last 2-3 years. This amount has
recently decreased. The main two sources of the
organization's revenues are commission (on drug and human
trafficking) and extortion. The expenditures of ROJ TV
amount to 12 million euros per year. It is thought that
recent financial problems may push the organization to
resort to organized crime.


7. The PKK/KONGRA-GEL has adopted harsh measures in order to
deal with those who have left the organization. As such, the
head of the Democratic Unity Party, Kemal Sor, was executed
in northern Iraq. Following the departure of his moderate
cadres, hardliners such as Murat Karayilan and Cemil Bayik
have gained influence within the organization.


8. The PKK/KONGRA-GEL has orchestrated over 200 attacks since
it gave up its so-called cease-fire of 1 June 2004. In this
period, the number of attacks increased two or threefold in
comparison with figures predating 1 June 2004. The
organization chooses mainly economic targets. There has been
an increase of 120% in the number of armed attacks. The
organization has started to use remote controlled bombs,
especially with the aim of hindering the transfer of security
forces in eastern and south-eastern Anatolia.


9. The PKK/KONGRA-GEL is holding its third congress (general
assembly) in early April in Kunera of the Mt. Qandil in
northern Iraq. The organization is expected to reach a
subsequent decision on increasing its attacks and activities,
a proposal which was forwarded during the conference of the
HPG (People's Defense Forces). A decision will also be taken
on the "Democratic Confederalism Protocol Draft." It is
possible that the president of KONGRA-GEL, Zubeyir Aydar,
will not participate in the congress.


10. The PKK/KONGRA-GEL's most recent affiliate, "New PKK",
held its first congress in the Kunera region of Iraq between
28 March and 4 April 2005. This shows that the terrorist
organization not only has the ability to hold congresses
freely, but also enjoys the support of certain elements in
Iraq.


11. Although the Turkish military authorities have informed
the US authorities about the presence and activities of the
PKK/KONGRA-GEL in Iraq since September 2002, the US
authorities have not taken any steps to counter these
activities (sic).

END TEXT


19. (U) Iraq posts minimize considered.
EDELMAN