Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA2061
2005-04-08 15:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM - A WEAK LINK IN TURKISH REFORM

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM TU OSCE 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002061 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TU OSCE
SUBJECT: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM - A WEAK LINK IN TURKISH REFORM

REF: A. ANKARA 1935

B. ANKARA 1511

C. ANKARA 814

D. 04 ANKARA 6871

(U) Classified by Polcouns John Kunstadter; reasons 1.4 b and
d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002061

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TU OSCE
SUBJECT: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM - A WEAK LINK IN TURKISH REFORM

REF: A. ANKARA 1935

B. ANKARA 1511

C. ANKARA 814

D. 04 ANKARA 6871

(U) Classified by Polcouns John Kunstadter; reasons 1.4 b and
d.


1. (C) Summary: Turks cite history to argue that Turkey is a
model of religious tolerance. They assert that the existence
of diverse religious communities in the Ottoman Empire and
the acceptance of the Jews who migrated to Istanbul after
expulsion from Spain in 1492 proves Turkey is free of
religious discrimination. However, from its founding until
today the Republic of Turkey has encouraged emigration of
"non-Muslims," principally Christians, through discriminatory
taxes and other policies, including the fomented Istanbul
riots of 1955 and pressures on Syriacs in the southeast.
Very few Christians and Jews remain in Turkey.
Discrimination or other pressure continues against Alevis and
others not in the Hanafi Sunni mainstream as well. EU
contacts say GOT failure to allow more freedom for religious
minorities could eventually derail Turkey's EU candidacy.
End Summary.

--------------
Image of Religious Tolerance a Myth
--------------


2. (C) If you raise concerns about religious freedom in
Turkey, the response will almost always be a kind of bemused
denial. The vast majority of Turks -- government officials,
journalists, academics, politicians, and people on the street
-- believe that their country is a model of religious
tolerance. In school they are taught a mythic version of
Ottoman and Turkish history, focusing on the presence of
various, sizable religious communities in the Ottoman Empire.
They claim with pride that their history is free of the kind
of bloody religious conflict that wracked Europe for
centuries (Turkish students are not exposed to a serious
analysis of the massacres of Armenians and Alevis or pressure
against the Syriacs).


3. (C) A prime example of this distorted, backward-looking
perspective is the way Turks constantly refer to the Jews who
fled Spain for Istanbul in 1492. Turks cite this historical
reference to reject the idea that religious minorities face

discrimination in Turkey today. For example, Mustafa Sait
Yazicioglu, an MP from the ruling AK Party (AKP) and former
president of the GOT's Directorate of Religious Affairs
(Diyanet),recently cited the events of 1492 in a meeting
with us as evidence that the Diyanet's current campaign
against missionaries (reftels A-C) does not reflect hostility
toward other religions.


4. (C) It is true that Jews were forced out of Spain and
taken in by the Ottomans. It is also true that the Ottoman
authorities did not massacre them, drive them from their
homes, or otherwise persecute them as European powers had
done. But the Ottomans treated Jews (and Christians) as
second-class subjects, and today, more than 500 years later,
the Republic of Turkey is doing the same. Jews, like
Christians and other religious minorities, are in practice
barred from careers in key State institutions such as the
armed forces, the MFA, law enforcement, the judiciary, and
the National Intelligence Organization. There are no
"non-Muslims" in the 550-seat Parliament.


5. (C) The popular image of a tolerant, religiously diverse
Turkey contrasts sharply with present-day reality. While
millions of Christians lived in the Ottoman Empire, few are
left today. The Armenian Orthodox comprise the largest
Christian community, with approximately 65,000, followed by
the 15,000-strong Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) community. The
once large Greek Orthodox population is now estimated at less
than 2,000. There are also approximately 25,000 Jews, 3,000
Protestants and small numbers of other religious minorities.
The overall national population is officially 99 percent
Sunni Muslim. However, this figure is inflated by the GOT's
refusal to recognize the Alevis, estimated to number 5-8
million, as a distinct religious group, or to take account of
the fact that a significant proportion of the nominally
Muslim population does not actively practice its religion.

--------------
GOT Policies Pressure "Non-Muslims"
--------------


6. (C) The winnowing out of religious minorities did not
happen by accident. Since its founding in 1923, the Republic
of Turkey has utilized a series of policies to encourage
emigration of religious minorities, principally of
Christians. In 1940, for example, the GOT imposed a wealth
tax on Christian and Jewish citizens at a rate up to 10 times
greater than the rate used for Muslims, a policy that
historian Bernard Lewis referred to as a "tax pogrom." This
type of approach continues in many forms, including the
State's relentless expropriation of properties owned by
"non-Muslim" foundations, and the above-mentioned Diyanet
campaign to define missionaries as a threat to national
unity.


7. (C) Nevertheless, the myth of religious pluralism
persists, fed by the inability of Turks to recognize how far
removed they are from the Western concept of religious
freedom. FM Gul recently denied the existence of religious
prejudice in Turkey by asserting that, "Turkey is a place
where churches and synagogues are built near mosques." In
fact, Turkey has many historic churches lying in ruins where
there are no longer enough Christians to form a congregation.
The State bureaucracy places great hurdles in front of
"non-Muslims" seeking to restore historic properties or open
new places of worship where there is a demand. The
Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary remains closed.


8. (C) Christians tend to draw the most suspicion and
hostility from the Turkish State, which remains mindful that
Christians long preceded Turkic peoples in Anatolia. The
Turkish State also resents Christians' insistence on
vigorously pursuing judicial redress, e.g., on restitution of
confiscated property. The Ecumenical Patriarchate predates
the Ottoman Empire, and its representatives do not hesitate
to assert historical rights. Muslim Turks also harbor
suspicions about Christians since they associate Christians
with the Crusades, the Russian invasions of eastern Anatolia
in the late 19th century and 1915, and the European powers
that defeated the Ottomans in World War I and aimed to carve
up Anatolia.


9. (C) Jews, by contrast, face far less official ire. The
Jewish community is still grateful to the Turks for taking in
their ancestors 500 years ago. In private, Turkish Jews will
acknowledge to us concerns about official discrimination.
But they almost never raise such concerns in public. When
they have a problem, they try to resolve it quietly through
channels. If that fails, they accept it. As Ankara
University professor Baskin Oran put it to us, "After 500
years the Jews still see themselves as guests here, and if
you're a guest you don't make trouble."

--------------
Religious Freedom a Sleeper Issue for EU
--------------


10. (C) In some small, symbolic ways, EU-related legal
reforms have caused a slight easing of conditions for
religious minorities. However, the overall impact remains
limited and Turkey's EU accession drive has highlighted the
country's shortcomings as never before. The European
Commission, in its progress reports on Turkey, has
consistently cited religious freedom as a weak area in the
GOT reform effort, and the European Parliament has repeatedly
called for greater efforts. However, EU member states
generally appear reluctant to raise the issue directly.


11. (C) Our EU contacts say it is difficult for member states
to criticize the GOT's approach to religion because the EU
cannot speak with one voice -- practices among EU states vary
significantly. However, they say religious freedom is a
sleeper issue that could derail Turkey's candidacy if the GOT
continues to avoid reform. "If they keep ignoring it, sooner
or later it will be a problem for the EU," said a Dutch
diplomat. There are signs of EU concern in the EU's reaction
to the anti-missionary campaign. Sema Kilicer, political
officer at the European Commission's Turkey Representation,
told us Enlargement Commissioner Rehn raised the missionary
issue with PM Erdogan in Brussels, and Ambassador Kretschmer,
head of the Turkey Representation, discussed it with FM Gul.
A German diplomat told us church leaders in Germany are
increasingly concerned about the plight of Christians in
Turkey, and the German Government is taking heed. Noting
that there are 3,000 mosques in Germany, he said German
officials are "fed up" with the hypocrisy of PM Erdogan and
other GOT leaders who ignore the rights of "non-Muslims"
while criticizing the EU as a "Christian club."


12. (C) A Danish contact averred to us that religious freedom
is the most difficult challenge for Turkey in its EU reform
drive. If change comes, he believes, it will come slowly,
spread over the 10 years or so it would take for Turkey to
complete the accession process. Others, however, are
starting to question whether the GOT will ever accept
religious pluralism. They believe religious freedom may
define the limit of the AKP's capacity for reform, and there
do not appear to be any parties among the opposition willing
to pursue the issue. "Maybe we expected too much of (AKP),"
said Kilicer. "They passed some reforms, but it seems they
cannot do more. Now what will happen?"

--------------
Comment
--------------


13. (C) Ersonmez Yarbay, a pious but iconoclastic AK MP, told
us the Turkish State at its founding made a terrible mistake
by turning Turkey into a one-religion society. Islam in
Turkey, he believes, would be strengthened by competition.
Imams would have to make greater efforts to teach Islam if
other religions were given free rein. There might be
slightly fewer Muslims, but their faith would be truer.
Moreover, if Turkey had retained its once large Christian
community it would today be more advanced and closer to the
West. It might have even won a Nobel prize or two by now, he
said.


14. (C) He is right, of course, but he is almost alone.
Reform rhetoric aside, the truth is that religious pluralism
is opposed across the Turkish political spectrum. Islamists
fear the influence of Western religions, particularly
Evangelical Christianity. For nationalists, religious
diversity -- like ethnic or linguistic diversity -- is a
threat to national unity. The general public is easily led
astray by nationalist-religious rhetoric. The Diyanet's
anti-missionary campaign, which has been strongly supported
at the Cabinet level, indicates that AKP is not about to
challenge the status quo.


15. (C) In his book "The Emergence of Modern Turkey," Bernard
Lewis writes of the 19th century Ottoman reform efforts aimed
at winning European support for the Empire. According to
Lewis, the most shocking element of the reforms for Ottoman
Muslims was the stated principle that subjects of all
religions would be equal under the law. Under both the
traditions of Islam and the policies of the Ottoman Empire,
"non-Muslim" subjects were to be "tolerated". However, this
toleration "was predicated on the assumption that the
tolerated communities were separate and inferior, and were
moreover clearly marked as such," Lewis wrote. For the
European powers, the Ottomans' treatment of "non-Muslims" was
"the touchstone of Turkish sincerity," according to Lewis.
At the time, the Europeans often found Turkish sincerity
wanting in the field of religious freedom. The EU will
likely reach the same conclusion unless the Turkish State,
government, and society develop a new, truly tolerant
approach to religious minorities.


EDELMAN