Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA2060
2005-04-08 15:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKISH MFA OFFICIAL: "NATO INVOLVEMENT IN THE

Tags:  MOPS MARR PREL PARM TU RS GG UP RO BU NATO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 002060 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2015
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL PARM TU RS GG UP RO BU NATO
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA OFFICIAL: "NATO INVOLVEMENT IN THE
BLACK SEA IS OUR END GAME"

REF: ANKARA 802

Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 002060

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2015
TAGS: MOPS MARR PREL PARM TU RS GG UP RO BU NATO
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA OFFICIAL: "NATO INVOLVEMENT IN THE
BLACK SEA IS OUR END GAME"

REF: ANKARA 802

Classified By: DCM Robert S. Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Turkey shares with us the goal of eventual NATO
involvement in the Black Sea, an MFA official told us April

7. At BLACKSEAFOR's March 31 senior officials meeting, the
members agreed on a common threat assessment and agreed that
it would be beneficial to build some ties with outside states
and organizations. Indeed, the U.S. and other interested
states are welcome to observe BLACKSEAFOR's "activation" in
Constanta, Romania this August. Ukraine declared itself
ready to join Turkey's maritime interdiction operation in the
Black Sea; a number of other littorals--including Russia--are
giving it a serious look. Turkey's deliberate approach seems
to be bearing fruit. End summary.


2. (C) PolMilCouns and PolMilOff called on MFA Deputy
Director General for Security Affairs Fatih Ceylan and NATO
Department Head Atilla Gunay on April 7 to get a readout on
the March 31 BLACKSEAFOR meeting of MFA senior officials.
Before Gunay could provide his readout (Ceylan could not
attend due to illness),Ceylan (unprompted) said that
Turkey's long-term goal is for NATO to be involved in the
Black Sea. "That's our end game," he declared. Ceylan
insisted there is "no plot" for Turkey and Russia to turn the
Sea into their own personal lake. He said Turkey was moving
slowly in this regard, but also that the Turks have told the
Russians that eventually BLACKSEAFOR or something like it
would have a "NATO affiliation." Ceylan reported that Russia
did not object to this.


3. (C) Gunay explained that the main goal of the Kiev meeting
was to reach agreement on a senior experts report evaluating
threats in the Black Sea maritime domain, chiefly terrorism
and WMD proliferation. The nations agreed that the wider

Black Sea region may have many threats--WMD proliferation,
terrorism, trafficking in persons and SA/LW, etc.--which have
the potential to "spill over" into the maritime domain.
However, Ceylan injected, based on Turkey's BLACK SEA HARMONY
operation (see reftel) and input from the other littorals,
Turkey cannot now make an assessment that there is an
"imminent and direct" threat in the maritime domain. Ceylan
also pointed out that Turkey had worked assiduously to have
the threat assessment include the same issues that are of
concern to the Alliance and to the EU. In essence, Ceylan
said, the BLACKSEAFOR nations agreed to measure their threat
assessment by Euro-Atlantic standards. Ceylan allowed us to
briefly review the threat assessment, but said he would need
permission from his superiors to hand us a copy; he
subsequently provided us a copy on April 8 (see para. nine),
asking that we hold it closely.


4. (C) The officials in Kiev focused on two issues: How to
operationalize dealing with threats in the Black Sea, and
whether the member nations had the legal framework in place
to do so. On the first issue, the nations agreed on the need
to improve communications. Additionally, the nations agreed
to create some sort of command center, at first during
activations of BLACKSEAFOR. The officials assigned their
respective naval commands to look into these issues. On the
legal issue, the officials agreed that in general the
BLAKSEAFOR founding agreement and relevant UNSCRs (especially
1540) provide an adequate legal framework.


5. (C) Gunay reported that the member states also agreed on
delicate language for how BLACKSEAFOR will relate in the
future to the "outside world." First, the officials agreed
that the U.S. and other interested countries were welcome to
observe BLACKSEAFOR's "activation" scheduled to begin August
8 in Constanta, Romania. Second, they agreed on language
stating that it would be beneficial for the littorals to
(collectively) look into "ways and means to interact with
other states and organizations" in the future.


6. (C) Gunay reported on Turkey's efforts to multilateralize
its BLACK SEA HARMONY maritime interdiction operation (MIO)
on the Black Sea. Ukraine has volunteered to join and has
only to sort out technical issues with the Turkish Navy. The
Russian official at the meeting said Russia is also quite
interested in joining but needs higher-level political
approval. Georgia is interested, although it essentially has
no navy. The Bulgarians said they had yet to complete their
interagency policy process on this issue. Romania was
apparently silent. Gunay noted that the Romanians did not
speak up as much as they normally do at the Kiev meeting, but
added that the Romanian official was fairly new. (COMMENT:
We defer to Embassy Bucharest, but wonder if Romania's
silence was based on what we understand is its reluctance to
carry out MIO in the Black Sea under the BLACKSEAFOR rubric.
END COMMENT.) Ceylan reported that--as fellow NATO
Allies--Turkey had offered Bulgaria and Romania "first dibs"
at joining BLACK SEA HARMONY as early as January of this
year, but that neither had responded by the time of the Kiev
meeting, where Turkey threw it open to others.


7. (SBU) Gunay noted that the next BLACKSEAFOR political
consultations will likely take place before June of this year
and again in the fall, followed by another senior officials
meeting NLT December 2005.


8. (C) Comment: While Turkey continues to take a "go slow"
approach with us vis-a-vis NATO or U.S. involvement in Black
Sea maritime security, we are impressed by Ceylan's comment
that NATO involvement is in Turkey's end game. The
willingness to accept foreign observers for the August
BLACKSEAFOR activation is encouraging. If the Turks' readout
of the BLACKSEAFOR meeting is accurate, their deliberate
approach seems to be working. We recommend that we continue
to support Turkish leadership in this area, while also
reminding all the littorals that we are always interested in
learning more and standing by to assist at any time we are
asked. End comment.


9. (C/NF) Text of BLACKSEAFOR document "Maritime Risk
Assessment in the Black Sea"

BEGIN TEXT (Note internal paragraph numbering)

Maritime Risk Assessment in the Black Sea


1. Definition of Maritime Risks:

Maritime risks encompass all actions with the potential to
disrupt law and order as well as to inflict certain damages
on persons, property and environment in the maritime areas,
caused by deliberate actions or negligence. Maritime risks
in the Black Sea are endogenous and exogenous in nature. The
following are the main risks which can be encountered in the
maritime areas.

a. Asymmetric Risks:

Asymmetric risks are those terrorism-related maritime risks
of non-military nature. These asymmetric risks may also stem
from spillover effects of risks such as aggressive
nationalism, separatism, religious intolerance, xenophobia,
temporary inability of some littoral states to enforce law
and order, trafficking in human beings and drugs, illicit
transfers in small arms and light weapons and possible
proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery and related
materials. Vessels can be used in illegal activities,
including terrorism at sea, and thus become tools of
asymmetric risks. Merchant shipping may also be misused to
transport asymmetric means (material and manpower) in between
certain geographic locations.

Furthermore, financial gains by merchant ships through
commercial activities might also be used in support of
asymmetric acts. Asymmetric risks in the maritime areas also
entail activities using surprise as an element, as well as
unexpected venues and means.

Asymmetric risks jeopardize the safety and security of
navigation, as well as of the maritime areas.

b. Organized Crime:

Illegal activities may be carried out in the maritime areas,
due to the difficulty in controlling vast sea areas. When
sea-lines of communications, as well as critical choke points
are controlled and partolled, these illegal activities might
be redirected into areas where no shipping lines cross or no
systematic surveillance takes place. Organized crime might
entail, but not be limited to the following illegal actions:
(1) Drug Trafficking
(2) Illicit Transfers in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
(3) Illegal Migration
(4) Trafficking in Human Beings
(5) Illicit Trafficking in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),
delivery systems and related materials.

c. Environmental Risks:

Any environmental incident polluting the maritime areas poses
a major risk to public health, economy and natural habitat,
thus generating, in some cases, far-reaching consequences.
These risks might be generated either by deliberate action
(e.g. dumping waste),or human error (e.g. collision at sea).


2. Assessment of Risks:

a. Asymmetric Risks:

The Black Sea has become a major route for oil, as well as
passenger and containerized cargo transportation. As in
other regions of the world where there is an increase in the
volume of maritime transportation, there are chances that
cargo traffic may be misused to disrupt security.

In the Black Sea, one specific incident took place in 1996,
in which a Panama flagged ferryboat was hijacked from Turkish
port of Trabzon. One cannot rule out such an incident
happening again in the future.

b. Organized Crime:

Trafficking in human beings exists in the territories of the
Black Sea region. However, there are no indications that it
is systematically done through maritime transportation.

Illegal migration stemming from the region, as well as from
parts of Europe, Asia, the Middle East is mainly using
terrestrial routes, but is has already started to cross the
Black Sea region.

There is no firm evidence that systematic drug trafficking
exists in the Black Sea. Narcotics destined to Europe from
Afghanistan via Central Asia are currently transported
through land. Although smugglers always use the most secure
paths and alter them frequently as possible, the Black Sea
may be used as a transit route in some isolated smuggling
cases. However, it remains a possibility that sea lines of
communications may be used more often in the future, if not
controlled properly.

Illicit transfers in SALW are increasing all over the world.
There are indications that the Black Sea is currently used to
a certain degree for such activities.

On the other hand, there have been no reported cases of
illicit trafficking in WMD, delivery systems and related
materials in the Black Sea. However, this risk cannot be
ruled out, given the lucrative nature of such activity.

As it is the case in any other region, there is also a
connection between international terrorism and transnational
organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering and illegal
arms-trafficking in the Black Sea region. The Black Sea is
not immune from possible illegal movement of nuclear,
chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials.

c. Environmental Risks:

No major catastrophic environmental incident occurred in the
Black Sea originating from asymmetric causes. Some past
incidents appear to have been caused by adverse environmental
conditions and/or human error. On the other hand, some cases
involving dumping or discharge or industrial waste have been
reported in the Black Sea.

3. Suspect Vessels in the Black Sea:
Since vessels prefer the shortest and safest routes to their
destinations-generally defined as sea lines of communication
- a vessel crossing the Black Sea through an unusual path or
wandering in areas outside usual navigation routes might
rationally be temporarily considered as a suspect vessel.
Such vessels may possibly be involved in activities creating
maritime risks, and deserve closer observation and
monitoring. Likewise, vessels identified by credible
intelligence as involved in illegal activities, but have no
such records in the past, may be classified as temporarily
suspect vessels.

Any vessel, formerly designated as temporarily suspect, with
continuous record of being involved in illegal activities
creating maritime risks may be classified as a "suspect
vessel."


4. Overall Assessment:

The strategic location of the Black Sea at the crossroads of
Europe, Asia and the Middle East and as an important transit
route makes it vulnerable to asymmetric risks. Instability
in the Black Sea region would have widespread implications
for the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.
While there is no security void in the Black Sea maritime
areas, asymmetric risks, organized crime and environmental
risks are the main security challenges which might be
encountered.

It is evident that the maritime areas are not fully immune to
risks of different nature that may originate from potential
sources of instability in and around the Black Sea region.
Terrorism, trafficking in human beings and drugs, illicit
transfers in SALW and possible proliferation of WMD, their
means of delivery and related materials require the littoral
States to remain vigilant against the probability of the
spillover effects of such risks into the maritime areas. In
other words, the principal challenge in this respect would
arise from the possibility of the Black Sea maritime areas
being turned into a transit route for sinister purposes. In
this regard, suspect vessels pose a major challenge, and the
potential of their use for illegal purposes makes continuous
surveillance of selected maritime areas as well as trailing
of such vessels necessary. This requires, inter-alia,
combined efforts by the six littoral states in this vein to
create synergy. BLACKSEAFOR is an instrument available to be
used effectively for countering the risks, threats and
challenges in the Black Sea.

END TEXT
EDELMAN