SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF GENERAL JOHN HANDY,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 001952

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2015
TAGS: OVIP MARR PREL TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF GENERAL JOHN HANDY,
COMMANDER, USTRANSCOM

REF: ANKARA 1906

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ERIC S. EDELMAN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (S) Summary: Your visit comes on the heels of a series of
US visits since the first of the year (Deputy Secretary of
State Armitage, NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Jones,
Commander US Central Command General Abizaid, Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy Feith, Secretary of State Rice, US Army
Europe and 7th Army Commander General Bell, and most recently
Commander Naval Forces Europe, Admiral Mullen). You arrive
in Turkey as we are emphasizing renewed dialogue on areas of
mutual concern to maximize achievable cooperation. Our task
is complicated by a government still questioning the value of
the U.S.-Turkish relationship. Recently the Turkish General
Staff (TGS) has been steadily, rationally, and publicly
signaling a desire to make the relationship work, although
there seems to be an overall resistance to the movement
towards change coming from the EU and IMF. The reinvigoration
of mil-to-mil engagement is therefore, a welcome and timely
building block to this effort. End Summary.

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Context of Your Visit
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2. (S) While it is difficult to accurately gauge the depth of
Turkey's feelings towards restoring the U.S.-Turkey
mil-to-mil relationship to its pre-March 2003 levels, their
eagerness to host General Bell's recent visit may serve as a
reasonable barometer on this matter. Land Forces Commander
General Buyukanit (likely to become CHOD in 2006),while
charismatic, popular within the Army and adept at working the
press, is also successful at playing his political cards
close to his vest, and consequently has avoided becoming
fixed to politically controversial positions (his nickname
among many officers is "weathervane"). Members of his staff
assert to us that he strongly favors returning to a robust
military relationship with the U.S. and he used the visit to
publicly demonstrate that relations with the US military are
improving.


3. (C) Admiral Mullen provided the CHOD and DCHOD with an
upbeat assessment of his recent visit to Iraq and highlighted
Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces accomplishments since the
Jan 30 elections. The CHOD and DCHOD expressed cautiously
optimistic views of the situation in Iraq. Admiral Mullen
also gained a better understanding of Turkish concerns about
US and NATO desires to conduct operations in the Black Sea.
General Ozkok stated he was not opposed to NATO's expansion,
but he feared such a move could damage NATO's relations with
Russia and possibly Ukraine. TGS officials congratulated
Admiral Mullen on his nomination as Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) and reminded him that it had been 16 years since the
last CNO visit to Turkey. Overall, visits by senior military
officials and mil-to-mil engagements have been positive and
are aiding in improving the bilateral relationship.


4. (C) That said, there have been several issues, which
underscore the fragility of our relationship. An informal
U.S. request in June 2004 to permanently base F-16 aircraft
at Incirlik went unanswered and was withdrawn in January

2005. Despite the informal nature of the request and lack of
written information, it still managed to surface in the
Turkish press, where speculation over U.S. military
intentions went wild. Also in June 2004, the U.S. formally
requested the use of Incirlik AB as a Multi-Directional Cargo
Hub, serving as an air bridge between Afghanistan and Iraq
theaters. To date, the U.S. has not received an official
response from Turkey. TGS leadership claimed in Sept. 2004
to have passed its endorsement to the government. Since
then, MFA and Prime Ministry officials have repeatedly told
us that the decision is at the inter-ministerial level and an
answer will be forthcoming "soon". Given the consistent lack
of responsiveness to mission inquiries, HQ EUCOM, in
coordination with the Mission, decided to stop making further
inquiries. After nine months we would normally assume that
the lack of a response translates to "no". However, a recent
flurry of press reports suggests the Turkish government may
be close to a response. The media speculates that this
decision may be an attempt by the Turkish government to mend
the US/TU relationship or to gain US support to defeat
Armenian lobbyist efforts for passage of a Congressional
resolution on alleged genocide. For more detail on this
subject, please see Ankara 1906.

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Iraq Dominates the Agenda
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5. (C) The Turkish Government shares the goal of a unified,
prosperous, democratic Iraq, at peace internally and with its
neighbors. However, our intervention there is unpopular and
has generated Turkish frustration and anger over a perceived
lack of U.S. action against the PKK in northern Iraq, Kurdish
separatism and designs on Kirkuk, as well as attacks against
Turkish truck drivers. Bilateral relations were poisoned by
grossly distorted Turkish media coverage of and irresponsible
statements by senior GOT officials about the Fallujah
operation late last year and incessant criticism of US
actions--and inaction (such as against the PKK)--in Iraq.
The EU decision on December 17 to begin accession
negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005, may have
provided the starting point for a small, but perceptible
positive shift in relations. A series of high-level
Administration and military visits at the beginning of this
year pushed some Turks to stand up for the relationship,
despite policy differences over Iraq.


6. (C) The Turks worry about long-term US staying power in
Iraq, that events there could spiral out of control, and that
Ankara could be faced with either a Shia-dominated government
that they assert will tilt dangerously toward Iran, an
intensified movement toward an independent Kurdish state
emanating from northern Iraq, or both. Since the success of
the Jan. 30 elections, however, Turkey appears to be taking a
more constructive approach toward its policy in Iraq.
Previous complaints of alleged voting fraud by Iraqi Kurds,
disenfranchisement of Iraq's Turkmen population, and the
non-participation of the Sunni Arab community have been
replaced by a more positive tone.


7. (S) Despite the continued public opposition to our
operations in Iraq, Turkey has provided valuable assistance.
Ankara offered to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq in
October 2003, approved the use of Incirlik Air Base tankers
to refuel aircraft on support missions for both Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF),
authorized the transit of U.S. troops from Iraq on rotation
out, and permits the transit (via Habur gate) of supplies for
our forces and humanitarian goods. Turkey is active in
reconstruction efforts, including providing electricity for
Iraq, and training in Turkey of Iraqi diplomats, Sunni
political groups and, as its main contribution to the NATO
training mission, Iraqi security forces.

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PKK - Unfulfilled Promises and New Direction
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8. (S) Turkish government and military leaders understand
that responsibility for dealing with terrorists within Iraq's
borders will increasingly pass to the Iraqis. In hosting the
January 2005 trilateral PKK talks, the Turks signaled their
willingness to work together with the Iraqis on this shared
problem. Still, they, and the public at large, remain bitter
over their perception that the US has taken no steps in Iraq
to fulfill President Bush's June 2004 pledge that that
country will no longer be a base for terrorist operations
against Turkey and they expect the US to remain engaged in
the effort. Some in the Turkish military harbor the belief
that the US acquiesces to (or supports) the PKK's presence in
Iraq, continually citing unsubstantiated reports of US/PKK
meetings. (NOTE: We also know that the military uses our
lack of action against PKK/Kongra-Gel to needle the current
AKP Government.)


9. (S) If confronted with this issue, you should remind the
Turks about our long-standing efforts that make us Turkey's
number one ally against the PKK: our listing of the PKK and
all successor groups as terrorist organizations; our
successful campaign to get the EU to do the same; and our
assistance in rendering PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. You
should refer back to the trilateral talks where, with the US
role in Iraq more one of facilitator than actor, the Turks
and Iraqis focused on concrete steps to pave the way for
actions against the PKK, including establishing an
intelligence-sharing mechanism and holding a legal experts
meeting after the government is in place to discuss issues
related to closure of PKK front offices and media outlets in
northern Iraq and the handling of known PKK terrorists who
are arrested. MNF-I is in the process of posting Tier I list
of PKK terrorists on CENTRIX. This is a small but an
important step by MNF-I and, once executed, should be
appreciated by the Turks.
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Global War on Terrorism
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10. (C) Turkey took command of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) VII in Afghanistan in February 2005,
and will contribute over 1,600 troops. Ankara renewed its
offer to lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in
Afghanistan, but location was again a problem -- Turkey wants
to take over a PRT in the north, while the Alliance needs
PRTs elsewhere to fulfill ISAF expansion requirements.


11. (S) On the other hand, the current government has
disbanded the anti-terrorism coordination center in the
National Security Council which used to bring together the
three main intelligence services (TNIO, Jandarma, and
National Police),which otherwise have a spotty record of
coordination. The absence of a coordination center raises
severe questions about the direction of the Turkish
anti-terrorism effort.


12. (C) Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, the US and Turkey
coordinate military assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan,
improving their abilities to protect important energy
transport routes. Turkey subscribes to every arms control
arrangement it is eligible to join, including the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),under which they
offered to host a multi-functional (air-sea-land) exercise in

2006. We had hoped that the Turks would hold this in the
Black Sea, especially given their own Operation Active
Endeavor-like Operation Black Sea Harmony and their
leadership in focusing the BLACKSEAFOR organization on
prevention of trafficking. However, they have been reluctant
to facilitate non-littoral states' operations in the Black
Sea (see para 17 below) and the PSI exercise looks likely to
occur in the Mediterranean. Turkey has also been mildly
supportive of international efforts to press Iran to meet its
commitments to the IAEA, and they publicly back the EU-3
process. The GOT has taken seriously information about
Turks' involvement in the AQ Khan network and is moving
toward prosecution of these individuals. Turkey's stance on
Syria has been disappointing: The government has
consistently been behind the curve on pressuring Syria to
withdraw from Lebanon. The government and many in the
military view Bashar Assad as a would-be reformer contending
with old-line Ba'athists. Their policy assumption is that
Assad represents "stability" and the possibility of gradual
change.


13. (U) The Turkish military's Partnership for Peace Training
Center in Ankara provides counter-terrorism and other
training to personnel from PfP partner countries. The
military has established a NATO Center of Excellence-Defense
Against Terrorism (COE-DAT),that will provide more
specialized training opportunities for both NATO partner
nations and Allies. Currently the TRADOC LNO, a U.S. Army
Major, stationed here in Ankara, is serving part time. The
U.S. Navy has offered to provide a Navy Captain as the Deputy
Director/Project Officer, and the Joint Staff recently agreed
to staff two additional US positions (one 04 and one E6) at
the center. The TGS has also offered training at the COE-DAT
as Ankara's contribution to NATO's Iraq training mission.

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Political and Economic Backdrop
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14. (S) Despite resentment and suspicion of the ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP) by the military and other
elements of the secular elite, Prime Minister Erdogan long
appeared unassailable, with a two-thirds majority in
parliament and a high personal popularity in the heartland.
Erdogan's frequent trips abroad and discontent and corruption
in the party and Cabinet signal that AKP has peaked and is in
a stall. Since December, the government has lost energy and
has begun to drift. Resurgent nationalism threatens to fill
the leadership void. Despite resentment and suspicion of AKP
by the military and other elements of the secular elite,
there is currently no alternative to PM Erdogan's AKP
government. Resignations are slowing eroding AKP,s
parliamentary majority, but Erdogan remains popular. With
the political opposition virtually non-existent, the only
opposition is in effect, the military. However, TGS Chief,
General Ozkok, while a solidly pro-Atlanticist senior
commander, is reluctant to take on the government publicly
for fear of derailing Turkey's EU accession and thereby
losing popular support for the military. Deputy Chief of
Defense General Basbug's (in line to become CHOD in 2008
after General Buyukanit) repeated emphasis on the breadth,
depth, and importance of relations with the U.S. during his
January 26 televised press conference (the first such
conference to be televised),might signal a subtle shift in
TGS reluctance to confront the government publicly. General
Ozkok has moved step-by-step to try to bring more modern
thinkers into senior ranks, but left-nationalist sentiments
are strong at lower ranks.


15. (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the
financial crisis of 2000-2001 and GDP grew 8.9% in 2004.
However, the recovery remains vulnerable due to a large
current account deficit (over 5 percent of GDP) and a large
debt with a short maturity structure. Unemployment and
poverty remain high, and ordinary people have not felt much
benefit yet from the overall macroeconomic improvement.
Turkey remains too reliant on Russian energy sources (a point
the Russians are trying to use as leverage for political
gain). Macroeconomic success has also bred a sense of
complacency about the need to persist with difficult reforms,
such as privatization and reform of the banking, social
security and tax systems. These reforms are being addressed
in the new three-year standby program that the IMF and GOT
are in the process of finalizing.


16. (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility and
opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received
less foreign direct investment than other countries of
similar size and potential. Many in the Turkish elite are
convinced that there will be a flood of foreign investment in
the wake of the EU's December decision to open accession
negotiations with Turkey in October. However, this is
unlikely to materialize unless more is done in the area of
structural reform. In addition, there appears to be a lack of
appreciation for the enormous challenges Turkey will shoulder
in the accession negotiations, for the fact that EU accession
will affect nearly every aspect of their lives, and for the
likelihood that it may in the end be quite costly for Turkey
to comply with EU directives in environmental protection and
other areas.

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TRANSCOM ISSUES
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17. (C) Suggested Talking Points:

-- OEF/OIF Tanker Refueling Operation: USTRANSCOM appreciates
Turkey's support for allowing the U.S. to utilize Incirlik AB
as a forward deployment base for air refueling aircraft. To
date U.S. tankers have off loaded more than 14 million pounds
of fuel to awaiting aircraft. Additionally, appreciate your
governments support in allowing over 8,500 U.S, troops to
transit out of Iraq in latter part of 2003 and beginning of

2004.

-- Transit of Italian equipment: Welcome Turkey's assistance
for the US movement of Italian equipment through Incirlik to
Afghanistan. Appreciate Turkey's support for both Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the NATO ISAF mission.

-- Air Operations for OEF/OIF: Extremely pleased with
Turkey's cooperation in regards to granting diplomatic
clearances for OEF/OIF. We will continue to educate our
pilots and planning staffs on abiding by guidelines contained
in these clearances.

-- Cargo Hub: (IF RAISED ONLY) Understand your need to
closely consider our request. We would welcome your positive
response. However, our missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are
ongoing. If you cannot respond positively, we will find
other options, as we have done up until now.


18. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN