TURKEY UPDATE FOR THE VISIT OF COMNAVEUR ADM MIKE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 ANKARA 001571

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2025
TAGS: OVIP MARR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY UPDATE FOR THE VISIT OF COMNAVEUR ADM MIKE
MULLEN

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Your visit comes on the heels of a series
of US visits since the first of the year (Deputy Secretary of
State Armitage, NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Jones,
Commander US Central Command General Abizaid, Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, Secretary of State Rice and
US Army Europe and 7th Army Commander General Bell). You
arrive in Turkey as we are emphasizing renewed dialogue on
areas of mutual concern to maximize achievable cooperation.
Our task is complicated by a government still questioning the
value of the U.S.-Turkish relationship. Recently the Turkish
General Staff (TGS) has been steadily, rationally, and
publicly signaling a desire to make the relationship work,
although there seems to be an overall resistance to the
movement towards change coming from the EU and IMF. The
reinvigoration of Mil to Mil engagement is therefore, a
welcome and timely building block to this effort. End Summary.

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The Context
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2. (S) While it is difficult to accurately gauge the depth
of Turkey,s feelings towards restoring the U.S.-Turkey Mil
to Mil relationship to its pre-March 2003 levels, their
eagerness to host General Bell,s recent visit may serve as a
reasonable barometer on this matter. Land Forces Commander
(and likely CHOD in 2006),General Buyukanit, while
charismatic, popular within the Army and adept at working the
press, is also successful at playing his political cards
close to his vest, and consequently has avoided becoming
fixed to politically controversial positions(his nickname
among many officers is "weathervane"). Members of his staff
assert to us that he strongly favors returning to a robust
military relationship with the U.S. and he rolled out the red
carpet for General Bell.


3. (C) That said, there have been several issues, which
underscore the fragility of our relationship. An informal
U.S. request in June 2004 to permanently base F-16 aircraft
at Incirlik went unanswered and was withdrawn in January

2005. Despite the informal nature of the request and lack of
written information, it still managed to surface in the
Turkish press, where speculation over U.S. military
intentions went wild. The U.S. also formally requested the
use of Incirlik AB as a Multi-Directional Cargo Hub, serving
as an air bridge between Afghanistan and Iraq theaters. To
date, the U.S. has not received an official response from
Turkey. After nine months it is clear this is as close to a
"no" as we will ever get.


4. (C) The GOT shares our goals of a stable, democratic,
unified Iraq, but our intervention there is unpopular-- owing
to a combination of refusal by the armed forces to support us
and a concerted disinformation campaign in the media stoked
in part by elements of the Turkish state --and has generated
Turkish frustration and anger over a perceived lack of U.S.
action against the PKK in northern Iraq, Kurdish separatism
and designs on Kirkuk, and attacks against Turkish truck
drivers. Bilateral relations were poisoned by grossly
distorted Turkish media coverage of and irresponsible
statements by senior GOT officials about the Fallujah
operation late last year and incessant criticism of US
actions--and inaction (such as against the PKK)--in Iraq.
The EU decision on December 17 to begin accession
negotiations with Turkey on October 3, 2005, may have
provided the starting point for a small, but perceptible
positive shift in relations. A series of high-level
Administration and military visits at the beginning of this
year pushed the Turks to stand up for the relationship,
despite policy differences over Iraq. While government
officials still refrain from publicly supporting US policies
or actions in Iraq, they have been adding less fuel to the
fire. In meetings with DepSecState Armitage and General
Abizaid, both Turkish government and military officials
reaffirmed the importance of our bilateral relationship and
called for close dialogue on issues of mutual interest.


5. (S) Despite the continued public opposition to our
operations in Iraq, Turkey has provided valuable assistance.
Ankara offered to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq in
October 2003, approved the use of Incirlik Air Base tankers
to refuel aircraft on support missions for both Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF),
authorized the transit of U.S. troops from Iraq on rotation
out, and permits the transit (via Habur gate) of supplies for
our forces and humanitarian goods. Turkey is active in
reconstruction efforts, including providing electricity for
Iraq, and training in Turkey of Iraqi diplomats, Sunni
political groups and, as its main contribution to the NATO
training mission, Iraqi security forces.


6. (S) Despite resentment and suspicion of Adalet ve
Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) by the military and other elements of
the secular elite, Prime Minister Erdogan long appeared
unassailable; with a two-thirds majority in parliament and a
high personal popularity in the heartland. Erdogan,s
frequent trips abroad and discontent and corruption in the
party and Cabinet signal that AKP has peaked and is in a
stall. With the political opposition virtually non-existent,
the only opposition is in effect, the military. However, TGS
Chief Ozkok, while a solidly pro-Atlanticist senior
commander, is reluctant to take on the government publicly
for fear of derailing Turkey's EU accession and thereby
losing popular support for the military. Deputy Chief of
Defense General Basbug,s (in line to become CHOD in 2008
after General Buyukanit),repeated emphasis on the breadth,
depth, and importance of relations with the U.S. during his
January 26 televised press conference(the first such
conference to be televised),might signal a subtle shift in
this TGS reluctance to confront the government publicly.
General Ozkok has moved step-by-step to try to bring more
modern thinkers into senior ranks, but left-nationalist
sentiments are strong at lower ranks.


7. (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the
financial crisis of 2000-2001 and is growing at an annual
pace of around 8-9 percent. However, the recovery remains
vulnerable due to a large current account deficit (about 5
percent of GDP) and a large debt with a short maturity
structure. Unemployment and poverty remain high, and
ordinary people have not felt much benefit yet from the
overall macroeconomic improvement. Turkey remains too
reliant on Russian energy sources (a point the Russians are
trying to use as leverage for political gain). Macroeconomic
success has also bred a sense of complacency about the need
to persist with difficult reforms, such as privatization, and
reform of the banking, social security and tax systems.
These reforms are being addressed in the new three-year
standby program that the IMF and GOT have just agreed to.


8. (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility and
opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received
less foreign direct investment than other countries of
similar size and potential. Many in the Turkish elite are
convinced that there will be a flood of foreign investment in
the wake of the EU,s December decision to open accession
negotiations with Turkey in October. However, this is
unlikely to materialize unless more is done in the area of
structural reform. In addition, there appears to be a lack of
appreciation for the enormous challenges Turkey will shoulder
in the accession negotiations, for the fact that EU accession
will affect nearly every aspect of their lives, and that it
may in the end be quite costly for Turkey to comply with EU
directives in environmental protection and other areas.

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Iraq Dominates the Agenda
--------------


9. (S) The Turkish Government shares the goal of a unified,
prosperous, democratic Iraq, at peace internally and with its
neighbors, and contributed to international pressure on the
Sunnis to participate in the elections. However, the Turks
worry about long-term US staying power in Iraq, that events
there could spiral out of control, and that Ankara could be
faced with either a Shia-dominated government that they
assert will tilt dangerously toward Iran, an intensified
movement toward an independent Kurdish state emanating from
northern Iraq, or both. Although not a naval theater,
Turkish Military leaders may still seek your assurance that
our military remain committed to ensuring a stable -- and
unified -- Iraq.


10. (C) Turning a corner?: The December death of five
Turkish policemen en route to Baghdad to take up security
duties at the Turkish Embassy shocked the country. After
being admonished by the Charge, the Turkish government and
military (General Ozkok sent a personal note of thanks to
General Myers),made a point to thank the US for the swift
TFO response, including killing or capturing of some
insurgents, aiding the wounded and repatriating the bodies of
the policemen killed. Additionally, the Turkish military was
quick to tell the mission that Turkish First Army Commander
General Tolon's accusations of US responsibility did not
reflect the Turkish General Staff position. Turkish press
reporting on the incident was generally factual. The
November establishment of trilateral (US/TU/IZ) talks on
Turkish truck driver safety, with the participation of
Multinational Force - Iraq (MNF-I),opened the door to
cooperative information sharing and other efforts to support
the drivers.

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PKK - Unfulfilled Promises and New Direction
--------------


11. (S) Turkish government and military leaders understand
that responsibility for dealing with terrorists within Iraq's
borders will increasingly pass to the Iraqis, and their
agreement to host the January 2005 trilateral PKK talks was a
positive sign that they will work together with the Iraqis on
this shared problem. Still, they, and the public at large,
remain bitter over their perception that the US has taken no
steps in Iraq to fulfill President Bush's June 2004 pledge
that that country will no longer be a base for terrorist
operations against Turkey and they expect the US to remain
engaged in the effort. Some in the Turkish military harbor
the belief that the US acquiesces to (or supports) the PKK's
presence in Iraq, continually citing unsubstantiated reports
of US/PKK meetings. (NOTE: We also know that the military
uses our lack of action against PKK/Kongra-Gel to needle the
current AKP Government.)


12. (S) If confronted with this issue, you should remind the
Turks about our longstanding efforts that make us Turkey,s
number one ally against the PKK: our listing of the PKK and
all successor groups as terrorist organizations; our
successful campaign to get the EU to do the same; and our
assistance in rendering PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. You
should refer back to the trilateral talks where, with the US
role in Iraq more one of facilitator than actor, the Turks
and Iraqis focused on concrete steps to pave the way for
actions against the PKK, including establishing an
intelligence-sharing mechanism and holding a legal experts
meeting after the government is in place to discuss issues
related to closure of PKK front offices and media outlets in
northern Iraq and the handling of known PKK terrorists who
are arrested. MNF-I is in the process of posting Tier I list
of PKK terrorists on CENTRIX. This is a small but an
important step by MNF-I and, once executed, should be
appreciated by the Turks.

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Global War on Terrorism
--------------


13. (C) Turkey took command of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) VII in Afghanistan in February 2005,
and will contribute over 1,600 troops. Ankara renewed its
offer to lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in
Afghanistan, but location was again a problem -- Turkey wants
to take over a PRT in the north, while the Alliance needs
PRTs elsewhere to fulfill ISAF expansion requirements.

14 (S) On the other hand, the current government has
disbanded the anti-terrorism coordination center in the
National Security Council which used to bring together the
three main intelligence services (TNIO, Jandarma, and
National Police),which otherwise have a spotty record of
coordination. The absence of a coordination center raises
severe questions about the direction of the Turkish
anti-terrorism effort.


15. (C) Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, the US and Turkey
coordinate military assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan,
improving their abilities to protect important energy
transport routes. Turkey subscribes to every arms control
arrangement it is eligible to join, including the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),under which it is
considering hosting an exercise in 2006. We had hoped that
the Turks would hold this in the Black Sea, especially given
their own Operation Active Endeavor-like Operation Black Sea
Harmony and their leadership in focusing the BLACKSEAFOR
organization on prevention of trafficking. However, they
have been reluctant to facilitate non-littoral states'
operations in the Black Sea (see para 17 below) and the PSI
exercise looks likely to occur in the Mediterranean. The AKP
government has also been mildly supportive of international
efforts to press Iran to meet its commitments to the IAEA,
and they publicly back the EU-3 process. The elected AKP
government is more inclined to accommodate Iran rather than
press it; the military and some in the Turkish bureaucracy
are more cognizant of the dangers of Iranian nuclear weapons.
The latter have also taken seriously information about
Turks' involvement in the AQ Khan network and is moving
toward prosecution of these individuals. Turkey,s stance on
Syria has been disappointing. The government has
consistently been behind the curve on pressuring Syria to
withdraw from Lebanon. The government and many in the
military view Bashar Assad as a would-be reformer contending
with old-line Ba,athists. Their policy assumption is that
Assad represents "stability" and the possibility of gradual
change.


16. (U) The Turkish military's Partnership for Peace
Training Center in Ankara provides counterterrorism and other
training to personnel from PfP partner countries. The
military has established a NATO Center of Excellence-Defense
Against Terrorism (COE-DAT),that will provide more
specialized training opportunities for both NATO partner
nations and Allies. Currently the TRADOC LNO, a U.S. Army
Major, stationed here in Ankara, is serving part time. The
U.S. Navy has offered to provide a Navy Captain as the Deputy
Director/Project Officer, and the Joint Staff has recently
agreed to staff two additional US positions (one 04 and one
E6) at the center. The TGS has also offered training at the
COE-DAT as Ankara's contribution to NATO's Iraq training
mission.

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Turks and the Black Sea
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17. (C) The Turks are committed to increasing their naval
engagement and cooperation with other Black Sea littoral
nations, but they fear a robust NATO or U.S. presence in the
Black Sea might anger the Russians and make them pull away
from participation in BLACKSEAFOR. However, we believe
their chief motivation for holding the US and NATO at bay in
the Black Sea is pride of place: a desire to stand alone as
the guarantor of peace and security in the Sea, and to be the
unchallenged maritime leader in the region.


18. (C) The Turks have proposed to their BLACKSEAFOR
colleagues to multilateralize the Turks, BLACK SEA HARMONY
operation, in which Turkey monitors suspicious sea traffic
and reports the data to NATO. In Turkey,s concept, all the
Black Sea littorals would monitor traffic and report the
results to each other as well as the Alliance. This is a
positive development (in essence a mini-OPERATION ACTIVE
ENDEAVOR on the Black Sea),but is also an attempt to
forestall a greater NATO role in the Black Sea.


19. (C) While we need to continue to engage with the Turks to
seek a cooperative relationship on the Black Sea, we should
not aggressively seek an enhanced U.S. role. This would only
increase Turkish resistance and, given the limitations of the
Montreux Convention (which many Turks--especially in the
military--believe we are anxious to amend or scrap
altogether) , our naval presence would perforce be limited
anyway. We should encourage their efforts to work with the
other littorals while reminding them that we have an
interest in what they are doing and would appreciate being
able to observe BLACKSEAFOR exercises or BLACK SEA HARMONY
operations.

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CYPRUS and NATO/EU
--------------


20. (C) The European Union at the December 17, 2004 Summit
agreed to open accession talks with Turkey in October,
marking a major step forward in anchoring Turkey's future and
in our strategic vision for Turkey and the region. However,
before talks begin, the EU expects Turkey to sign a protocol
extending the EU Association agreement to the 10 new EU
members, including the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey is
dissatisfied with the EU's handling of this issue, with
several European leaders indicating publicly that extending
the protocol would constitute recognition of the Republic of
Cyprus. Moreover, Turkey sees the EU as failing to fulfill
its pledge to ease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots
following their vote in favor of a settlement last April. As
a result, Ankara is blocking Cyprus' entry into
nonproliferation regimes that the EU desires to include all
its members. Similarly, taking a legalistic view of North
Atlantic council decisions related to Berlin Plus, the GOT is
blocking Cyprus from participating in NATO-EU fora,
effectively stymieing dialogue between the two organizations.
While some Turkish officials recognize how keeping NATO and
the EU apart hurts Turkey's interests, to date Cyprus policy
has won out over alliance management considerations within
the GOT. Last month, General Buyukanit was on television
announcing that Turkey will not withdraw one soldier from
Northern Cyprus until the situation was fairly resolved.


21. (C) The mission believes any ship visit to southern
Cyprus before the above situation is resolved will evoke a
strong reaction from the Turks. This reaction will be even
stronger and potentially more damaging to relations if a
ship,s previous or next port of call is in Turkey. ADM
Ornek's staff has heard that a visit to southern Cyprus has
been under consideration and may raise the possibility with
you.

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Security Cooperation Issues
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22. (C) Major Security Assistance programs are as follows:

The Turkish Air Force (TuAF) requested an LOA for a major
upgrade of their entire F-16 fleet of 217 aircraft.
Budgetary constraints have forced the TuAF to reduce the
original scope of the upgrade to 118 aircraft. LOA is valued
at approximately $1B. SAF/IA and the TuAF held a final
configuration meeting in December 2004 and it is anticipated
a final LOA will be presented to Turkey in April 2005.

Turkey awarded a contract for four Boeing 737 Airborne Early
Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft ($1.2B) in June 2002,
with an option to buy two more aircraft for $700M. In
December 2002, Turkey signed an LOA to provide FMS-only
hardware.

In 2002 Turkey became a Level III partner during the Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) System Design and Development (SDD)
Phase at a cost to Turkey of $175M over seven years.
Turkey,s projects a requirement of 100 aircraft with
delivery starting in 2013 .

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Turkish Navy
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23. (S) For its part, Turkish Navy leadership generally
tends to be more pro-Western in its orientation and less
xenophobic than that of the Turkish Army, or even the Turkish
Air Force, which tends to share many of the Turkish Army's
suspicions of U.S. initiatives in the region. Within the
limits placed on it by the Army-dominated Turkish General
Staff, the Turkish Navy seems to be more eager than the other
branches of the Turkish Armed Forces for engagement with the
US, and welcomes opportunities to train with and host visits
by the US Navy. In this sense, the Turkish Navy may be
considered the biggest advocate of the US within the Turkish
Armed Forces. However, this does not apply in the Black Sea,
where even the Turkish Navy views with suspicion any
engagement initiatives by the US Navy -- particularly those
that do not include Turkey. In fact, Turkish Navy attitudes
regarding Black Sea maritime security are currently more
aligned with those of Russia, which joins Turkey in resisting
any naval presence by non-littoral countries in the Black
Sea, specifically the navies of the US as well as non-Black
Sea NATO nations.


24. (C) Naval Relations: You may want to praise our naval
cooperation in the NATO context and bilaterally, although you
may be asked to explain the reduced number of ship visits in
the last few years. Although Turkish Navy officials profess
to understand many of the factors which have combined to
hamper US Navy engagement with Turkey, such as lack of
assets, the country-wide Force Protection Condition Charlie
and the decision to limit bilateral exercises, there remains
a persistent perception of a deliberate disengagement by the
US Navy. This perceived disengagement, when combined with
what appears to the Turks to be US Navy efforts to bypass
them in the Black Sea in favor of Bulgaria, Romania, and
Ukraine, convinces the more conspiracy theory-minded
individuals in TGS and the Turkish Navy that the US is trying
to control the Black Sea for its own purposes (i.e.,
domination of the Middle East and access to resources).


25. (C) Turkish Navy modernization goals have been hampered
by lack of funding stemming from the 2000/2001 economic
crises. The Turkish Frigate 2000 has been placed on hold.
An RFP/RFQ was published last fall for the MILGEM (national
ship) corvette. This would be a commercial venture with a
Turkish shipyard; however funding of this procurement remains
an issue.


26. (C) The Undersecretary for Procurement (SSM) is currently
in commercial contract negotiations with Sikorsky for 12 S-70
helicopters. Turkey previously procured eight of these
helicopters from Sikorsky. Contract negotiations have been
ongoing for over a year; both pricing and the terms and
conditions to include: delivery schedules and parts support
have been an issue. Additionally, Turkey intends to use the
remaining $324M from the EXIM Bank Loan for this procurement.
This loan was extended previously for this procurement and
due to the delay in contract negotiations; Sikorsky
anticipates that they will likely need a further extension on
the loan. ADM Johnson during his trip last fall told ADM
Ornek that the loan could not be extended. This may be a
discussion item or request during your meetings. SSM has not
yet responded to Sikorsky's "best and final offer." Sikorsky
has asked the Ambassador to ask SSM and/or the government
whether there is still a commitment to purchasing these
aircraft from Sikorsky or fold them into a future
multi-service tender for utility helicopters. You might
sound out ADM Ornek as to how urgent he sees the need for
these 12 additional S-70s.


27. (C) The Turkish Navy has expressed interest in obtaining
four Osprey Class MHC,s (mine hunters are one of their
priorities) and one Spruance Class Destroyer. OPNAV is
currently staffing the transfer of two MHC,s (one grant/one
sale) and two Spruance Class Destroyers (one grant/one sale).
The Spruances would be as a package deal, Turkey would not
have the option of taking only one. Turkish Navy understands
that these transfers are still being staffed, but the
transfers may come up in discussions.


29. (C) Turkish Navy has identified the
procurement/upgrading of their Harpoon missiles to the Block
II as one of their modernizations goals. Within the last
couple of weeks, Turkish Navy submitted a Price and
Availability request to upgrade 120 missiles, Harpoon Weapon
Station and Block II upgrades to their Kilic, Mekos and Perry
class ships.


30. (C) A bright spot in Turkish Navy,s modernization has
been the Genesis Project. This project upgrades the Combat
Information Centers on the Perry class ships by replacing the
current equipment on these ships with SUN workstations under
an open architecture system. This is a commercial venture
with Raytheon as the prime US contractor. A working system
is currently being tested in Port Hueneme, CA and the first
ship installation should start early next year. Long range
plan is for Turkey to market this system to other countries
that have Perry Class Frigates.


31. (U) Last CNO counter-part visit was almost 16 years ago.
You may get invited by ADM Ornek to come back to Turkey once
you relieve as the CNO for an official counter-part visit.
The mission would enthusiastically support this request.
EDELMAN