Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA1484
2005-02-28 14:02:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

IRAQ: TURKS TRYING TO CHANGE A LOSING GAME

Tags:  PREL PGOV ELTN ETRD TU IZ 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001484 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2025
TAGS: PREL PGOV ELTN ETRD TU IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: TURKS TRYING TO CHANGE A LOSING GAME

REF: A. 04 ANKARA 6615

B. ANKARA 1211

C. ANKARA 1071

D. BAGHDAD 923

E. USADO ANKARA IIR DTG 281402Z FEB 05

F. ANKARA 1283

G. ANKARA 1230

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001484

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2025
TAGS: PREL PGOV ELTN ETRD TU IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: TURKS TRYING TO CHANGE A LOSING GAME

REF: A. 04 ANKARA 6615

B. ANKARA 1211

C. ANKARA 1071

D. BAGHDAD 923

E. USADO ANKARA IIR DTG 281402Z FEB 05

F. ANKARA 1283

G. ANKARA 1230

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Turkey's leadership and policy establishment
appears to be grasping for a new and more constructive policy
direction on Iraq, in part (we believe) based on the desire
to limit the weight Iraq puts on the U.S.-Turkish
relationship, in part also due to the Turks' post-election
evaluation that they have been pursuing a losing strategy on
Iraq. We believe the Turks will now try to focus on Iraq as
a whole and to support the ITG (when it emerges),and will
resist their inclination to look at Iraq as a collection of
northern Iraq-centered problems (federalism cum Kurdish
separatism, Kirkuk, Turkmen, PKK) as it does now. We have a
small but discernible window of opportunity to work with the
Turks on Iraq, but we fear bad news from Iraq could close
this window, so we should capitalize on this opportunity
quickly and strengthen the GOT's willingness to stand up to
the pressure. End summary.

Turks Seek to Change a Losing Game
--------------


2. (C) While the GOT has not formally announced a new Iraq
policy, we have picked up indications publicly and privately
that it is struggling to form one. Just before and after
Iraq's Jan. 30 elections, MFA statements were lukewarm at
best and took particular pains to cite at length Turkish
concerns about Sunni non-participation and what the Turks
viewed as Kurdish manipulation of events on the ground in
Kirkuk, including allegations that the Kurds sought to
disenfranchise and intimidate the region's Turkmen. Erdogan
was particularly unhelpful, at one point criticizing the
election as "undemocratic."


3. (C) Yet following the Feb. 13 announcement of the election
results--and despite their obvious disappointment with the
performance of Iraq's Turkmen overall and especially the
Ankara-supported Iraq Turkmen Front (ref b)--MFA issued a
somewhat warmer statement supporting the transition to

democracy in Iraq and a separate statement praising the UIA's
choice for PM, Ibrahim Ja'afari, as a "senior politician whom
we know well." In a stunning revision of history, FonMin Gul
said in a March 1 interview that it was Turkey who had
propped up a wobbly Arab world and the U.S. by insisting that
elections in Iraq go forward on Jan. 30 as planned. We were
also surprised when in a recent interview Turkish National
Intelligence Organization (MIT) U/S Atasagun showed subtlety
and flexibility in analysis, including on the eventuality of
a Kurdish state.


4. (C) On Feb. 24, a civilian and military delegation led by
GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Amb. Osman Koruturk traveled to
northern Iraq to meet PUK leader Jalal Talabani (usually
Talabani comes here) (ref c). Koruturk carried a letter from
PM Erdogan to Talabani in which--according to the Ankara PUK
rep Bahros Galali--Erdogan offered Turkey's support for a
federal system for Iraq (previously many Turks saw federalism
as merely a step on the way to the establishment of an
independent Kurdish state). The press here (and, to us,
Galali) portrayed the trip positively and spun Koruturk's
mission as Turkey lending its support to Talabani in his bid
to become President of Iraq. The Turks have often complained
to us about Kurds being given too much influence in Baghdad,
but we are not hearing such complaints now from Ankara.
Indeed, MFA DG For the Middle East Oguz Celikkol told the DCM
March 10 that part of the intention behind the Koruturk
mission was to dispel reports that Turkey objected to
Talabani becoming President.

Looking at the Kurds from a National Perspective
-------------- ---


5. (C) We believe the Turks see the Kurds as a balance
against possible UIA moves to impose both Sharia law and Shia
hegemony into the Iraqi political system, and they have also
recognized the importance of Kurdish buy-in (as shown by
Turkish Ambassador Cevikoz's March 2 conversation with
Ambassador Negroponte--ref d). Yet even as the Turks want
the Kurds to be part of the Baghdad policy nucleus, they are
concerned that Ja'afari may be forced to make too many
concessions on Kirkuk and maintaining the peshmerga, still
hot-button issues here. DCM emphasized to Celikkol in their
March 10 conversation that there are other communities and
political forces in Iraq who take Kirkuk seriously, not just
the Kurds, and that we do not believe these forces will
easily concede to Kirkuk's becoming part of the KRA.
Celikkol understood the point. At the same meeting, MFA
Department Head for Iraq Avni Botsali said that U.S. and
Turkish policies on Iraq "are coming together," and repeated
with emphasis that a U.S. failure in Iraq would also be a
failure for the West, including Turkey.

Turkish Leaders (Finally) Talk About the Importance of
Working With Us on Iraq
-------------- --------------


6. (C) According to press reports, at the Feb. 25 meeting of
the National Security Council (which includes the PM as well
as key ministers and military leaders),the GOT evaluated
both its Iraq policy and the U.S. relationship and assigned
PM Erdogan to work on improving the U.S.'s public image in
Turkey--an image pummeled in recent months by outrageous
allegations against the U.S., usually centered on Iraq, by
journalists and politicians inside and outside the
government. Instrumental in turning the government around
was a series of senior visits in the first six weeks of the
year, culminating in the Secretary's visit Feb. 5-6. Indeed,
even the day before the Feb. 25 NSC meeting, Erdogan
(discussing U.S. policy in Iraq) commented that "There could
be differences in our ways of taking an approach to various
regional issues and events. Nevertheless, the rich
historical background of the ties between the two countries
and their multifaceted character...are sufficient to ensure
that our friendship and cooperation continue with greater
vigor." This is not the kind of line we have heard from GOT
leaders for some time indeed.


7. (S) The military also appears to be shifting to a more
positive position on Iraq. TGS was well out in front of the
civilian leadership in standing up for the relationship
despite policy differences on Iraq, best illustrated by
Deputy CHOD Basbug's Jan. 26 press briefing, in which, while
laying out Turkish concerns, he did so judiciously and
accompanied by repeated emphasis on the importance of
relations with the U.S. and on not reducing them to a single
issue. Some military sources have indicated that TGS is
revising its view that the U.S. is failing in Iraq and that
the country is in imminent danger of disintegrating. These
sources tell us that TGS is drafting a paper saying that the
U.S. is succeeding and therefore Turkey should support us and
the Iraqis (see ref e). While Embassy has its doubts that
the report is correct, our recent contacts with the military
indicate they are also thinking of Iraq as a larger issue
than the usual Turkish concerns. When PolMilCouns met with
TGS J3 Plans and Operations Chief Maj Gen Eroz on March 9,
Eroz never once raised the PKK/Kongra-Gel or the Turkmen.
This seems to be a contrast to his harsh assessment after
Jan. 11 trilateral talks on PKK/Kongra-Gel that they had
accomplished nothing.

Comment: Can They Take the High Road?
--------------


8. (C) The positive shift in Ankara's approach toward Iraq
is, thus, the result of realizing its previous approach
failed and a desire to prevent a further slide in U.S.-Turkey
relations. While we believe the Turks are now making a
renewed effort to be helpful on Iraq and in supporting our
relationship, we are not convinced that the policy apparatus
or the leadership has either the discipline or the political
courage to stay on course if events in Iraq bring the
standard Turkish bogeymen back to life. Injudicious
statements by Kurds on Kirkuk or Kurdish independence, new
allegations of oppression of Turkmen, an uptick in PKK
attacks in Turkey (a normal occurrence in the spring),or a
major CF anti-insurgent operation could each by themselves be
enough to inspire the Turkish press to renew its blatant
misreporting and airing of grievances. The proof of the
pudding will come when Erdogan or Gul face the microphones
and have to decide whether to pander to Turkish public
opinion or be real leaders. Their past record does not give
us strong reason for optimism.


9. (C) Comment, cont.: Thus, if we have issues where we can
press forward--issues such as helping with reconstruction,
the second border gate (ref f),encouraging Iraqi-Turkish
dialogue on water issues (ref g),more contributions to NATO
Training Mission-Iraq or training police, or simply pushing
the Turks to show more leadership in supporting the ITG and
democratization in Iraq--we should move smartly before this
window of opportunity might slam shut. Deepening their
engagement with us on Iraq may strengthen their will to stand
up to the critical press and for our relationship. End
comment.


10. (U) Iraq posts minimize considered.
EDELMAN