Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA1049
2005-02-28 09:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY SET TO NEGOTIATE ANKARA AGREEMENT EXTENSION

Tags:  PREL CY TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001049 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015
TAGS: PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY SET TO NEGOTIATE ANKARA AGREEMENT EXTENSION

REF: ANKARA 879

(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001049

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015
TAGS: PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY SET TO NEGOTIATE ANKARA AGREEMENT EXTENSION

REF: ANKARA 879

(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) A Turkish delegation travels to Brussels March 1 to
begin negotiating the text of the Ankara Agreement extension
protocol. The Turkish MFA foresees no major problem
negotiating a text Turkey can sign. The tricky part will be
crafting the inevitable Turkish statement that the extension
does not constitute recognition of the ROC. The Turks are
coming armed with legal opinions on what text will prevent
this; the EU will press for softer language; the MFA
anticipates ROC opposition no matter what the language. End
Summary.

Turkish Delegation to Brussels March 1
--------------


2. (C) A Turkish MFA delegation travels to Brussels March 1
to begin negotiating the text of Ankara Agreement extension
protocol with the European Commission and to get a better
understanding of the procedure by which the EU will approve
it. MFA Acting DDG for Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs
Bilman still foresees no major problems negotiating a text
that Turkey can sign. However, the Turkish delegation
includes hard-line MFA legal expert Bolukbasi (currently
Turkish permrep to the WTO and head of the Turkish
negotiating team for the abortive OIF northern front option
in 2002-2003).


3. (C) Negotiations will center around whether the protocol
should cover all countries that have entered the EU since
1963, when the Ankara Agreement was signed, or simply those
that entered in May 2004; and the form of Turkey's addendum
emphasizing the protocol does not constitute recognition of
the ROC.


4. (C) The GOT would prefer, but will probably not insist,
the protocol cover all countries that have entered the EU
since 1963, not just the ten that entered in May 2004.
Otherwise, Bilman wonders how the Agreement can be extended
to the other EU countries. Bilman claims the ROC opposes
this idea out of what he depicts as unreasoning concern that
this waters down the effect of the extension to the ROC.

The Tricky Part: Non-Recognition of the ROC
--------------


5. (C) Crafting the form of Turkey's inevitable statement
that the extension does not constitute Turkish recognition of
the ROC will be tricky. Turkey originally envisioned
labeling it a "reservation," but will probably settle for
denominating it a "footnote" or "declaration."


6. (C) The MFA has solicited legal opinions on how to craft
the text to prevent the ROC from claiming that the protocol
constitutes recognition. An EU colleague here said EU
countries are pressing the Turks to soften their language in
order to keep the ROC from rallying support against the
protocol. For example, Bilman claims the UK suggests the
Turkish non-recognition language be accompanied by a
statement that Turkey still seeks permanent settlement. No
matter what the language, Bilman anticipates ROC opposition
to the protocol.
EDELMAN