CODEL KYL SCENESETTER FOR TURKEY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000104

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

TEL AVIV PLEASE PASS TO CODEL KYL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OREP PREL MARR PGOV ECON TU IZ
SUBJECT: CODEL KYL SCENESETTER FOR TURKEY



1. (SBU) Summary: Your visit to Turkey comes at a bumpy
period in the bilateral relationship, in large measure
connected with developments in Iraq. This message provides a
brief overview of the state of bilateral relations,
cooperation in Iraq, Turkey's EU accession process and the
state of the economy. End Summary.

The Bilateral Relationship
--------------


2. (SBU) Bilateral relations have entered another choppy
period. The Turks are freely criticizing U.S. policy in Iraq
and elsewhere in the Middle East, but do not offer
constructive alternatives. A barrage of media disinformation
about Falluja and U.S. actions in general in Iraq -- fanned
by statements by PM Erdogan and by Foreign Minister Gul
alleging excessive use of force and civilian casualties -- is
creating negative public opinion. Some observers have
characterized the general attitude in Turkey toward the U.S.
and our role in the world as the most negative in memory.


3. (SBU) The negative Turkish attitude towards the U.S.
reverberates in other areas. During a recent visit by Greek
Orthodox Americans to discuss religious freedom, Turkey dug
in its heels, reiterating its resistance to reopening of the
Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki Seminary and the ecumenical
nature of the Patriarchate in Istanbul (an ecumenical nature
recognized in Orthodoxy since the sixth century). The
delegation's visit set off a round of accusations that the
U.S. refused to respect "Turkish sensitivities" and had an
ulterior motive.

Iraq
--------------


4. (SBU) Turkey shares our goals for Iraq: a secure, stable,
democratic country, united and territorially whole. To that
end, Turkey has provided valuable assistance and cooperation.
Ankara offered to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq in
October 2003, approved the use of Incirlik Air Base for
tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions for both
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF),authorized the transit of US troops from Iraq on
rotation out, and permitted the transit of supplies for our
forces and humanitarian goods. Turkey is also active in
reconstruction efforts, including providing electricity for
Iraq and training Iraqi diplomats, and has offered senior
military leadership training in Turkey as its contribution to
NATO's Iraq training mission.


5. (SBU) This cooperation is provided despite the fact that
our actions in Iraq are highly unpopular with the Turkish
public, which is fed on a diet of sensationalist and
erroneous press reports about US operations and actions in
Iraq, and which the government rarely corrects. In response
the mission has established a regular information-sharing
program on events in Iraq, which has resulted in fewer public
misstatements. Many Turks in and out of government worry
about the fragility of Iraq's territorial integrity, fearing
that the Kurds in the north aspire for independence and that
the tensions between Sunni and Shia Arabs might become
intractable. The Turks insist on interpreting U.S. failure
to date to go directly after the Kurdish PKK terrorist
organization in northern Iraq, the friendly U.S. attitude
toward northern Iraqi Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani,
and the U.S. view that the number of Turkmen in Iraq is
significantly lower than the figure cited by Turkey as
"evidence" that the U.S. supports both the PKK and an
independent Kurdish state. The future of oil-rich Kirkuk is
a particular source of concern, as the return of Kurds
forcibly expelled by Saddam could disrupt an uneasy balance
between resident Arabs and Turkmen, the latter with whom the
Turks feel a bond of kinship. The Turks have urged Sunnis to
remain engaged and have gone on record supporting the IIG and
full participation in elections, which they want to see held
on January 30, as scheduled. On January 11, the US, Turkey
and Iraq will hold the first trilateral discussions with the
aim of developing cooperative measures against the PKK.


6. (SBU) The high number of Turkish truckers killed (70 as
of 1/1/05) in Iraq has raised concerns among the public and
Turkish officials. To address this issue, the first
trilateral US/GOT/IIG talks on security in Iraq were held on
November 30. The Turks and Iraqis met again in late December
to discuss follow-up measures and trilateral talks will
continue. The Dec. 17 murder of five Turkish police officers
traveling to Iraq to assume duty at the Turkish Embassy
stunned Turkey. While press outrage was directed at the US,
the government noted its appreciation for the swift US
military response in which several insurgents were killed,
the wounded were treated and the bodies were repatriated.

Counter-Terrorism/Non-Proliferation
--------------


7. (SBU) The Turks have been an active partner on other
fronts in the global war on terrorism and international
security: Our militaries coordinate assistance to Georgia
and Azerbaijan, improving their abilities to protect
important energy transportation routes. Turkey subscribes to
every arms control arrangement it is eligible to join,
including the Proliferation Security Initiative, through
which it is considering hosting an exercise in 2006. Ankara
has been publicly supportive of international efforts to
press Iran to meet its commitments to the IAEA. The Turkish
military's Partnership for Peace Training Center provides
counterterrorism and other training to personnel from PfP
partner countries. The military has recently established a
NATO Center of Excellence for the Combat Against Terrorism
that will provide more specialized training opportunities for
both NATO partner nations and alliance members. And Turkey
will again assume the command of ISAF in Afghanistan in
February for a six-month period during which they will send
up to 1,600 troops.

EU Accession
--------------


8. (SBU) The European Union at the December 17 Summit agreed
to open accession talks with Turkey in October, marking a
major step forward in anchoring Turkey,s future and in our
strategic vision for Turkey and the region. However, the
next steps in the process could be rocky. Before talks
begin, the EU expects Turkey to sign a protocol extending the
EU Association agreement to the 10 new EU members, including
the Republic of Cyprus. Several days after the Summit, the
GOT sent a letter to the EU stating Turkey,s objections to
the fact that the EU Summit conclusions state that
&derogations8 may be included in the framework for
negotiations. The EU plans to apply a &screening process8
before opening formal talks on each chapter of the EU acquis.
The Turks say they can accept this, as long as the screening
begins in early 2005 and the formal talks start later in the
year. It is not yet clear how the EU will carry out the
process. The GOT, meanwhile, has yet to name a chief EU
negotiator and to assign the hundreds of officials needed to
work on the process of harmonizing Turkish legislation with
the acquis.


9. (SBU) Many in Turkey see the U.S. and EU relationships as
a zero-sum choice. They believe they can improve relations
with the EU by distancing Turkey from the U.S. Others also
look for a third alternative based on partnership with Russia
) which was a theme of the recent Putin visit.

Economy
--------------


10. (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the
financial crisis of 2000-2001 and is growing at an annual
pace of around 8-9 percent. However, the recovery remains
vulnerable due to a large current account deficit (about 5
percent of GDP) and a large debt with a short maturity
structure. Unemployment and poverty remain high, and
ordinary people have not felt much benefit from the overall
macroeconomic improvement. Macroeconomic success has also
bred a sense of complacency about the need to persist with
difficult reforms, such as privatization, and reform of the
banking, social security and tax systems, all of which are
being addressed in a new three-year IMF standby program.


11. (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility and
opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received
less foreign direct investment than other countries of
similar size and potential. Many in the Turkish elite are
convinced that there will be a flood of foreign investment if
the Turks get a date for EU accession negotiations later this
month. However, this is unlikely to materialize unless more
is done in the area of structural reform. In addition, there
appears to be a lack of appreciation for the enormous
challenges Turkey will shoulder in the accession
negotiations, for the fact that EU accession will affect
nearly aspect of their lives, and that it may in the end be
quite costly for Turkey to comply with EU directives in
environmental protection and other areas.
EDELMAN