Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA1
2005-01-01 05:01:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

IRANIAN FONMIN KHARRAZI'S VISIT TO TURKEY: IRAQI

Tags:  PREL PGOV MNUC PARM ENRG TU IR IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000001 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV MNUC PARM ENRG TU IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRANIAN FONMIN KHARRAZI'S VISIT TO TURKEY: IRAQI
ELECTIONS, IRANIAN NUKES, ENERGY


(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (a,b,c,d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000001

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV MNUC PARM ENRG TU IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRANIAN FONMIN KHARRAZI'S VISIT TO TURKEY: IRAQI
ELECTIONS, IRANIAN NUKES, ENERGY


(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (a,b,c,d).


1. (C) Summary: Turkish MFA interlocutors tell us PM Erdogan
strongly underscored Turkish concerns about Iran's nuclear
program to visiting Iranian FonMin Kharrazi. End summary.


2. (C) In separate, coordinated Dec. 29 calls on MFA,
Polcounselor met DDG for South Asia (including Iran) Evirgen
and PolMilcounselor met DDG for Disarmament and Arms Control
Meric for readout of Dec. 24 Kharrazi visit.


3. (C) Both our interlocutors said the visit was arranged
hastily at the request of Kharrazi, who wanted to focus on
Iran's concerns about possible postponement of Iraqi
elections. Evirgen reported that both sides agreed to use
their influence on all parties in Iraq to ensure no
postponement.


4. (C) We queried both MFA interlocutors whether the Turkish
side raised Iran's nuclear program. Both affirmed that PM
Erdogan did so but neither President Sezer nor FonMin Gul
did. Both said Erdogan told Kharrazi that Turkey recognizes
Iran's right to a nuclear energy program as long as it is for
peaceful purposes but that Turkey urges Iran fully to comply
with IAEA requirements.


5. (C) We pressed Evirgen, who attended the meetings, for
more details. The U.S. has noted that, whereas key elements
of the Turkish state -- the MFA and General Staff -- have
expressed strong concern about the implications of Iran's
nuclear program, the lack of public interest or debate
suggests that the GOT at the political level does not see the
program as a concern. How strongly did Erdogan express the
Turkish view? Evirgen acknowledged that, in the past, the
Turkish approach had been "too soft" and that he had not
expected Erdogan would raise the issue. However, surprising
both Evirgen and, more important, Kharrazi, Erdogan did so
with vigor, drawing on the MFA's now more forcefully
expressed talking points. Erdogan even said that Turkey
"wants to believe" the Iranian program is only for peaceful
uses. Noting that, to a Turk, "wants to believe" contains an
even stronger warning than "doesn't believe", we asked
whether the Turks had used their own interpreter and whether
Kharrazi had gotten the nuance. Evirgen said the Turks had
used Kharrazi's interpreter but his (Evirgen's) Persian was
still good enough to follow the gist, and the interpretation
was faithful. Indeed, Evirgen said, Kharrazi's face
stiffened and he grew visibly uneasy.


6. (C) We asked both Evirgen and Meric whether they thought
the Iranians might construe the Turks' concession that Iran
has a right to a nuclear program for peaceful purposes as a
wink and a nod about the rest. Both said that the Turks used
the right to peaceful uses line first in order to take it
away from the Iranians as an arguing point.


7. (S/NF) We asked Evirgen whether, if Iran did obtain nukes,
Turkey might consider a counter step. Misunderstanding our
question as asking whether Turkey might consider a
pre-emptive military response, Evirgen said quietly that, "a
few days ago", Turkey and Israel held very detailed
discussions about options. Noting the appearance of some
speculative columns in the Turkish press, we then asked
whether Turkey might be considering a nuke program of its own
or in cooperation with any of several nuclear weapons-holding
countries. Evirgen asserted he has heard of no such
considerations, "but who knows what the world will look like
in 20 years."


8. (C) In response to our question whether Kharrazi raised
Iran's interest in concluding a comprehensive natural gas
deal, Evirgen affirmed that he did but the Turks did not
yield. We have heard separately from leading national
security analyst Faruk Demir, who has close contacts with
Turkish Energy Minister Guler, that, because the Turks want
to avoid antagonizing the U.S. through a deal with Iran but
see no sign of a U.S. push for a breakthrough on a Caspian
natural gas pipeline, Erdogan is ready to sign a
comprehensive energy agreement with Russia when he visits
Moscow Jan. 11.


9. (C) Kharrazi also brought up President Khatemi's interest
in making an official visit to Turkey. According to Evirgen,
both sides agreed the timing would have to be right.
However, Evirgen noted wryly, unusually for the normally wily
Iranians, Khatemi has boxed himself in by acknowledging that
in order to be able to make the trip he would first have to
resolve the barriers Turkish investors (Turkcell for the
mobile phone network and TAV for management of the new Tehran
airport) have run into at the hands of more radical elements
in Iran.


10. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN