Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05AMMAN9923
2005-12-28 09:54:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

Amman Avian Flu Contingencies

Tags:  TBIO KHIV AMED EAGR ECON PGOV PREL JO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 009923 

SIPDIS

STATE PASS USAID FOR GLOBAL HEALTH/K HILL, D CARROLL
USDA FOR APHIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO KHIV AMED EAGR ECON PGOV PREL JO
SUBJECT: Amman Avian Flu Contingencies

Ref: State 219189

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 009923

SIPDIS

STATE PASS USAID FOR GLOBAL HEALTH/K HILL, D CARROLL
USDA FOR APHIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO KHIV AMED EAGR ECON PGOV PREL JO
SUBJECT: Amman Avian Flu Contingencies

Ref: State 219189


1. (U) Summary: Embassy Amman has implemented broad-based
contingency planning for avian influenza that covers
protection of USG personnel, continuity of operations, and
our responsibility to American citizens in Jordan.
Tripwires are in final clearance and will be posted on
TRIPS. End summary.

Avian Flu Task Force Readies Amman Tripwires
--------------


2. (U) In October, post created an Avian Influenza Task
Force that serves as an interagency planning forum and
information clearinghouse for the official Embassy community
and for the larger American citizen community.


3. (U) The AI Task Force has developed Jordan-specific
tripwires through extensive discussion in-house and with
relevant Jordanian organizations. Post will publish the
tripwires on the classified Tripwire Reporting and
Integrated Planning System (TRIPS) per reftel instructions.

Overview of Jordan's Medical Response Capabilities
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) Jordan has small numbers of well-trained
individuals in animal and human health surveillance systems,
but lacks capacity at the lower levels. The same is true
for its laboratories: Jordan has a small number of well-
equipped, well-staffed labs but not many of them, and they
cannot handle the highest level of analysis. Jordan's labs
are unable to perform the polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
tests that are essential to mounting an effective, rapid
response to an influenza outbreak. The PCR test would have
to be done elsewhere, adding days to a response time.
Jordan has among the most effective, well-trained and well-
equipped health systems in the region, but it lacks the
"bench" of numerous, qualified personnel and effective
systems that integrate at all levels. Post's view is that
Jordan would be able to respond well to a small-scale
emergency by throwing its top assets at the problem, but
that these people and resources would quickly be overwhelmed

by a larger crisis.

Responses to Individual Items in Reftel
--------------

Mission Briefings:

5. (U) (Reftel item 8(A)): Ambassador has led two Town Hall
meetings on avian influenza, one for American staff and one
for FSN staff, and a meeting of wardens where avian
influenza was discussed. Hard copy information sheets in
both Arabic and English on avian influenza were distributed
at those meetings, and Embassy Amman has extensive avian
influenza information available on its intranet and public
websites. Mission also briefed the Overseas Security
Advisory Council.

Medical Human Resources:

6. (U) (Reftel (8(B)): Post has a Regional Medical Office
(RMO) staffed by one Foreign Service physician, a Regional
Psychiatrist, three locally hired nurses and one support
staff. RMO is responsible for Israel, Cyprus, Syria,
Lebanon and Jordan. Peace Corps/Jordan has a full time RN as
their medical officer. Post has several additional American
and FSN staff with medical skills. There is no
institutional mechanism for identifying these additional
individuals; post's awareness of these skills is through
informal means. Post has a group of bio-chem "first
responders" already trained, equipped with personal
protective equipment, and in place. RMO is developing plans
for providing basic training to non-medical personnel to
care for influenza patients.

Drugs and Medical Equipment:

7. (SBU) (Reftel (8(C)): Post has one hundred courses of
Tamiflu at the chancery and a large supply of Cipro. The
Peace Corps has ten courses of Tamiflu. The health unit has
full protective gear (gowns, masks, goggles, gloves) for
thirty persons, and roughly four hundred N-95 masks. Staff
at the Defense Attache Office and Military Assistance
Program office have M-40 chem-bio masks. RSO's "first
responder" group has a dozen sets of chem-bio protective
gear.

Security for Drugs:

8. (SBU) (Reftel (8(D)): Post's supplies of Tamiflu are
maintained in a secure location.

Stockpiling:

9. (U) (Reftel (8(E)): Embassy staff have been urged to
stockpile food, water and medical supplies at their
residences. The length of time that post could shelter in
place, drawing upon these supplies, would depend on the
number of staff and family members at post. Post has
emergency stockpiles of gasoline, water, meals ready to eat
(MREs) and diesel fuel in place and is augmenting that
supply. The current supply of MREs is expired; new ones are
on order and are expected at post within a month. In a
crisis, post would be able to draw on goods in the on-site
commissary. This would significantly augment post's current
stockpile of emergency food and water. Peace Corps has
their own Emergency Action Plan that includes specific
gathering points that have been prestocked with food and
water.

Continuity of Operations:

10. (U) (Reftel (8(F)): Post has up-to-date plans in place
for operations from an alternate Embassy site. Emergency
stores at that site are in the process of being replenished.
Consular Section is completing a transition of its American
citizen registration system from an in-house system to an
internet-based system. Consular staff have successfully
tested their ability to access these names and email
addresses, and as of February 2006 will have those names
available in a manner that permits the warden system to be
run from any of several possible locations.

Essential Staff:

11. (U) (Reftel (8(G)): Post has just updated its drawdown
lists for emergency and minimal staffing situations.

At-Risk Staff:

12. (U) (Reftel (8(H)): Regional Medical Office maintains a
list of American staff who are at risk because of underlying
medical conditions.

Pre-Planned Departure Packets:

13. (U) (Reftel (8(I)): Administrative packets to
facilitate authorized/ordered departure have been prepared
by the Human Resources Office and are ready for immediate
use.

Border Closure:

14. (SBU) (Reftel (8(J)): Post has multiple options under
various border/airport closure scenarios, including overland
departure to Israel or Egypt, and by boat from Aqaba.
Overland departure from Jordan might not be realistic or
desirable if a pandemic was affecting neighboring
countries. Embassy staff would likely be better off in
Jordan, with its small population and good medical
infrastructure.

Amcit Town Halls:

15. (U) (Reftel (8(K)): Post feels that physical town hall
meetings for interested Amcits would not be feasible, given
the nearly ten thousand American citizens resident in
Jordan. Post's plan to maximize outreach on a fair basis is
to promote information sharing through warden messages,
additional warden meetings and post's public internet page.
Other tools such as a "web chat" are being evaluated.

Engagement with Host Country:

16. (U) (Reftel (8(L)): Several sections at post, including
AID, RMO, Econ, RSO, Military Assistance Program and
Environmental Hub, routinely discuss avian flu issues with
their GOJ counterparts, other contacts in Jordan, and
regional contacts.

HALE