Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05AMMAN9393
2005-12-06 09:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

CODEL HAGEL MEETING WITH KING ABDULLAH

Tags:  PREL PTER KPAL IZ JO 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

060930Z Dec 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 009393 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL IZ JO
SUBJECT: CODEL HAGEL MEETING WITH KING ABDULLAH

REF: AMMAN 9329

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

-------
SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 009393

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL IZ JO
SUBJECT: CODEL HAGEL MEETING WITH KING ABDULLAH

REF: AMMAN 9329

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a November 29 meeting, King Abdullah told CODEL
Hagel that the December 15 elections in Iraq were crucial to
that country's stability. He warned against Iranian
influence in Iraq, and highlighted Jordan's efforts to assist
in quelling the insurgency. The King agreed with efforts to
isolate the SARG, though he cautioned the U.S. to be prepared
in case the Syrian regime were to unravel. On the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the King said that Jordan
remained ready to assist the Palestinian Authority on
security and economic matters. END SUMMARY.

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IRAQ
--------------


2. (C) A U.S. Congressional delegation comprised of Senator
Chuck Hagel, Senator Thomas Carper and Representative Ellen
Tasucher (accompanied by Charge) met with King Abdullah on
November 29 to discuss regional issues and to express
condolences on the November 9 bombings in Amman. Prime
Minister Marouf Bakhit and Foreign Minister Abdul Ilah Khatib
also attended. Regarding Iraq, the King said that
"everything depended" on the results of the December 15
elections. A moderate government not aligned with Iran would
be the most positive outcome, according to the King, and
would allow Jordan to continue or perhaps even increase its
efforts to help quell the insurgency. He stated that if a
pro-Iranian government - "like the current one" - were to
instead emerge from the elections, "I don't know what we'll
do." The King reiterated his willingness to do more to train
and equip Iraqi soldiers in Jordan, and mentioned the
possibility of embedding Jordanian special forces into Iraqi
military units in western Iraq. He characterized as
counterproductive some of the MNF-I military campaigns in
western Iraq vis-a-vis getting tribal leaders to stop their
support of insurgents.


3. (C) The King strongly cautioned against Iranian influence
in Iraq, particularly in the South. If this influence was
not checked, he warned, it could lead to effective Iranian
rule of southern Iraq, and to an even more active and
dangerous Hizballah in Lebanon. In response to the CODEL's
inquiry about Iraqi Deputy PM Ahmad Chalabi, the King said
that contacts between the GOJ and Chalabi to resolve their
differences out-of-court had unfortunately broken off. The
King speculated that once Chalabi felt he was getting back
into good USG graces, as evidenced by his recent visit to
Washington, he no longer felt the need to take a soft
approach with Jordan. The King emphasized that Jordan was
still planning to sponsor a postponed conference of Iraqi
tribal and religious leaders, noting that the Arab League
(AL) preparatory conference in Cairo on Iraq - which had not
impressed him - had pushed back the proposed timing of the
event. PM Bakhit agreed that the Cairo conference had
accomplished very little.

--------------
SYRIA
--------------


4. (C) On Syria, King Abdullah said he supported U.S.
efforts to isolate, and to apply political and economic
pressure on, the SARG. He added, however, that the U.S.
should be prepared for what may happen next in Syria in case
"things unravel." A possible takeover of the country by the
Muslim Brotherhood, the King warned, would be very negative
for both Syria and the region. During Bakhit's recent visit
to Damascus (reftel),the King explained that the SARG had
tried to enlist Jordan to help fend off pressure to cooperate
with the Melhis investigation. The GOJ refused, bluntly
telling the Syrians to fully comply with the investigation,
and asking why Jordan should come to the aid of Damascus when
the SARG deemed the GOJ to be the "agent" of the U.S. and
Israel. The King noted that he sensed that both the
Egyptians and Saudis had pulled back - to a degree - from
their earlier, tougher line with the SARG.

--------------
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
--------------


5. (C) King Abdullah stated that the GOJ continues to try to
help the Palestinian Authority on security issues, especially
organizational reform of Palestinian security forces. Jordan
was also willing, according to the King, to further
facilitate Palestinian trade, including possibly constructing
a transportation terminal on Jordan's border with the West
Bank. He underscored that Quartet Envoy Wolfensohn had the
most complete understanding of the needs of the Palestinian
economy, as well as the necessary plans to strengthen it.
The election of Amir Peretz as the new leader of the Israeli
Labor Party, the King remarked, could impact the peace
process by bringing "increased dynamism" to the Israeli
political scene.

6. (U) CODEL Hagel did not have the opportunity to clear
this message before departing Jordan.
HALE