IRAQ SUNNI OUTREACH: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD'S AMMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 008259

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ JO IR SY
SUBJECT: IRAQ SUNNI OUTREACH: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD'S AMMAN
MEETINGS WITH IRAQI POLITICAL AND TRIBAL FIGURES

REF: AMMAN 2796

Classified By: DAVID HALE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, REASONS: 1.4 (B &D)

Summary
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1. (C) U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad pursued Iraqi
Sunni outreach in Amman October 3 through a series of
meetings with Iraqi political and tribal figures, including a
small group of prominent ex-Ba'athists presented to him by
former Prime Minister Allawi; Sheikh Dari al-Fassal, an Iraqi
tribal leader from Mosul who is the brother-in-law of Saudi
King Abdullah; and with Hassib al-Aref, a Sunni Arab member
of the Constitution Drafting Committee who heads a small
non-sectarian movement. Khalilzad stressed recent efforts to
deal with Sunni Arab concerns over the draft Constitution.
He asked for help in encouraging Sunnis to support the
Constitution, participate in the December election, and back
moderate, nationalist, and non-sectarian candidates and
coalitions. All interlocutors agreed that the December
election is crucial, and agreed to encourage widespread Sunni
turnout. Sheikh Dari and the former Ba'athist group also
indicated a willingness to publicly support the new
Constitution, though Dari later qualified this by insisting
that a statement declaring that "Iraq is a member of the Arab
world" be added to the text. Dari also agreed to cooperate
with Ambassador Khalilzad in organizing a meeting of key
Sheikhs. End Summary.

Ex-Ba,athists Ready to Accept the Constitution
--------------


2. (C) At the suggestion of former Prime Minister Iyad
Allawi, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad met on
October 3 in Allawi,s Amman office with a small group of
veteran former Ba,athist leaders, including Farouk Awni,
Khalid Tabra, and Mahmud Bashi. Allawi described them as
trusted "old friends." Speaking for the group, Awni read a
long prepared statement to the effect that most ex-Ba,athis
are not associated with Saddam,s crimes and are educated,
patriotic Iraqis who accept democracy and want only to live
normal lives. Ironically, he claimed, mass dismissals of
Ba'athist rank and file from government jobs, and similar
ongoing "persecution" has brought ex-Baathist party members
closer together than they ever were when they ruled the
country. He deplored continued persecution of ex-Ba,athis
who have not committed crimes. He also noted their concern
that Iraq remains unified, and that Iranian infiltration end.



3. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad observed that Iraq is passing
through a very difficult transition. The new Iraq needs to
be inclusive, pursue good relations with its neighbors, and
reject all forms of extremism and terrorism. Khalilzad,
stressing the need for an "accountability and reconciliation"
process, stated that there should be no problem with full
re-integration of ex-Ba,athist party members not guilty of
serious crimes, or were not senior members of the party, into
Iraqi society. He provided the group with copies of recent
proposed revisions to the new Constitution. The revisions
clarify that "former members of the Ba,ath party who were
not senior leaders and who did not commit crimes" shall enjoy
equality and protection, including full political rights.


4. (C) Farouk and the group lauded the new constitutional
language on the rights of ex-Ba,athis, and agreed that the
December election is crucial. They also stressed that they
want good relations with the U.S. and an end to
confrontation. Allawi,s staff subsequently passed word to
Khalilzad that the group has decided to issue a public
statement supporting the new Constitution as an acceptable
stepping-stone to the crucial December elections.
Bolstering Tribal Contacts
--------------


5. (C) Khalilzad also called on Sheikh Dari al Fassal al
Jarba from Mosul, a leader of the Shammar tribe in Iraq who
has been living in Amman over the past year. Note: Dari is
the brother-in-law of Saudi Arabia,s King Abdullah and the
uncle of Prince Mish,al. He has a wide network of tribal
and clerical contacts throughout Iraq, and has been working
assiduously with Talal al-Gaaod and others since late 2004 on
defeating extremism and returning stability to Iraq. In
recent months he has worked closely with (Jordan) King
Abdullah,s tribal affairs advisor, and as an informal
conduit between the Jordanian and Saudi rulers. Dari also
attended Ambassador Khalilzad,s September roundtable with
Sunni tribal leaders in Amman (ref b). End note.


6. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad outlined to Dari his recent trip
to Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., and explained that he is
currently focusing on key tasks: obtaining additional
revisions to the draft Constitution to address Sunni
concerns, encouraging Sunni participation in the December
election, and promoting an alliance between moderate
nationalist leaders and movements that will work toward a
unified, stable, and prosperous Iraq. Khalilzad enumerated
the recent proposed revisions to the Constitution dealing
with federalism, de-Ba,athification, right of citizenship,
and Iraq,s Arab identity, and asked if Dari would be
prepared to come to Baghdad on October 10 for a meeting of
inter-ethnic leaders who will endorse the Constitution.


7. (C) Dari praised the recent revisions and expressed
willingness to come to the Baghdad meeting and bring other
Iraqi tribal figures with him. Note: He subsequently made
this agreement dependent on insertion of language stating,
"Iraq is a member of the Arab world." End Note. Dari also
promised to promote emergence of a moderate, non-sectarian
leadership and encourage a large Sunni voter turnout in the
December election. Dari noted that, working with Talal
al-Gaaod and others, he has already scored significant
success behind the scenes in strengthening the moderate Sunni
Waqf against the Islamic Scholars Council and its
confrontational leader, Harith al-Dhari.

Stabilizing Tal Afar
--------------


8. (C) Dari praised Khalilzad,s efforts to move Iraq
forward and expressed appreciation for Khalilzad,s
understanding of Iraq,s tribal nature and of the Iraqi
mentality. He cited the Tal Afar episode as a typical
example of a problem that arose out of misunderstanding and
manipulation of U.S. forces by outsiders tied to SCIRI.
Note: Dari spent two weeks in the Tal Afar area visiting with
tribal leaders in early July. End Note.


9. (C) Dari asked Ambassador Khalilzad to attend a notional
meeting that Sheikh Dari will set up with Tal Afar area
tribal leaders, and asked that Khalilzad bring key U.S.
regional military figures with him. Dari said that he wants
Khalilzad to explain how the insurgency facilitates Iran,s
agenda, and works against the people - "tell them that
Zarqawi gives money, but will go away, while the U.S. and
Iraq will stay." He also stressed the importance of dealing
with hunger and offering employment and other legitimate
sources of money to the impoverished Tal Afar people.
Ambassador Khalilzad acknowledged that the U.S. had made some
"mistakes" in understanding the background of the Tal Afar
situation, welcomed Dari,s offer, and agreed to attend the
notional meeting.

Meeting with Hassib al-Obeidi
--------------


10. (C) Khalilzad,s final outreach meeting was with Sunni
Constitution drafter (and a former Saddam Hussein
international relations advisor) Hassib Aref al-Obeidi
(ex-Prime Minister Allawi was also present). Note: Hassib is
a Sunni Arab from Kirkuk who heads a small political movement
with a moderate, democratic, and Iraqi nationalist platform.
According to Talal al-Gaaod, he has recently worked closely
with Saleh Mutlak and Sa'ad al-Janabi. End Note. Hassib
told Ambassador Khalilzad that the draft Constitution was
acceptable with minor changes, one of which, a clarification
that rules on citizenship will be regulated by law, the
Ambassador said he has already agreed to support. Hassib
also wanted a statement that Iraq is part of the Arab world,
and elimination of specific references to "Saddamite"
Ba,athists.


11. (C) Hassib asserted that the Constitution is going to be
ratified in any event, and said that his main focus is on the
December election. In that respect he asked that the U.S.
pay close attention to issues of voting logistics and
"fairness." Khalilzad assured him that we are very conscious
of this need. Hassib said that Allawi will be the next Prime
Minister, and promised to support him, but not necessarily to
join his pre-election coalition. He claimed to have recently
met with the Syrian Prime Minister, and opined that U.S.
suspicions of active Syrian support for Zarqawi are
"exaggerated." He asserted that Iran, not Syria, is the
"Silk Road of al-Qaeda." Hassib warned against launching
large-scale military operations in the run-up before the
referendum, claiming that some Sunnis will see this as
referendum-related intimidation. Khalilzad assured Hassib
that any operations held prior to the referendum will be
limited, highly focused in scope, and carried out with the
active cooperation and support of local people.
RUBINSTEIN