AMBASSADOR JEFFREY AND DELEGATION MEET WITH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 008166

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/I, NEA/I, AND NEA/ARPI
TREASURY FOR LARRY MCDONALD
NSC FOR CHARLES DUNNE
CENTCOM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL MARK KIMMITT
CJCS FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL JONES
OSD FOR JON FERKO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EFIN IR IZ SY JO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY AND DELEGATION MEET WITH
JORDANIAN OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS IRAQ

Classified By: CDA David Hale for 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY: On October 9, S/I Ambassador Jeffrey and his
delegation met with King Abdullah, Foreign Minister Farouq
Kasrawi, Finance Minister Adel Kodah, Chairman of the
Jordanian Armed Forces General Khalid Sarairah, and General
Intelligence Directorate chief Samih Asfoura. The Jordanians
pledged to continue urging other Arabs to upgrade ties with
Iraq. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Accompanying Senior Advisor to the Secretary and
Coordinator for Iraq Ambassador James Jeffrey and Charge
were: Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt (Deputy Director, Plans
and Policy-CENTCOM),Brigadier General Michael Jones (Deputy
Director of Politico-Military Affairs-J5),Ambassador
Christopher Ross (Senior Advisor for NEA/I),Jon Ferko
(Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Defense),Andrew Liepmann (Director, Office of
Iraq Analysis),Larry McDonald (Director for Middle East and
North Africa, US Department of Treasury),Charles Dunne
(Director for Iraq, National Security Council),Christine
Sanford (Special Assistant to Ambassador Jeffrey) and Maryz
Habib (NEA/I Desk Officer).

===================================
FM KASRAWI SHARES HIS VIEWS ON IRAQ
===================================


3. (C) Amb. Jeffrey explained to Foreign Minister Farouq
Kasrawi that the delegation was in the region in order to lay
out for our partners the USG,s strategy for moving toward a
democratic Iraq. The U.S. recognized the importance of
obtaining Iraqi Sunni Arabs, support for the draft
constitution. Iraq,s neighbors needed to help Iraq become
free and stable. He also explained that the USG was
concerned over Iranian influence in Iraq. Jeffrey closed by
sharing the USG,s appreciation for Jordan,s assistance,
including the training of new Iraqi security forces in Jordan.


4. (C) Kasrawi said the GOJ was urging a strong relationship
with Iraq and planned to strengthen ties further. Kasrawi
reported how, during the Arab foreign ministers, meeting in
Jeddah October 2, he had worked to impress on to the other
FMs the Arab states, interest in a positive outcome to the
Iraqi political process. He believed his efforts had met
with success, and hoped that the momentum would continue.


5. (C) Kasrawi said it was time to direct the international
media,s attention away from U.S. forces, and toward Iraqis,
own efforts. A careful drawdown of coalition forces from
Iraq would help; however, he agreed with Amb. Jeffrey that
this had to be done with realistic benchmarks keyed to
improvements in security, and not arbitrary deadlines.


6. (C) Kasrawi believed that following the October 15
referendum on the constitution, the Arab world must help
Iraq,s three chief communities achieve reconciliation.
Kasrawi saw the election of a moderate parliament in the
December elections as an essential step toward further
engagement of the Sunni Arabs.


7. (C) When Jeffrey asked for Kasrawi,s ideas on
reconciliation, the Minister pointed out the importance of
countering Iran's considerable presence in Iraq. Iran worked
carefully, at all levels of society, to strengthen it
influence sector by sector; Syria, by contrast, exerts it
influence through insurgent fighters but has no other levers
in Iraq. Jeffrey commented that AL SecGen Amre Musa and the
whole of the Arab League needed to watch closely the levels
of Iranian influence in Iraq when explaining Shia interest in
a ®ional option8. Jeffrey commented that many others
felt that the political process must guard against giving the
Kurds rights not afforded others, &a la Quebec8. All three
communities, but especially the Sunni Arabs, needed
consideration. Kasrawi then asked Jeffrey what the USG
wanted Jordan to do. Jeffrey said we needed the GOJ to
encourage other Arab states to get more involved with Iraq,
as Jordan is, and we wanted GOJ advice on how to approach
other Arab states.


8. (C) Kasrawi raised the issue of Jordan's Ambassador to
Iraq. The GOJ felt it was high time General Ahmad al-Lozi
presented his credentials in Iraq, but security was a
problem. Perhaps he could present credentials and return to
Jordan until a secure residence was found. He said the GOJ
would continue its outreach to Iraq, and continue to
encourage others in the Arab World to do the same.


9. (C) Turning again to Iran, Kasrawi said a way needed to be
found to use &Arab Shi,a8 to counter "Persian Shi,a"
inroads in Iraq. Many in the Shi,a communities in states
neighboring Iran "receive their instructions from Tehran."
It would be better for Arab countries to create ties with as
many of the Shi,a leaders as possible, and with Arab Shi,a
tribal elements, to influence them into accepting a united
Iraq. This means finding Shi,a leaders who either reject
Iranian-style theology, or who are "genuine Iraqis." He
mentioned Muqtada al-Sadr as a "wild card," but "attention
should be paid to him and he should be brought into the
process." Kasrawi noted Jordan,s excellent embryonic
relationship with Sistani. He and his staff stressed the
need to avoid ignoring other marja, leaders in the Iraqi
Shi,a community. However, when his staffer seemed to suggest
that this could go so far as to find &alternatives to
Sistani8 (Comment: a theme seen in the past with Ayad
Allawi, a frequent and respected visitor to Amman. End
Comment.) Jeffrey warned his interlocutors to be very careful
about any effort in this direction.


10. (C) Brigadier General Michael Jones expressed
appreciation for Jordan,s support for the effort in Iraq,
and briefed Kasrawi on the President,s October 6 message
concerning the USG,s continued commitment in Iraq. The USG
is committed to staying the course in Iraq. The transfer to
Iraqi forces of full responsibility for security will
continue deliberately; there will be no unrealistic
deadlines. The coalition transfer to Iraqi forces of sole
responsibility for security, region by region, will be based
on four factors: 1. the capability of local Iraqi units, 2.
&enemy condition,8 meaning the Iraqis, ability to mount
and organize concerted attacks against local insurgents, 3.
the ability of the Iraqi government to provide basic services
to the public, and 4. the capability of coalition forces to
return to an area in an emergency. Kasrawi concurred that
artificial deadlines would be counterproductive. BG Jones
thanked the GOJ on behalf of the U.S. military for all of
their efforts in fighting the war on terrorism, not just
regarding Iraq.

=================================
KING REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON AL-SADR
=================================


11. (S) Amb. Jeffrey told Jordan's King Abdullah that the
President had sent this delegation to six key Arab states to
build support for Iraq, and to urge others to follow Jordan's
lead. It was necessary to signal to the Sunni Arabs in Iraq
that the only way to bring Iraq together was on a democratic
political basis. Asked about Iraqi Sunni Arab attitudes to
the USG, the King stressed that one of the first ways to
increase confidence was to share with the Iraqi Sunni Arab
leaders a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. It doesn't matter if
that schedule is strictly adhered to, as long as the leaders
can show their constituents that there is a plan for
withdrawal.


12. (S) The King questioned whether it was possible to
rehabilitate Muqtada al-Sadr and draw him into the political
mainstream as a counterweight to Iranian influence. Before
testing the waters further with al-Sadr )- a Sadr envoy had
recently visited Amman and sent out significant feelers of a
desire to work with moderate forces )- the King wanted a
green light from the U.S. Amb. Jeffrey was basically
positive, with caveats. He stated that it was key for Jordan
and the U.S. to consult with one another regarding Al-Sadr.
The USG has also reached out to al-Sadr's people, but one had
to be very careful. When al-Sadr wanted to be helpful, he
was, but he could also cause trouble and was suspected of
receiving Iranian monetary support. The King and Amb.
Jeffrey agreed that Jordan should continue to seek broad
support against the insurgency, but exercise caution with
specific individuals whose motives were not clear.


13. (S) Asked about Syria, the King said that much depends on
the Mehlis report. The results could be damaging to
President Asad. Amb. Ross cautioned that the report might
not finger Asad's closest family members, as had been
speculated. In turn, the King cautioned the delegation that
the Syrians might attempt to appeal to Arab solidarity to
resist pressure in response to the report. He felt that he
had already seen some wavering in Egypt and Saudi Arabia on
this point. It was agreed that the USG and GOJ should
consult on this matter further, depending on the outcome of
the report.

===========================
SARAIRAH'S OPINIONS ON IRAQ
===========================


14. (C) Jordanian Joint Chiefs chairman General Sarairah
reviewed for the delegation the threats facing Jordan along
its borders. He made a plea for additional assistance in
order for Jordan to strengthen its own border security.
Sarairah then turned to terrorism, and the need for all Arab
countries to put more pressure on Iran, Syria and Hezbollah
to convince them that their continued support for terrorism
was a threat to the entire region. Sarairah observed that
Iran continues to meddle in Iraqi internal affairs.

=========================================
ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL COOPERATION WITH IRAQ
=========================================


15. (C) Members of the Jeffrey delegation and Finance
Ministry officials discussed debt relief for Iraq, and areas
where the GOJ could lend Iraq financial policy guidance.
Amb. Jeffrey expressed USG gratitude for Jordan's "strong
embrace" of a new Iraq. Finance Ministry Secretary General
Kasasbeh responded, "We are willing to do what Iraqis ask us.
We see them as a partner." Additional cooperation might
include technical assistance on banking, IMF financing, tax
reform, and subsidy removal. Kasasbeh pointed to Jordan,s
graduation from IMF financial support, and a successful
campaign to sell oil subsidy removals to the public, as
examples that Iraq might emulate. NOTE: Emboffs followed up
with MinFin, and will provide Embassy Baghdad with
documentation related to Jordan's program of removing oil
subsidies. END NOTE.


16. (C) Ambassador Jeffrey asked that Jordan work to resolve
the $1.35 billion debt Iraq owes Jordan in a manner that is
consistent with the plan agreed between Iraq and the Paris
Club, and make its effort known publicly. SecGen Kasasbeh
pledged cooperation, and Treasury representative Larry
McDonald offered to check on whether repayment in-kind with
Iraqi oil of 20% of the debt would violate Paris Club
conditions. COMMENT: While the Secretary General seemed
willing to consider a debt reconciliation program, he does
not speak authoritatively, and the proposal would have to
overcome the objections of other stakeholders, all at a time
of worsening macroeconomic conditions in Jordan. The debt
itself is held by the Central Bank of Jordan and includes
some commercial claims. In the face of declining aid and
increasing oil prices, Jordan's own public debt may exceed
the legally mandated cap of eighty percent of GDP currently
projected for 2006. END COMMENT.

==========================================
ASFOURA: SUNNIS MUST BE POLITICALLY ENGAGED
==========================================


17. (C) Samih Asfoura, Director of the General Intelligence
Directorate (GID),said that the GID's work to engage the
Sunnis in the upcoming elections had now shifted to preparing
for the conference that the GOJ would host in November for
influential Iraqis of all communities to discuss the outcome
and next steps. The GID frequently talked with persons from
the three chief communities to convince them of the benefits
of working together. While all agreed that the Kurds were
unique and should maintain regional autonomy, the Sunnis are
against federalism for fear of being left out in the cold.


18. (C) Once Iraq became more secure, Asfoura feared, the
terrorists would leave Iraq and find another country to
target. Syria must be pressed to realign itself with the
Arab world rather than with Iran and its anti-U.S. agenda.
The USG needed to confront Syria directly in order to get its
point across. Any failure of the political process in Iraq
would impact Syria domestically. "If there is no peace in
Iraq, we are all in danger. Terrorism is as much our battle
as it is yours, maybe more because when the U.S. leaves, we
are still their neighbors."

19. (C) COMMENT: The GOJ,s ideas on Iraq were generally
consistent with our own. Jordan is on board with increasing
outreach, seeking more involvement on the part of other Arab
governments, and in establishing a political system in Iraq
that is moderate, democratic and pluralistic to reflect the
tapestry that is Iraq.


20. Ambassador Jeffrey cleared this cable.
HALE