Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05AMMAN8050
2005-10-11 05:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

CODEL SHAYS MEETS WITH KING ABDULLAH'S CHIEF OF

Tags:  PREL PTER KISL KPAL IZ IS JO 
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110530Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 008050 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER KISL KPAL IZ IS JO
SUBJECT: CODEL SHAYS MEETS WITH KING ABDULLAH'S CHIEF OF
STAFF


Classified By: CDA DAVID HALE FOR REASONS 1.4 (b and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 008050

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER KISL KPAL IZ IS JO
SUBJECT: CODEL SHAYS MEETS WITH KING ABDULLAH'S CHIEF OF
STAFF


Classified By: CDA DAVID HALE FOR REASONS 1.4 (b and d)


1. (SBU) Summary. CODEL Shays met on October 8 with Marouf
Bakheet, Chief of Staff to King Abdullah (and Deputy Director
for National Security),to discuss progress in Iraq and other
regional issues. Bakheet emphasized the need for greater USG
interaction with Iraqi Sunnis to bring them into the
political process, and questioned the wisdom of disbanding
the Iraqi army (a decision made under the CPA) as well as the
breadth of the early, CPA-initiated de-Ba'thification
process. Bakheet characterized the 2002 Arab initiative on
the Middle east Peace Process as a missed opportunity. End
Summary.


2. (U) Congressman Christopher Shays (R-CT),transiting Amman
en-route to Iraq, was joined in the meeting by Congressmen
Michael McNulty (D-NY),Michael Capuano (D-MA),Ron Kind
(D-WI),and delegate Eni Faleomavaega (D-American Samoa),as
well as DCM.

--------------
IRAQ
--------------


3. (C) In response to Rep. Shays' request for an assessment
of USG performance in Iraq, Bakheet told the CODEL that the
U.S. decisions in 2003 to disband the Iraqi army and broadly
dismiss Ba'thist Party members from government jobs were
major mistakes. Most Ba'th Party members were such out of
professional obligation, according to Bakheet, and were not
ideologically aligned to the party. By engaging in
widespread de-Ba'thification, the U.S. disenfranchised these
marginal Ba'th Party members, who otherwise might have become
valuable partners in the rebuilding of Iraq. The disbanding
of the army was even more damaging given it led to thousands
of young men with military training being let loose with no
prospect for gainful employment.


4. (C) Bakheet reaffirmed Jordan's commitment to working with
the USG on bringing stability to Iraq through careful
analysis of its "political map", and to coordinating closely
through both diplomatic and intelligence channels. He said
that Jordan is engaging all three major communities in Iraq
(i.e., Kurds, Sh'ia, and Sunni Arabs),trying to help put all
major players on the same path toward a viable future.
Jordan is working with the Iraqi Kurds, assisting Kurdish
region president Mustafa Barzani on the "Arab world" language
in the draft Iraqi constitution. Jordan is also working with
Iraqi Shiites, and is attempting to coax Muqtada al-Sadr off
of the extremist path and into the political process, he said.


5. (C) Responding to several CODEL members' questions about
when the U.S. should leave Iraq, Bakheet cautioned against
withdrawing too early. A premature, substantial U.S.
withdrawal would harm U.S. interests in the region, anger
U.S. friends, damage U.S. prestige, and undercut regional
democratization.


6. (C) The U.S. needs to work more on Sunni inclusion,
according to Bakheet. Active Sunni Arab participation in the
political process is needed to calm the insurgency. The U.S.
needs to offset Iranian influence and tamp down the
expectations of the Kurds and Shia. Both Jordan and the U.S.
need to do more to engage and empower the Sunnis.


7. (C) Bakheet predicted that the constitution will pass the
October 15 referendum, but emphasized that meaningful
elections are ultimately more important than the
constitution. In his estimation, a new Iraqi parliament and
government that are representative of the whole of Iraqi
society - though not necessarily a pure democracy - are the
means by which internal peace will be attained and will pave
the "way out" for the U.S. military presence.

--------------
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
--------------


8. (C) Bakheet noted the centrality of the Palestinian
question to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the continuing
ability of terrorists to attract new recruits throughout the
region. He said that the Arab peace initiative that came out
of the 2002 Beirut Arab League summit was a potential way
forward that was not embraced or properly promoted, and that
the Arab initiative would likely have been better than the
Quartet-led roadmap - even from the Israeli point of view -
given its inclusion of broad security guarantees from all
Arab states. Bakheet twice stated that whatever happens in
the process on the right of return of displaced Palestinians,
the Jewish character of Israel needs to be preserved.


9. (U) CODEL Shays did not have the opportunity to clear this
message.
HALE