AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD PROMOTES ELECTION FOCUS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 007602

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL JO IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD PROMOTES ELECTION FOCUS IN
MEETING WITH KEY IRAQI SUNNI TRIBAL LEADERS

Classified By: DANIEL RUBINSTEIN, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, REASONS: 1.4 (B &D
)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad outlined recent
compromises in the Constitution drafting process and promoted
the need to focus on the December elections during a
three-hour meeting in Amman with Iraqi Sunni Arab tribal
leaders. The meeting included several major Sunni Arab
tribal figures, including the brother-in-law of the King of
Saudi Arabia and the paramount Sheikh of one of Iraq's
largest tribes. Baghdad political figures Iyad Allawi, Adnan
al-Janabi, and Izzat Shabinder also attended the meeting.
The meeting saw active give and take on issues ranging from
federalism and the status of Kirkuk, to the need to maximize
Sunni Arab political participation and form a broad-based new
government after the December elections. Alleged continued
growth in Iranian influence and presence inside Iraq, and
alleged pro-Iranian activities of the current government,
were also major issues. Ambassador Khalilzad put the latter
issue in the context of the need to maximize Sunni political
participation. Opposition to the insurgency and terror and
support of building a strong Iraq will help defeat Iran's
strategy of keeping Iraq weak and dependent. Initial
reaction to the meeting was very positive, and many of the
Iraqi Sunni attendees asked for future follow-up. In
addition to directly promoting U.S. goals and expanding
contact links, the meeting appeared to advance the
coalition-building efforts of Iyad Allawi. End Summary.


2. (C) U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad met for
three hours with a large group of influential Iraqi tribal
and political leaders on September 21 at the U.S.
Ambassador's residence in Amman. While the group included
former Iraq Prime Minister Iyad Allawi (a secular Sh,ia),
eighteen of the twenty-one Iraqis present were Arab Sunnis,
including leading Sunni tribal figures from Anbar, Mosul,
Kirkuk, Tikrit, and the South (see paragraph 18 below for an
annotated list of Iraqi attendees).


3. (C) In his opening statement, Ambassador Khalilzad
described his mission in Iraq as "working with Iraqis to help
Iraq succeed" in becoming a democratic, stable, united, and
prosperous country. However, Khalilzad stressed, these goals
cannot be achieved unless the various communities in Iraq
come to an understanding and agree on certain principles with
regard to the future. This in turn requires realism, good
will, and willingness to compromise.

Working on the Constitution
--------------


4. (C) Khalilzad outlined his intensive efforts since
arriving in Iraq in late July to work with the Iraqi
Constitution drafters and political leadership, including
Sunni Arabs, to help craft a document that promotes
achievement of the above goals and be acceptable to the large
majority if not all Iraqis. He noted that "a Constitution is
not a political party platform," but a living document
reflecting the broadest possible consensus on how a people
wish to be governed. Such a document cannot be achieved
without compromise; no one group can expect to get everything
it wants. He observed that the recent Constitutional
negotiations were difficult, and compounded by the tendency
of most of the current political leadership (excepting ex-PM
Allawi and his party) to overlook the cross-cutting interests
and aspirations of Iraqis as a whole in favor of narrow
ideological or ethnic interests. Nonetheless, Khalilzad
noted, several important compromises in the areas of
Federalism, the role of Islam, ownership of energy and water
resources, and Iraq's place in the Arab world, were achieved
during the final weeks of drafting. He outlined each of
these compromises in some detail, and noted that discussions
on additional "tweaking" of the Constitution are continuing.


Defeating Iran's Strategy
--------------


5. (C) In addition to noting that the Constitution is
subject to amendment, Khalilzad stressed that decisions on
implementation and parameters of many key governance issues,
including the precise form and nature of Federalism in Iraq,
have been consciously left for decision by the next National
Assembly and government, to be formed after the December 2005
elections. He emphasized that this, plus the probable
multi-year longevity of the next government, makes widespread
participation in these elections by Sunni Arabs who care
about the future of Iraq absolutely essential. Khalilzad
described the Sunni Arab boycott of the January 2005
elections as a "huge mistake" that crippled Sunni Arab
influence and promoted Iran's strategic and tactical
objectives of achieving a weak and dependent Iraq. He
forcefully encouraged those present to promote the largest
possible participation and voter turnout by their communities
in the December election.

6. (C) Allawi followed up on several of Khalilzad,s points,
arguing that, despite its shortcomings on federalism,
religion, and other issues, the Constitution is largely
acceptable and should be regarded as a way station to the
December elections, which, more than the Constitution itself,
will determine Iraq's future. Formation of a
forward-looking, nationalistic and democratic coalition after
this election will defeat the agenda of Iran and Syria and
finally put Iraq on the right track for the future. It will
also permit revision through amendment or interpretation of
some of the current problematic portions in the Constitution.


Dealing with Federalism
--------------


7. (C) Most attendees clearly took on (albeit sullenly in
some cases) Khalilzad's and Allawi's key points on the need
to look past the Constitution draft and focus on the December
election. Several attendees agreed that the January 2005
Sunni election boycott was a mistake. Khalilzad and
Allawi,s stress on the importance of the December election
and the call for massive Sunni Arab participation was not
challenged, nor did anyone argue that the Constitution was
completely unacceptable. The only Constitutional issue that
was actively pursued by attendees was federalism. Abdullah
Khorbit, Rafaa Sahab al-Kubaisi, Majid al-Suliman, (all from
Anbar) and Gazi al-Hanesh (paramount sheik of the al-Taie),
among others, raised several concerns over federalism, and
especially its implications for a strong and cohesive Iraq,
and as a possible Trojan horse for rising Iranian ambitions.



8. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad responded that "like it or not,"
the reality is that federalism cannot be avoided in any Iraq
that includes Kurdistan. Kurdistan has been effectively
separated from Iraq for nearly 15 years, and cannot be
peacefully re-integrated with the rest of Iraq outside of a
federal structure. The implications of federalism for the
rest of Iraq will be decided by the next Iraqi government;
options run the gamut from no federal structure outside of
Kurdistan to a wide variety of other options. Asked if the
US really favors a unified Iraq, Khalilzad reiterated that
the U.S. has no position on federalism per se (other than
recognizing the realistic need for it in order to
re-integrate the Kurds),but is committed to formation of a
united, strong, democratic, and prosperous Iraq that cannot
be divided or turned into a dependent by neighboring
countries, as Lebanon formerly was by Syria.


9. (C) Sheikh Wasfi al-Asi al-Obeidi made a long and
sometimes emotional comment on alleged Kurdish leadership
efforts to unfairly deprive Arabs and Turkomen of political
power in Kirkuk, including allegations that large numbers of
Iranian Kurds are entering Iraqi Kurdistan and being lodged,
presumably as potential new voters, in Kirkuk. He also
recounted several allegations about Kurdish leadership abuses
during the January 2005 election, including alleged
widespread transportation of Kurdish voters in support of
multiple voting inside Kurdistan and the Kirkuk region. He
said that Arab and Turkomen voters do not want be victims of
fraudulent elections, and are sure that this "pattern" will
continue unless there is comprehensive U.S. and/or UN
supervision of the election voting and the final count. He
explicitly rejected reliance on Kurdish or Sh,ia-dominated
Iraqi security forces in the Kirkuk area as guarantors of
voting security.


10. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad recognized al-Obeidi,s
concerns and assured him the USG firmly supports the
residency rights of Kirkuk,s Arab citizens; however,
Khalilzad warned, all of Kirkuk,s residents need to be wary
of outside manipulation. Khalilzad seconded the need for
voters to have confidence in the "fairness" and legality of
the voting process. He suggested working with the Election
Commission to ensure that fairness and voting rights are
protected.

Ex-Ba,athi Reintegration
--------------


11. (C) Several speakers, including Rafaa Sahab al-Kubaisi,
Abdul Jabar al-Kubaisi, and Adnan al-Janabi, criticized
continued efforts to deprive ex-Baathis of a political role
and to prevent the re-emergence of a "democratic" Ba,athist
party that could compete in future elections. The
al-Kubaisi,s were the most strident in this regard, Rafaa
noting that he "has been authorized" by the Ba,athist party
(in exile?) to speak for it in this regard. Ambassador
Khalilzad asked how many other attendees agreed that a
(non-Saddamist) Ba,athist party should be allowed to
re-emerge, but few responded.

12. (C) While agreeing that the large majority of Ba,athist
party members were not criminals and should be allowed to
fully participate in Iraqi society, Khalilzad stated
categorically that the USG will not cooperate with those who
nostalgically desire to recreate an old-style Ba,athist
regime. "The old regime is dead and it is never coming
back," he stated. That being said, Khalilzad outlined an
idea that he said would be crystallized over coming months to
initiate a comprehensive accountability and reconciliation
process that will re-integrate most ex-Ba,athis with
parallel, active prosecution of Ba,athist criminals. Allawi
added that there were three kinds of Ba,athists: criminals
("very few"); honest true believers; and opportunists. The
last two categories (though not the Ba,athist party per se)
should be fully reintegrated into the Iraqi political system,
he opined.

Sunni Arabs: "Iran is Taking Over"
--------------


13. (C) The large majority of speakers made reference to
alleged massive Iranian infiltration into Iraq, and/or
control over much of the current Iraqi government. "Baghdad
is about to fall again," warned Sheikh Sa,ad Abdullah Kharo
al-Nasiri from Tikrit. Sheikh Mutashar al-Saadoun from
Nasiriyyah and Basra shook with anger as he alleged rampant
Iranian migration, intimidation, and takeovers in the south.
Some speakers wondered if this indicates a secret U.S. desire
to strengthen Iran.


14. (C) After several such comments, Khalilzad set the
record straight by energetically stating that the U.S.
regards Iran as a dictatorship led by liars and extremists,
that the U.S. resolutely opposes Iranian and Syrian
infiltration and destabilization activities, and that the
U.S. will never agree to allowing Iraq to become an Iranian
satellite. While agreeing with the Sunni Arab questioners
that the Iranians are a "big problem," Khalilzad reminded
them that their community must also shares partial
responsibility for the growth in Iranian influence. For
example, their promotion of the Sunni Arab election boycott
brought Iranian allies to power (only 150, 000 additional
votes for Sunni parties of Allawi,s coalition would have
blocked them),and the cooperation of some in their community
with Iran,s surrogate Syria insurgents advanced Iranian
goals. While agreeing that the Iranian problem requires
attention, Khalilzad reiterated that the most powerful way to
repel the Iranian threat is through the ballot box - i.e., by
electing a responsible, nationalistic government that will
create stability and help Iraq develop its economy. This in
turn will eventually win over most of those currently
cooperating at some level with Iran, he predicted.

Praising Sheik Sabah of al-Qaim
--------------


15. (C) Prior to the conclusion of the meeting, Talal
al-Gaaod from Anbar rose to extend special recognition to
Sheikh Sabah from al-Qaim, who was recently forced out of
al-Qaim after several days of fighting Zarqawi forces, due to
lack of ammunition. "Sheikh Sabah, alone among us (tribals),
has actually done something" al-Gaaod noted to the assembled
sheikhs. Sheikh Tariq al-Abdallah (seconded by Allawi)
proposed that a group of Sunnis go on a speaking tour to the
USA and meet with USG officials to show that "we are not
against the goals of the United States." The Iraqi attendees
thanked Khalilzad for meeting with them and many asked that
the USG contact be strengthened. Ambassador Khalilzad agreed
that he meeting had been very helpful and promised to find
ways to continue exchanging views with Iraq's tribal
leadership, whether in Iraq or Amman.

Comment
--------------


16. (C) This meeting promoted Sunni outreach and overall
U.S. goals in Iraq. It succeeded in moving the focus away
from the resentment over the imperfect constitution to the
need to work together to promote a large voter turnout in
December. The discussion became increasingly animated, and
despite emotional moments, the atmosphere was positive
throughout. The Iraqis greatly appreciated the meeting and
initial feedback from attendees has been positive. Most but
not all of the tribal leaders were first rank, and the guests
were diverse in background. Most of the attendees were not
from Baghdad and have had limited or no contact with senior
USG officials over the last two years. As noted by
Ambassador Khalilzad, to following-up this conclave with
further sessions is needed to gain greater traction and
foothold in the Sunni Arab community.


17. (C) Another apparent "winner" from the meeting was
ex-Prime Minister Allawi and his coalition-building policy.
Allawi conducted himself with dignity and calm throughout,
and was surrounded by Sunni tribals for many minutes after
conclusion of the meeting.
End Comment.


18. Iraqi Attendees:


1. Ex-PM Iyad Allawi


2. Dari al-Fassal al-Jarba. Key Shammar leader from
Mosul, now living primarily in Amman. Brother-in-law of King
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia.


3. Majid al-Suliman from Ramadhi. Paramount Sheik of the
Dulaime, his influence
has declined. Working closely with Allawi.


4. Sabah Sattam al-Shargi from al-Qaim. Fought bitterly
over the summer against Zarqawi and his allies. Pushed out
of al-Qaim two weeks ago when his tribe ran out of
arms/ammunition. Hopes to form a tribal unit to be trained
by US forces.


5. Gazi al-Hanesh. Paramount Sheik of the Al-Taie. From
Mosul area.


6. Mutashar al-Saadoun. Sunni tribal leader from South
(Basra/Nasirriyah).


7. Talal al-Gaaod, originally from Heet.


8. Abdullah Khorbit from Ramadhi. The young, &political
face8 of the Khorbits.


9. Tarik al-Abdullah. Wealthy businessman and tribal
leader from near Fallujah. He mainly shuttles between Amman
and the Gulf


10. Abdul Jabbar al-Kubaisi. A leading figure in this
West Anbar clan.


11. Akram Zankana. Wealthy Kurdish tribal chief and
businessman based in Amman. Close to Allawi.


12. Sa,ad Abdullah Kharo al-Nasiri. Head of clan in
Tikrit. Opposed to Saddam, well connected in Salah )al-din
Governorate.


13. Khalid Effan al-Eysawi


14. Daham Hamad al-Alwani


15. Rafaa Sahab al-Kubaisi. Ex member of Ba,athist party
from Anbar, willing to cooperate as a "Neo-Baathist" in the
political process. Supposedly authorized to speak to the USG
for this group. Reportedly very influential in West Anbar.


16. Sa,ad al-Obaidi. Influential in Kirkuk, Mosul, and
Salah al-Din.


17. Saa,d al-Jabouri al-Mulla. From Doura area (SE of
Baghdad). Shuttles between Iraq and Jordan.


18. Wasfi al-Asi al-Obeidi. Key Sunni Arab tribal figure
in Kirkuk.


19. Izzat Shabinder. Iraqi nationalist Sh,ia close to
Allawi. Quasi-Islamist.


20. Adnan al-Janabi. National Assembly member and chief
of the al-Janabi,s.


21. Ahmed Abdul-Gaffur al-Samarrai. Head of the Sunni
Waqf.


HALE