ANOTHER CABINET SHAKEUP EXPECTED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000583

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2010
TAGS: PGOV ECON JO
SUBJECT: ANOTHER CABINET SHAKEUP EXPECTED

REF: A. AMMAN 571

B. AMMAN 187

C. 04 AMMAN 6160

Classified By: Charge David Hale, Reasons 1.4 (B) & (D)


1. (C) Summary. The three-month old cabinet's
non-performance has sparked speculation about another shakeup
soon, possibly to include a change of prime ministers. While
PM Fayez's limitations are self-evident, a likely successor
is not. Rumors in elite west Amman focus on intelligence
chief Khayr or Royal Court Minister Rifai for the role.
While both bring as many liabilities as advantages, this
trend in speculation reflects the fact that a) those are the
two predominant voices around the King and b) their
harder-line view toward the political opposition (reftel A)
prevails. The irony is that while the King wants a cabinet
that can manage parliament, the poor talent pool in the house
keeps him from making the otherwise obvious choice of an MP
to lead the next government. The long-term solution requires
more fundamental reform of parliament and the political
process. But the immediate reaction will be to go slowly.
End summary.


2. (C) Only three months old, the reshuffled Fayez cabinet
is already facing widespread handicapping of its longevity,
with most bets we hear placed on a March/April termination.
The speculation in part arises from salon boredom, in part
from recognition that cabinet shuffles and changes are a
frequent device of Jordanian kings, but most significantly
from the plain evidence that the government is a dud. It was
widely hoped that the October reshuffle would strengthen the
hand of the cabinet's reformers. In fact the appointment of
a number of small-bore East Bank figures, aimed at appealing
to various factions close to the Prime Minister, has if
anything sharpened the division in the cabinet between
traditionalists and reformists . One reforming minister told
us that last week only three cabinet colleagues joined him in
voting support for a package of draft laws needed to
implement the good governance initiative spearheaded by
Deputy Prime Minister Muasher.


3. (C) If the reformers fare so poorly in cabinet ) and
with an initiative clearly blessed by the King ) how can the
government succeed in getting its legislation through
parliament, critics ask? In fact, the cabinet may have been
reflecting an assessment that the legislation is too
ambitious for a parliament that wants to be loyal to the
King, but not at the price of reforming away the tools of
patronage, tribal favoritism, protection from economic
competition, and limited women's rights ) all the
traditional furnishings that comprise the known world to a
remarkably conservative group of MPs.


4. (C) The looming test is the government's budget,
submitted to parliament two weeks ago (reftel B). Some
observers believe parliament will reject the bill not because
of any substantive objections, but as an assertion of
parliamentary power. Multiple non-binding recommendations to
last year's budget bill went unheeded by the government,
angering many MPs. A provisional law designed to strengthen
women's rights met this fate last year as several MPs cast
their opposing votes solely to spite the government, not
necessarily because they opposed the legislation (reftel C).
Parliamentary dynamics are driven by four competing blocs,
the Islamic Action Front (with a clear philosophy and policy
line) and three secular groups which are vehicles for the
personal ambitions of their leaders but are otherwise
indistinguishable to the outside observer. On almost any
given issue, a marriage of convenience emerges between the
IAF and one or more of the secular blocs, in opposition to
the government. Apart from the budget and the new reform
bills, there are more than 150 temporary laws still awaiting
consideration, many of which laid the foundation for Jordan's
WTO and FTA agreements. Their passage requires mobilization
of the cabinet, a task which seems beyond Fayez, ministers.
One difficulty the government faces is the legacy of its own
behavior. Last year's budget passed only after significant,
direct cash payments were made to members. With this
vote-buying precedent set, the cabinet now faces the
ever-inflating demands of MPs for more. Earlier this month,
the PM announced an undistinguished list of dozens of
sub-cabinet appointments, which seemed to mark a return to
East Bank cronyism as a substitute for good governance ) a
step which discouraged the reformers but is unlikely to
impress parliament.


5. (C) Further fueling speculation is the sense that the
King is losing patience with Fayez. Although averse to
challenging personally his close associates (among whom Fayez
once numbered),and philosophically inclined toward longer
government tenures to improve performance, Abdullah does show
in private signs of being fed up. In November, he told
Charge that if ministers did not show performance within
three months, they'd be out. The three month mark has been
reached, and the PM himself has little to show. The
difficulty, of course, is that a decision to sack a prime
minister must also entail a decision on a successor. The
options are not enticing. Each factional leader in
parliament may think his behavior shows that as prime
minister he could deliver parliament, but in fact their
obstructionism and self-promotion makes them improbable
candidates. Jordan's elder statesmen, who gave King Hussein
a set of plausible choices depending on domestic trends, have
largely been cashiered. Furthermore, they are out of step
with the King's swift, results-oriented style and suffer
other generational liabilities. Two leading cabinet
reformers, the (Christian) Deputy Prime Minister Muasher and
the (Palestinian) Planning Minister Awadallah suffer
sectarian burdens, and neither would be able to improve on
the government's performance in pushing through legislation.


6. (C) This hypothetical process of elimination leaves the
King with a choice between his two closest advisors at the
moment, GID chief Saad Khayr and Royal Court Minister Samir
al-Rifai. Khayr brings a proven reputation for telling
people what to do, and getting them to do it. However,
regardless of Khayr's actual behavior, the selection of the
head of the security services would signal at best a lack of
conviction in political liberalization. While the title of
Prime Minister would appeal to Khayr's vanity, in many ways
it would not be a real promotion (and, for the conspiracy
minded, therefore all the more enticing for the King, who has
brought the ambitious Khayr down a peg or two in recent
months). He should be able to manage parliament more
successfully than Fayez, but in a way which would move the
country away from the reform vista. Rifai's inheritance (he
is the third generation of a family that has built its
fortunes ) political and otherwise -- on loyal service to
the Hashemites) and smooth performance make him an almost
inevitable prime minister, like father and grandfather. He
is the single Jordanian most reflective of the King's
thinking, and as royal court minister he has in fact taken
over management of the cabinet when ministers have strayed
from the King's desires or common sense. But he may be the
first to realize that successfully maneuvering the anteroom
politics of the palace is not sufficient seasoning for the
prime ministry ) and there is the cautionary example of
Fayez himself, who made a similar move from Court Minister to
PM. More executive, ministerial experience would be the
logical next step for Rifai.


7. (C) As happened last fall, the King may seek sweeping
changes out of frustration, but his limited options may bring
him around to extending Fayez, political life. This will
reinforce the tendency of the palace and GID to do the
cabinet's job for it, reinforcing the paradox of Jordan's
palace-led reform. Jordan has a shallow pool of political
talent. The long-term solution to this problem, as it is to
a number of others here, is to open up the political system
and permit real parliamentary politics. Unfortunately, in
the near term the regime seems more likey to use the dearth
of talent as a reason to go slowly.
HALE